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In Search of a Theory of Public Memory:
The State, the Individual, and Marcel Proust
BRIAN F. HAVEL*
This Article posits the existence and pervasiveness of an official public (or State)
memory that is primarily constructed using public law devices and statements of
official policy. While official public memory serves the purposes of social control and
stability, it also seeks to mask contestation and is, accordingly, neither complete nor
authentic. Using philosophical, scientific, and literary sources, this Article
demonstrates how the affective (emotional) memory that is unique to individuals
creates a permanent potential for contestation and authenticity and therefore sets a
natural conceptual limit to the power of officially managed memory to contrive the
past. To help establish this Article's initial claim, Part I provides as an illustration of
the phenomenon of official public memory the legal and policy means by which the
Austrian government sustains an official public memory ofAustria as a victim State of
Nazi aggression. Part H builds upon the Austrian illustration as well as examples from
other States to expose the characteristic patterns-selectivity, constructivism,
mythmaking (mythopoesis), incorporation, and presentism-by which government
elites create and maintain a contrived ideological account of the past. It shows how
States exploit law and the legal process in this task. In response to Parts l and I, the
remainder of this Article (Parts IlI-V) is a search for a concept of public memory that
provides a more contested (and authentic) account of the past, and thus a challenge to
the law-sustained contrivance of official public memory. Others have sought to open
up contestation by proposing actions that occur entirely within the construct of law
and legal institutions. This Article broadens the inquiry by seeking to support
contestation (and authenticity) using the work of other disciplines. Part III begins this
quest for an alternative discourse by exploring the discipline of history, which is
characterized by archivistic efforts to discover the "true" past. History's unending
revisionism, however, makes it unlikely to serve the purposes of social control and
stability that give official memory its power. And history's relativist biases makes it no
more likely than official memory to create a broadly accurate portrait of the past. Part
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IV considers whether social philosophy offers a more accessible paradigm of public
memory, one that is grounded in the lived experience of individuals. In particular,
Part IV draws on the concept of non-official "collective memory" expounded by
French social philosopher Maurice Halbwachs as an alternative account of public
memory. But this, too, is deficient as an authentic counterpoint to official public
memory, because Halbwachs fails to exclude the effects of that very contrivance from
his theory. Nor, importantly, does he account in his social theory of memory for a
unique feature of individual lived experience, the scientifically verified condition of
emotional or affective memory. Part V seeks to use literature, and in particular the
theory of transcendent memory offered by Marcel Proust in In Search of Lost Time, to
meet the ontological challenge of demonstrating how affective memory is the feature
of individual lived experience that is most likely to sustain a reconceptualized public
memory. By representing affective memory as an autonomous condition, this Article
sets a cognitive, definitional, and even scientific limit to the power of official memory.
Rather than finding a discourse to displace official public memory, therefore, this
Article reaches the reassuring conclusion that affective memory allows an
understanding of official public memory as intrinsically confronting a potential for
contestation, and therefore for authenticity.
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INTRODUCTION: POSmING AN OFFICIAL PUBLIC MEMORY
On the contrary, it's only fact. Truth is quite another thing and is the work of the
imagination.'
And if the facts say otherwise, then the facts must be altered. Thus history is
continuously rewritten.... The mutability of the past is the central tenet.... Past
events... have no objective existence, but survive only in written records and in
human memories. The past is whatever the records and the memories agree upon.
And since the Party is in full control of all records.., it follows that the past is
whatever the Party chooses to make it.... [W]hen [the past] has been recreated in
whatever shape is needed at the moment, then this new version is the past, and no
different past can ever have existed. 2
A new future requires a new past.
3
This Article posits the existence and pervasiveness of an official public memory.4 It
explains that this kind of memory is primarily constructed using public law devices and
statements of official policy. Government elites use this portfolio of techniques to
shape for each demos a sanctioned and often sanctified collective national interpretive
idiom (and remembrance of things past5 ). Thus, for example, this Article examines how
an apparently sympathetic gesture of memory work, the modern device of establishing
truth commissions, is exploited as part of the incorporative, assimilationist agenda that
characterizes elite memory production.
This Article acknowledges that official public memory serves purposes of social
control and stability. But official memory also seeks, through maintenance of a
contrived ideological account of the past, to mask contestations of that account.
Accordingly, official public memory is neither complete nor authentic, and that is the
1. TOM STOPPARD, THE INVENTION OF LOVE 93 (Grove Press 1997) (line attributed to
Oscar Wilde).
2. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 175-76 (Signet Classics, 1950).
3. ERIC FONER, WHO OWNS HISTORY?: RETHINKING THE PAST IN A CHANGING WoRLD 77
(2002).
4. "Official public memory" should not be considered as synonymous or coterminous
with the more plastic notion of a "collective memory." As this Article explains, official memory
is a conscious attempt by ruling elites to steer a public recollection of the past. That effort may
succeed in also establishing a "collective memory" among the citizenry at whom these attempts
are directed, but whether or not it does so, or to what extent the effort is compromised by
competing sources of information, is not the dialectical concern of the present Article. See infra
notes 6 & 7 (establishing the conceptual boundaries of this Article). It can certainly be
recognized, however, that the sheer endurance of official public memory is likely to have an
important influence on the shaping of the collective memory of the citizens of a State. See infra
note 347 (on the imprecision of the notion of "collective memory" in contemporary social
thought); see also infra text accompanying note 331 (examining a specific concept of a
"collective" memory developed by Maurice Halbwachs).
5. Cf MARCEL PROUST, A LA RECHERCHE Du TEMPS PERDU (formerly translated as
"Remembrance of Things Past") (Gallimard 1999). (For the Shakespearean provenance of the
English title, see infra note 390.) Proust's great novel of time and memory provides the
conceptual structure for a theory of "transcendent memory" discussed in Part V of this Article.
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IN SEARCH OF A THEORY OF PUBLIC MEMORY
issue with which I am most preoccupied in this analysis. Using philosophical,
scientific, and literary sources, this Article seeks to demonstrate how officially
produced memory is conceptually unable to mask the most authentic characteristic of
individual memory, the emotional and affective resonance that individuals retain of
past events. 6 As such, while official public memory, particularly in the form practiced
in modem liberal democracies, has techniques by which it seeks to block (and, in this
sense, to incorporate or assimilate) contested interpretations of the past, the existence
of individual affective or emotional memory creates a permanent potential of
contestation of the officially managed narrative.
7
6. The effect of the inability of official public memory to dictate or define individual
emotional memory might be interpreted in a number of ways. In the first place, one might regard
official public memory as dangerous insofar as it attempts to do something that might be
considered inappropriate, namely, to constrain individuals in developing their own sense of
identity and to deny populations access to resonances of memory that allow conflicts and
nuances of the State's past to be absorbed more authentically. Alternatively, one might regard
the autonomy of individual emotional memory as protected by the intrinsic impotence of official
public memory and thus perceive the creation of an official memory by States as futile-and,
therefore, not harmful. These alternative normative propositions raise a series of separate
questions that this Article does not address, but which I take up in a separate work, Brian F.
Havel, The Power and Impotence of Official Public Memory (on file with author). This Article
instead takes on the fundamental tasks of identifying the concept and reach of official public
memory and analyzing the important conceptual distance that separates official memory from
individual emotional memory.
7. I acknowledge that the memory work of summoning a vanished past takes many
forms-the private endeavor of historians, writers, and poets, for example. See, e.g.,
CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, UNACKNOWLEDGED LEGISLATION: WRITERS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE
(2000) (essays illustrating how works of literature have acted as precursors to social and
political reform); AvisHAI MARGALIT, THE ETHICS OF MEMORY 11 (2002) (noting the role of
"[m]ythmakers, epic poets, and chroniclers of the royal court" who may provide legitimacy for
regimes whose entitlement to govern is anchored in past events). Thus, although the streams of
influence affecting the public memory of late-model bourgeois societies include also the media,
the educational establishment, political parties and pressure groups, the military, organized
religious organizations, and large business corporations, this Article is centered on government
activity. While the contributory roles of what social critics Michael Bommes and Patrick Wright
call this "accumulation of public forms," Michael Bomrnes & Patrick Wright, 'Charms of
Residence:' The Public and the Past, in MAKING HISTORIES: STUDIES IN HISTORY-WRITING AND
POLITICS 253, 260 (Richard Johnson et al. eds., 1982), are impossible functionally to
disaggregate, the central government, and the law, enjoy "a centrality of voice within societies
which other institutions lack." Jennifer Balint, Law's Constitutive Possibilities: Reconstruction
and Reconciliation in the Wake of Genocide and State Crime, in LETHE's LAW: JUSTICE, LAW
AND ErIncs IN RECONCILIATION 129, 133 (Emilios Christdoulidis & Scott Veitch eds., 2001).
Some have argued that governments of democratic liberal democracies have less need to attach
to the kind of memory reconstruction and what one history professor describes as "organized
oblivion," Claudia Koontz, Between Memory and Oblivion: Concentration Camps in German
Memory, in COMMEMORATIONS: THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL IDENTI[Y 258 (John R. Gillis ed.,
1994), practiced by authoritarian regimes. Each election, in this view, acts as a switching
mechanism that constantly jolts the national attention toward the future. See MARGALIT, supra,
at 11-12 (arguing that liberal democracies are "exempt from an orientation to the past and rest
their power on their vision of the future"). This is unlikely to be true, even as a generalization.
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In making this radical argument, this Article practices a form of disciplinary
consilience, s marrying the insights and intuitions of two distinguished French
contemporaries; Maurice Halbwachs, a social philosopher whose conception of a
"collective" memory shared by sub-State groups remains fundamental to understanding
the social construction of memory,9 and Marcel Proust, literature's iconic novelist of
memory and author of the prototypical narrative of time and memory, In Search of Lost
Time.'0 Halbwachs provides the framework for an autonomous model of public
memory that operates below the centralized structures of official memory, but his
model (like official memory) fails to appreciate the powerful effects of individual
affective memory. Proust, on the other hand, robustly illustrates how the emotional
memory of individuals has transcendent power, since it overcomes the distance that
normally separates recall of past events from the lived experience of those events. For
Proust, affective memory reflects the most authentic existential experience of all
memory. Accordingly, rather than finding a discourse that displaces official public
memory, this Article reaches the reassuring and humanistic conclusion that the
authenticity of affective memory places a natural limit on government control of the
individual." 1
All governments are forced to operate in a diachronic continuum that relies on elements of
shared memory (or of shared amnesia). Fidelity to a national constitutional tradition, to take a
conspicuous example, is a manufactured process of memory that enlists a document of the
"past" in the service of legitimizing elite actions in the present and for the future. Paul Ricoeur,
France's leading contemporary critical philosopher, contends that the institutional grip on
memory, itself a product of an ideology of legitimacy, "is not a specialty of totalitarian regimes
alone; it is the [natural accompaniment] of all those enamored of glory." PAUL RCOEUR,
MEMORY, HISTORY, FORGETTING 85-86 (Kathleen Blarney & David Pellauer trans., Univ. of
Chicago Press 2004).
8. Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis expresses respect for how the disciplines of the
natural sciences succeed by "remaining open-the word is consilience-to what insights from
one field can tell you about another." JOHN LEwIs GADDIS, THE LANDSCAPE OF HISTORY: How
HISTORIANS MAP THE PAST 61 (2002) (emphasis in original).
9. See MAURICE HALBWACHS, ON COLLECTIvE MEMORY 22 (Lewis A. Coser trans. &
ed., 1992) [hereinafter HALBWACHS, ON COLLECTIVE MEMORY]; MAURICE HALBWACHS, THE
COLLECTIVE MEMORY (Francis J. Ditter & Vida Yazdi Ditter trans., 1980) [hereinafter
HALBWACHS, THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY]. Maurice Halbwachs first identified a separate
consciousness of collective memory that could be contrasted with the more formal discipline of
history and the personal autobiographical memory. See id. at 52.
10. MARCEL PROUST, IN SEARCH OF LOST TIME (Christopher Prendergast ed., Ian
Patterson et al. trans., Penguin Books 2002). This Article adopts the new English translation of
In Search of Lost Time (which it sometimes refers to as "the Search") published by Penguin
Books in 2002. The "Penguin Proust," the work of six different translators under the
stewardship of a general editor, is the first completely new translation since the 1920s. See infra
note 393 (noting that new translation is based on the most authoritative original version of
Proust's novel). Proust and James Joyce have been said to represent the "time cult" of literary
exploration. Wyndham Lewis, Time and Western Man (extract), in MARCEL PROUST: REvIEwS
AND ESTIMATES IN ENGLISH 107, 107 (Gladys Dudley Lindner ed., Stanford University Press
1942) [hereinafter PROUST: REvIEws IN ENGLISH] (suggesting that the "time-cult" is in full
operation in Proust and Joyce).
11. Margalit holds that memory (like will and belief) applies primarily to individuals, so
that it is typical that an interpretive primacy is accorded to the individual sense of this concept
as opposed to its use in collectives. See MARGALIT, supra note 7, at 48. For this Article,
[Vol. 80:605
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This Article proceeds in five parts. Parts I and II establish the initial claim about the
existence of an official public memory. Part I provides an empirical illustration of the
phenomenon of official memory by tracking the experience of the modem Republic of
Austria in coming to terms with the legacy of Nazi occupation and collaboration. In
particular, this Part focuses on how the Austrian government continues to use public
law-including a new legal category called a "State Treaty" negotiated with the Allied
Powers after World War I-to establish an official public memory of Austria as a
victim State of Nazi aggression.
The fluidity of memory work, so much in thrall to time and place and circumstance,
makes generalization (though ultimately necessary) both difficult and inadequate.
Empirical study, therefore, is essential to reveal some of the patterns of an official
public memory. While many empirical contexts exist, the example of Austria allows an
instructive exploration of how an official memory of Nazism, in a modern liberal
democratic State, came under blistering challenge in the late 1990s when Austria and
Austrian companies were "caught in the cross-hairs" of American class-action lawyers
seeking restitution for the primarily Jewish victims of Nazi-era forced and slave labor
and property confiscations. 2 This sudden return of the suppressed fact of its "brown"
past forced the Austrian Republic to a historic moment of reckoning. Austria's elites
consciously used one of official memory's most potent resources-the instruments of
public law and policy-to maintain the cohesion and stability provided by the mytho-
legal construct of a victim State that valiantly overthrew Nazi oppression and
reclaimed its place in the community of civilized nations. Austria, as it joined Germany
and Switzerland in propitiation of these old claims, sought still to preserve the core of
this mythology, a specific Vergangenheitspolitik,13 even as the master narrative faced
counter-mythological contestation after decades of uneasy silence.'
4
however, such a dogmatic separation would prejudge the entire premise of the argument.
Official public memory and individual memory do share many characteristics, not the least of
which is a dominating selectivity and the absence of a comprehensive reprographic recall even
of deliberately selected events. See infra text accompanying note 363. This Article anticipates,
however, an eventual point of conceptual separation where individual memory will transcend
the bandwidth capacity of a posited official memory.
12. STUARTE. EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: LOOTED ASSETS, SLAvE LABOR, AND THE
UNFt NSHED BusiNEss OF WORLD WAR 1 279 (2003) (beginning a description of how Austria
inevitably became the next State, after Germany, to face U.S. class-action lawsuits brought
against its corporations by lawyers for conscripted Nazi-era workers and dispossessed property
owners).
13. See NORBERT FREI, ADENAUER'S GERMANY AND THE NAZI PAST: THE POLITICS OF
AMNESTY AND INTEORATION xii (Joel Golb trans., 2002) (translating Vergangenheitspolitik as
"policy for the past"). The expression, from the immediate post-war Adenauer era, signified a
deliberate effort to anesthetize the effects of the Nazi legacy through "social, professional, and
civic" (though not political) rehabilitation of millions of Nazi Party members. See id. As Frei
notes, the application to previously dismissed Nazi officials and fellow travelers makes the
phrase much more precise in meaning than the commonly used reference, also a part of the old
West German Republic's political vocabulary, to "overcoming the past." See infra note 14.
14. See Pierre Nora, Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de M~moire, 26
REPRESENTATIONS 7, 16-17 (1989) (noting how modem nations emphasize historical
discontinuity through mythologies of founding). Austria is a fascinating study of the dynamics
of official public memory, not only because of its respectability as a denizen of modem
international civil society, but also because, through a combination of domestic and foreign
20051
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Part II builds upon the Austrian illustration, as well as examples from other States,
to expose certain characteristic patterns-selectivity, constructivism, mythopoesis
(mythmaking), incorporation, and presentism-by which government elites create and
maintain a contrived ideological account of the national past. The patterns reveal how
States consciously exploit law and the legal process in this task. Selectivity partitions
the huge corpus of past events and people into the memorable and the not-to-be-
remembered, but does so in a framework of ideology rather than pragmatism.
Constructivism involves the making of a claim, supported by law and policy, about a
selected past event or series of events. It is revealed, for example, through a "claim,"
backed by public law, that emphasizes Austria's disappearance as an independent State
during the Nazi occupation and that assigns responsibility for Nazi collaboration to
individual citizens. Mythopoesis, the manufacture of myths, focuses on the fetishistic
and cultistic dimensions of elite memory production, the creation of a canonical master
narrative or master concept of the State. France and Great Britain have nurtured strong
anti-historical self-concepts, but Germany has been forced to bend to the will of
history. Again, law plays a central role in this kind of mythmaking, as this Article
demonstrates through exploration of the Austrian and U.S. experiences.
The pattern of incorporation describes the complex ways in which official public
memory seeks to absorb, and thereby to mitigate, contestations of the master narrative.
This Article initially considers how Austria adjusted aspects of its master narrative to
detoxify a series of challenges to the claim of victimhood, but enlarges this discussion
into a broad analysis of how contestative events are managed by the pattern of
incorporation. In this context, this Article contends that Mark Osiel's normative
proposal for a procedural republic characterized by perpetual dissensus, as well as John
Gillis's descriptive insistence on a post-national era where the State is no longer the
principal site of memory for most people, account only for the margins of discourse.
The ontology of incorporation, by which the State seeks to assure its dominance, is
illustrated through the evolution of a German post-Nazi narrative of national regret and
the normative separation of the post-war German Republic from the "unlawful State"
of Nazism. This Article considers also how governments have successfully promoted,
and habituated themselves to, certain devices of public law-including the recent
influences, it has so recently re-entered world consciousness for its past complicity with Nazi
hegemony and the Holocaust. There is, in Austria as well as in Germany, a belated but still
uneasy recognition that the Nazi legacy has remained unresolved. The notion of a second
opportunity to come to terms with the past supposedly implicates replacement of
Vergangenheitsbewiltigung ("overcoming the past") by Aufarbeitung ("working through the
past"). Alexandra Barahona de Brito et al., Introduction to THE POLmCs OF MEMORY 1, 19
(Alexandra Barahona de Brito et al. eds., 2001) (discussing these terms in the context of
Germany's perception that the Nazi legacy remained unresolved). But the Nazi legacy clings
limpet-like to the modem German State. German historian Daniel Frei uncovers Hitler's
enduring political appeal to Germans even after World War II. See FREI, supra note 13, at viii,
xi (noting that Germany's reconcilement to its past only became an independent subject for
research in the 1990s when public debates began to consider the Holocaust and the issue of
forced and slave labor). Similarly, this Article shows how Austria's governing elites have used
law, in effect, to compromise a process of "working through" the past, maintaining a stolid
resistance to certain re-workings of history urged by the voices of contestation. As noted in the
main text, this analysis is supported empirically by examples drawn inter alia from the course of
Austria's settlement negotiations on compensation for victims of Nazi-era forced and slave
labor.
[Vol. 80:605
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phenomenon of truth conmuissions-that manage, rather than create empathic spaces
for, threats to the master narrative. Through incorporation, the compiled record of the
administration becomes legally dispositive and part of the State liturgy.
Presentism, the final characteristic pattern, recognizes how official public memory
is biased toward a State's living (and future) citizens and operates within this
framework to achieve goals of stability and social order. For Austria, the law-based
claim of victimhood acted as a national tranquillizer and social balm and continues to
allow today's Austrians, temporally removed from Nazism, to reclaim a glorious pre-
Nazi history and to esteem post-war neutrality and economic success. Governments,
therefore, practice a kind of historical engineering that seeks to maintain the welfare
and stability of their polities through sponsorship of a particular view of the past.
Closing Part II, this Article reflects once again on the importance of the lawmaking
power to the creation of official memory. The five characteristic patterns of official
public memory are observed through the lenses of law and the legal process, since it is
also a characteristic of official memory construction (as opposed to the memory work
of other elites such as the media or organized religion, for example) that the civil law-
making apparatus is at the exclusive disposal of governments.1 5 Law's distinctive
15. In this sense, this Article instantiates what have been described as "expressive"
theories of law. Theories of this kind "tell actors-whether individuals, associations, or the
State-to act in ways that express appropriate attitudes to various substantive values." Elizabeth
S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2000). For example, with respect to the Patriot Act mentioned in the
main text, see infra text accompanying note 16, the word "Patriot" (a contrived acronym formed
from the full title of this anti-terrorist legislation, see infra note 16), signals the values (freedom-
loving, favoring strong repressive government measures against terrorism) that are coded into
the legislation but which are also part of an evolving master discourse that is de-
internationalizing American political thinking. See infra notes 16 & 19 and accompanying text.
The idea that law can express elite-sponsored values, or that it is sometimes symbolic of societal
intent, is hardly an affront to sound thinking, yet for some scholars the debate resolves into a
reductio ad absurdum that queries whether one can cogently ascribe a meaning to the collective
action of a representative body such as Congress. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Expressive
Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1389 (2000) (suggesting that
a multimember legal body voting on a text does not have a "mental state" independent of the
mental states of each member, whereas a genuine communication presumes a genuine speaker).
As Anderson and Pildes argue in reply, members of collective bodies "must be capable of
understanding themselves as expressing mental states," but, in any event, in democratic States
"they are not the final arbiter of meaning"-public and shared meanings, as well as, presumably,
court-ordered meanings, are also involved. Anderson & Pildes, supra, at 1526-27. Aside from
this strange insistence (routinely contradicted by popular ascriptions of intent to Congress or to
international organizations, for example), that plural subjects are a conceptual impossibility,
Adler's fundamental point, it seems, is that it is wrong to overemphasize the symbolic power of
laws. To do so, he argues, overemphasizes an inappropriate (and sometimes inconceivable)
linguistic meaning; a particular law (in this sense, a "government action") can cause what he
calls "status harm" to a minority group without linguistically stigmatizing them. Adler, supra, at
1434. Thus, laws can have disparate impact on minorities and even impoverish them (welfare
laws, for example) without betraying the kind of explicit stigmatic content of a law; for example,
a law which provides that "only white males are eligible to serve as jurors." Id. at 1430, 1438.
Thus, his primary point is that expressivist theories retain too strong a conceptual link to
language, even though he appears to concede, remarkably, that law's cultural impact may indeed
2005]
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categories, including constitutions, legislation, treaties, truth commissions, and
criminal trials, allow access to the past to be filtered through familiar and replicable
structures, and thereby help to stabilize social expectations.
A prominent recent example of elite claim-making exercised through the legislative
process is the adoption of the "Patriot Act'16 in response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Through the Act, and repeated elite invocations of the Act,
official public memory of that day (designated "Patriot Day" by official edict 17) has
shape or reinforce social norms, social forms, and social practices. Id. at 1498. Anderson and
Pildes respond to Adler by picking up on this apparent concession, pointing out that law's
expressive power is socially constructed, since any proposed interpretation of a law "must make
sense in light of the community's other practices, its history, and shared meanings." Anderson &
Pildes, supra, at 1525. Thus, an interpretive context must exist, and not, pace Adler, merely a
decontextualized string of possible semantic meanings. The interpretive context suggested in the
present Article is the construction of an official public memory. As Anderson and Pildes
conclude, a notion of expressivism "captures many intuitive understandings of the concerns of
the law." Id. at 1575. As these authors also note, purely expressive harm has led to some laws
being struck down because they strike "contemptuous, hostile, divisive attitudes ... without
[necessarily] requiring any demonstration of adverse causal consequences." Id. at 1534. The
authors mention voting rights cases in this rubric, but a more pertinent recent example is the
Supreme Court's galvanic opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating a
Texas law that criminalized homosexual conduct, in part because the law was a declaration by
the State that homosexual persons may be subjected to discrimination). The contemptuous value
that is integrated into the Texas law is expressed by the Court as follows:
When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that
declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres. The central holding of
Bowers has been brought in question by this case, and it should be addressed. Its
continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons.
Id. at 575. Another case from the Court's evolving States' rights jurisprudence, Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706 (1999), is replete with language that Anderson and Pildes describe as having "a
strong expressivist cast"-epithets such as the "dignity" of States, the "esteem" with which
Congress must regard the States as sovereigns, and the status of the States as "residuary
sovereigns," Anderson & Pildes, supra, at 1563. The ultimate critique of Adler, according to
Anderson and Pildes, is that he avoids ascribing moral import to these legal communications by
focusing on the subjective reactions of addressees, a position these authors characterize as
"bizarre." Id. at 1574.
16. The Act's popular name is an acronym for the final seven substantive words of its
formal title, "Uniting and Strengthening of America to Provide Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001," Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). It will
be noticed that all ten substantive words in the title spell out "USA-Patriot Act." This elongated
title appears to be a conflation of the titles of separate bills from the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees (the "USA Act" from the Senate and the "Patriot Act" from the House. See Jess
Bravin & Ted Bridis, Investigation and Mobilization: Political Role Reversals Shape
Antiterrorism Legislation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2001, at A8). But see Provide Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism, H.R. REP. No. 107-236, pt. 1 (2001) (statement
of Rep. Frank) (attacking the decision to construct an "awkward" title for the proposed
legislation to yield the acronym "Patriot," and finding an implication that those who disagree
with the legislation are not patriots).
17. See H.R.J. Res. 79, 107th Cong. (2001) (joint resolution of the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States designating September 11 as "Patriot Day," and requiring
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probably attained a point of inscription, where the event it recalls is now in compliance
with a redemptive (and constructed) ideology of State survival.18 In the context of Bush
Administration policies, the redemptive ideology (the claim that the Administration
makes about September 11, 2001) and the legislation (which mythicizes that claim)
have supplanted a competing and prior narrative of international community, the
narrative of a U.S.-led international collaboration using the diplomatic and legal
frameworks that were established after the Second World War. 19 Official public
memory has implanted a sense of a new foundational moment in legal culture that
seeks to incorporate human rights-and international law-into the recast official
narrative as evanescent indulgences, negotiable in the face of threats of terror, rather
than as prerequisite conditions of the global order.
20
The U.S. decision to attack Iraq without a formal U.N. Security Council resolution
was emblematic of this rebuilt official ethos21 and was aided by official cultivation
(through very public acts of withdrawal and rejection with respect to existing and
future treaty commitments) of a mood of public antipathy toward global cooperation. 
2
the President to issue a proclamation inter alia calling on "the people of the United States" to
observe a commemorative moment of silence on that day).
18. See JENNY EDKINS, TRAUMA AND THE MEMORY OF POLITICS 91, 102-03 (2003)
(positing the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks, including the declaration of a war on
terrorism, as an example of how the State, through its powers of memorialization, "can capture
the debate [and] reinforce the narrative of the nation").
19. See Jed Rubenfeld, Two World Orders, PROSPECT, Jan. 7, 2004, at 32, 33 (detailing
the U.S. role in setting up post-war international institutions, a"new internationalism" designed
to "transmit American principles to the rest of the world").
20. See generally John Strawson, Introduction to LAW AFTER GROUND ZERO, at xi-xiii
(John Strawson ed., 2002) (examining disturbances to the legal culture caused by the Bush
Administration's reaction to the World Trade Center attacks, including toleration of mass
detentions without trial as well as a much-contested reinterpretation of the U.N. Charter to treat
a terrorist attack as an armed attack justifying measures of preemptive self-defense). In
Strawson's assessment, international law has now become a post-Westphalian "contested
arena." Id. at xix. But see Michael J. Glennon, How War Left the Law Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
21, 2002, at A33 (arguing that the U.N. Charter provisions on the use of force "are simply no
longer regarded as binding international law," so that the U.S. realpolitik attitude that attacks do
not legally require U.N. approval is the more correct interpretation of current international law).
21. But see GLENNON, supra note 20 (disputing international law requirement for such a
resolution). The Iraq invasion was legally premised on a doctrine of preemptive action to
counter a sufficient threat to U.S. national security. See 2002 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (Sept. 2002). In this
report to Congress, President Bush proposed an adaptation of the traditional international law
doctrine of preemption based on an imminent threat. Id. The broader Bush doctrine would allow
anticipatory action "even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack."
Id.; see also Amy E. Eckert & Manooher Mofidi, Doctrine or Doctrinaire-The First Strike
Doctrine and Preemptive Self-Defense under International Law, 12 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
117 (2004) (arguing that the Iraq situation disclosed no legally valid imminent threat-a
prerequisite for preemptive self-defense).
22. During this period, the United States refused to ratify the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on
global warming, see Letter to Members of the Senate on the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change,
37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 444 (Mar. 19, 2001); withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty, see Remarks Announcing the United States Withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1783 (Dec. 17,2001); disputed the application of
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And public policy that is developed in reaction to sudden events has a tendency to
change the complexion of the legal environment well beyond the passage of the
triggering event.2 3 This process of conversion of the past into a scriptural
interpretation, using the centrality of the law, is quintessentially the province of
government.
In response to the demonstration of the contrived nature of official public memory
in Parts I and II, the remainder of this Article (Parts III-V) is a search for a concept of
public memory that allows a more contested (and hence more authentic) account of the
past, and thus represents a challenge to the law-based contrivance of official public
memory. Writers like Osiel and Gillis seek to open up contestation by proposing
actions (such as Osiel's notion of civic dissensus) that operate entirely within the
existing State-centered apparatus of law and policy. The remainder of this Article,
however, seeks to broaden the search for authenticity by consulting the work of other
disciplines whose discourses may not be beholden to the collectivizing, mythologizing,
and generalizing legal and policy analysis that produces the official public memory
investigated in Parts I and II. Because authenticity implicates, among other things, a
restoration of simple accuracy to the past, this Article looks initially to history, a
discourse that (on first impression) appears to be separated from official public
memory by a visceral ontological distinction, the difference between the ritualistic,
selective recall of official memory and history's detailed archivistic rendering (which
this Article calls chronique). History work, in contrast with official memory work, is
obsessional about discovering a "true," as opposed to "canonical," past.
On closer inspection, however, history proves to be both very unlike official public
memory and very similar, and in each of these respects as a discourse it proves a
weaker model for maintaining an enduring counter-discourse, a discourse of authentic
recall, than might be expected. As a practical matter, its mission of chronique, the
discovery of a literal "true" past, while undoubtedly separating history from the
constructed product of official memory, also implicates an endless cycle of
contestability that cannot serve the purposes of social control (through consensus) that
the Geneva Conventions to detainees held in the war on terrorism, e.g., Remarks Prior to
Discussions with Chairman Hamid Karzai of the Afghan Interim Authority and an Exchange
with Reporters, 38 WEEKLY COMp. PIEs. Doc. 127, 128, 130-31 (Feb. 4, 2002); rejected
NATO's offer of support in the fight against the Afghan Taliban, see Press Release, Statement
by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson (Oct. 8, 2001), available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/200l/pOl-138e.htm; opposed proposals to strengthen and verify the
1972 Biological Weapons Convention, see Statement on Strengthening the International Regime
Against Biological Weapons, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1580 (Nov. 5, 2001); and, most
remarkably in terms of conventional international law jurisprudence, purported to "unsign" its
earlier signature of the 1998 Rome Statute to establish an International Criminal Court, see
Robert S. Greenberger & Jess Bravin, The Assault on Iraq: War May Conform with Law, but
U.S. Prestige May Suffer, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2003, at A13 (listing treaties that the Bush
Administration has rejected or unsigned); see also Exchange with Reporters in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1123 (July 8, 2002); Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer
(May 7, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020507-6.htnl).
23. See Strawson, supra note 20, at xvii (noting that anti-terrorist legislation enacted in
haste tends to become a permanent feature of the legal environment); see also Michael Ignatieff,
Is the Human Rights Era Ending?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2002, at A26 (suggesting that "the
intellectual and political climate of a war on terror now resembles the atmosphere of the cold
war").
[Vol. 80:605
IN SEARCH OF A THEORY OF PUBLIC MEMORY
give official memory its narrative power. Historical knowledge, which opposes a
canonical, closed past, is always revisionist, because a perfect chronique, the knowing
of everything about everything that occurred in the past, is ontologically unattainable.
Revisionism is anti-hegemonic and schismatic, uninterested in (and probably incapable
of commanding) a continuing consensus. Ironically, therefore, because of its most
defining (and intellectually appealing) characteristic, history lacks the dogmatic
stability-and, frankly, the institutional centrality-that would make it a discourse that
would challenge the supremacy of official memory.
But history also resembles official public memory in a telling respect. History is not
the work of Clio, the Muse of History, but of historians. While they would recoil from
notions of alteration or management of the past, historians do interpret the past just as
official memory seeks to do. The work of historians is never a pure facsimile of the
past but an ideologically fraught conversation among the present, the past, and
themselves. Historians operate subject to a relativistic mixture of contemporary
ideological and professional influences, and often view the entire past through
presentist ideological concerns (for example, discourses based on feminism, minority
rights, sexuality, nationalism, or class). In this sense, historians are no less immune
than governments from the viral effects of the interpretive fallacy-the idea that all
attempts to configure the past are threatened by the biases of relativism and presentism.
Part III concludes with an illustration of how the elusiveness of chronique defeats
history's essentialist claim to provide a comprehensive (and objective) picture of the
past. Drawing again on legal processes, this Article analyzes the adversarial portrayal
of historical incidents during recent Holocaust-related criminal and civil trials. This
discussion reveals how history's ontological failure to provide a comprehensive
reckoning of past events (for example, the absence of a documented order by Adolf
Hitler to initiate the mass extermination of Jews) means that canonical (official)
memory is rarely disturbed by the forensic scrutiny of a trial, whereas history's claim to
ex post verification is belied not only by factual divergences and the incompleteness of
the record, but also by the mediated and interpretive nature of what historians do.
Having set history aside as a model of memory that offers a permanent counter-
discourse to the claims of official public memory, Part IV considers whether social
philosophy offers a more accessible paradigm of public memory, one that is grounded
in the lived experience of individuals, in place of the constructed images of official
memory and history's burdens of chronique and relativism. In so doing, this Article
moves from exploring a theory of public memory that might challenge official memory
to a theory that conceptualizes a possible inherent-and therefore definitional-
limitation of official memory. In this understanding, public memory will be
reconceptualized as comprising both a non-dynamic component, official public
memory, and an autonomous condition, the emotional or affective memory of
individuals, that remains cognitively protected from official memory.
Part IV builds its quest for a public memory based on lived experience upon the
concept of collective memory expounded by French social philosopher Maurice
Halbwachs. It opens by acknowledging (as Halbwachs does) that much of the
remembered past is merely mediated memory, a schematic measure of the actual
experiences that others have lived. The techniques of official public memory, in fact,
exploit this property of what this Article calls "contingent knowability." For
Halbwachs, however, the personal lived memory predominates over the superficial
stamping of the general conceptions of official public memory. He roots his notion of
public ("collective") memory in socially constructed sub-State frameworks (a nuclear
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family, a class of alumni or, more broadly, a religion or fellowship of musicians),
whose multiple viewpoints on the past establish what he calls an "affective
community." Halbwachs proposes a ground-up conceptualization of public memory
that contrasts with the top-down techniques of official memory. Each individual
memory in the community is a viewpoint on that non-official public memory. Within
this conceptualization, Halbwachs, in fact, criticizes history as a universal, monolithic,
self-isolating process, remote from the memory of the groups who experienced past
events.
Two important conceptual faults limit the applicability of Halbwachs's theory as a
source of an authentic public memory. First, Halbwachs does not examine how much
of his sub-State memory space-given the borrowed nature of much of official
memory-could still be occupied by the constructed ideological frameworks of official
memory. His theory appears to call for public memory to be depoliticized and
reindividualized, but he offers no conceptual boundaries for ensuring that this happens.
Second, and more problematically, although Halbwachs visualizes an "affective
community," this Article shows that he does not appear to have grasped the full
resonance of this idea. His decentralized public memory, which he proposes implicitly
as a more authentic social confirmation of individual memories, is just as structurally
incapable as official memory of accounting for the emotional or affective effects of
memory on each individual who lives within his decentralized frameworks. Affectivity,
the memory of how an individual felt in the past, necessarily transcends the shared
stories and accumulated details about a past occurrence.
Halbwachs's notion of an affective community, therefore, contains more than he
seems to have imagined. He may have assumed-given the scientific knowledge of his
time-that a collective memory comprising separate individual memories (or
viewpoints) could not ipso facto be confused with the constructed formats of official
memory. Yet, as modem science verifies, ordinary individual memory, like official
memory, is itself a constructed phenomenon even though it does not recall in a
precisely linear fashion and seems responsive to randomized impulses. While there is
no searchable database of every memory trace we have ever laid, memory's evacuative
properties help us to enjoy the benefits of this constructed memory, including the
ability to concentrate on higher order judgmental operations and to allow a kind of
mental precipitate to form, which comprises our rationality, our capacity to form
general impressions, and to extrapolate from those to judgment.
Yet Halbwachs's reference to an "affective community" does signal (even if, for
him, unconsciously) that individual memory differs radically from official memory in
having an emotional dimension, an affectivity, that is precisely the unconstructed
capacity to recall the emotional resonance (if not necessarily the specific details) of a
past event. This attribute of affectivity separates individual memory both from official
public memory and also from Halbwachs's notion of a public collective memory. New
scientific research attests to the intuitively persuasive idea that emotional or affective
memory-including memories of past trauma-represents the most adhesive type of
recall. Our emotional quotient or affectivity, in other words the capacity to remember
how we felt at the time of a past incident or series of incidents, is integral to a
functional personal memory.
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Part V uses literature, and in particular Marcel Proust's great novel of time and
memory, In Search of Lost Time,24 to overcome the hermeneutic challenge of
demonstrating how "affectivity" is the feature of individual lived experience that is
most likely to sustain a reconceptualized, more authentic concept of public memory.
The complexity of Proustian memory pits unreliable simple memory, the incomplete
(and highly constructed) forensic process of recovering past events, against authentic
(and frequently uncomfortable) affective memory. The final volume of In Search of
Lost Time is a manifesto of the potency of affective memory. The richest grain of this
kind of memory-the Proustian moment-operates by a recessive analogical power
that occurs instantaneously when a triggering mechanism (such as the taste of the
madeleine pastry) causes a jolt of affective recognition of a past experience and a
"transcendence" of the flux of time.5 These authentic experiences of emotional recall
(spontaneous and involuntary) are contrasted with mechanical (and voluntary) efforts
to summon images and recollections from the past.
Proust thus creates a forceful literary context for understanding the power that
modem science attributes to affective memory. While his understanding of a
spontaneous transcendent memory occurs within the confines of the non-spontaneous
and structured format of a novel, this irony of artifice simply elevates Proust's success
at depicting the force of affective memory in our inner lives. Rather than focusing on
the magical interventions of an involuntary memory, it is best to understand Proust's
24. While Proust's essential insights into time and memory suffuse popular and
scholarly discourses, he is most noted in popular culture for his motif of the madeleine,
symbolizing involuntary spasms of returning memory. In fact, the image of the madeleine plays
no explicit role in the final volume of his work (considered, infra, in Part V of this Article), in
which he presents his summa summarum of memory using an entirely different set of mnemonic
triggers. See also EDMUND Wi-IrE, MARCEL PROUST 1 (1999) ("the madeleine moistened by
herbal tea has become the most famous symbol in French literature; everyone refers to sudden
gusts of memory as 'Proustian experiences"'); JULIA KRiSTEVA, TIME AND SENSE: PROUST AND
THE EXPERIENCE OF LITERATURE I (Ross Guberman trans., Columbia University Press 1996)
("The 'petite madeleine,' which is flavorful, incestuous, delicate, elusive, and diluted in tea...
offers a taste of Proust even to those who have never read him."); SERGE DOUBROVSKY, WRITING
AND FANTASY IN PROUST: LA PLACE DE LA MADELEINE I (Carol Mastrangelo Bov6 & Paul A.
Bov6 trans., University of Nebraska Press 1986) (questioning his own decision to write on a
subject so "rehashed as that of the famous madeleine"); HrrcHENS, supra note 7, at 73 (invoking
"the madeleine"of the memoirs of Gore Vidal); MARGALrr, supra note 7, at vii (following the
pattern noted here of the madeleine as an opening motif, commencing his exploration of
memory by acknowledging that a local newspaper article was "[tlhe Proustian [miadeleine cake
that triggered my search and research into the memory of the lost past"); David R. Ellison,
Proust and Posterity, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO PROUST 200, 201 (Richard Bales ed.,
2001) [hereinafter CAMBRIDGE COMPANION] (suggesting also that it is not an exaggeration to say
that Proust's fame "rests upon the twin pillars of a rather insipid pastry ... and very long
sentences").
25. Part V of this Article concentrates on an extended treatment of Proust's complex
(and incompletely articulated) theory of transcendent memory. The unsettling prospect of the
entire 3000 densely-textured pages of the Search (in French or in English) has always caused
Proust to be "a name to quote" rather than a writer to read. F.L. Lucas, The Mystic of Memory,
in PROUST: REVIEWS IN ENGLISH, supra note 10, at 186, 187. Yet the last volume of the Search
offers, in 300 pages, a self-standing study-what may be the most sustained and profound in
world literature---on the essence of individual affective memory.
2005]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
notion of transcendence as a way of understanding that so much of ordinary memory is
dull and unspecific. As a novelist rather than a scientist or a philosopher, Proust is
engaged in a spectacular novelistic rendering of an important truth of human memory.
To demonstrate the force of these exposed realities, this Article uses Proustian
transcendence to rehabilitate Halbwachs's concept of lived experience as the true basis
of memory. Halbwachs correctly grasps the importance of lived experience to an
authentic public memory, but understands the memory of lived experience only as
Proust did before he experienced the ecstasy of transcendent memory: as sterile recall,
images without the essence of experience. In Part V, therefore, this Article
reconceptualizes Halbwachs to establish a sphere of memory that lies beyond the
selected, constructed, mythicized, incorporative, and presentist patterns of official
public memory, a sphere of memory that is (as Halbwachs may well have sensed but
never formally articulated) cognitively protected from the State.
This Article's search for an authentic theory of public memory, therefore, concludes
with the understanding that the State's managed recall reaches the conceptual limit of
its power in the face of the unique affectivity of individual memory. When we express
the sense that the past remains open or open-textured, but always threatened by the
canonical actions of official memory (and perhaps also of history, as it turns out), we
can now also recognize that a theory of public memory must embrace the lived
experience of individuals as reflected in their personal affective memory, and therefore
must always embrace the potential of contestation. Rather than a normative or
descriptive commentary on public memory, the theory of public memory advocated in
this Article recalibrates official public memory itself as intrinsically confronting the
permanence of contestation. Whether or not contestation ever breaks the surface of
State memory management, the threat of contestation endures as a cognitive reality in
the minds of individuals, outside the incorporative mechanisms of official memory.
Thus, this Article reaches the reassuring conclusion that there is a cognitive,
definitional, and even scientific limit to the power of the State over the individual.
In an Epilogue, this Article closes with reflections on the enduring role of the State
as a mythmaker for the past and on the limits of law as an agent of affectivity, and with
a recapitulation of this Article's thesis that there exists a natural limit on government
control of the individual.
I. CLAIMING SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE PAST: AN EMPtaCAL STUDY
A. Introduction
I turn now to a more precise reification of the characteristic patterns of official
memory. The method of analysis, as explained earlier, is resolutely inductive. It is
based on observation of a class of facts-official construction of memory in the
Republic of Austria-as the premise for discovering the characteristics of how official
public memory operates generally. Thus, while this empirical study narrates Austria's
specific experience, the elements of the narration could be universalized as a
prototypical group of issues (for example, the legal relationship of succession between
a new government and a departed repressive regime) that could confront any State
engaged in a morphology of post-conflict official memory. In Part 1, I will offer a brief
synthesis of these issues as a conceptual bridge to the derivation of the characteristic
patterns of official public memory that follows. In this Part, however, it is necessary to
analyze Austria's construction of an official memory of the era of Nazi occupation and
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collaboration, and how very recent challenges to that official memory (most
conspicuously from U.S. lawyers for victims of Nazi-era forced and slave labor and
property confiscations) have been managed. The Austrian post-occupation experience
also offers a powerful case study of how a State can construct its official memory using
the centrality of law.
B. Austria after 1945: The Mantle of Victimhood
Newsreels of cheering Austrians welcoming Adolf Hitler to Vienna2 6 would have
undermined a founding narrative of a victimized people breaking out of the carapace of
the Nazi ancien regime.27 Moreover, the Austrian State had been locked in a forced
union (the so-called Anschluss 2 ) with a defeated Germany,29 so that an epic of
autonomous national resurrection was plainly impossible to script. For the Austrian
post-war leadership, official elaboration of a restored self-image would require both a
narrative of victimhood that identified Austria with other nations subject to Nazi
aggression, and a complementary and interwoven narrative to place Austria beyond the
circle of defeated Axis powers as an Allied sympathizer whose fate compared to that of
neutral Belgium.
30
26. See JUDITH MILLER, ONE, BY ONE, BY ONE: FAcING THE HOLOCAUST 61-62 (1990)
(noting estimates that some 250,000 people, a third of the city's population, filled Vienna's
Heldenplatz to greet Hitler on March 15, 1938; see also GORDON BROOK-SHEPHERD, THE
AusTRIANs: A THOUsAND-YEAR ODYSSEY 325-28 (1996) (describing tumultuous and resistance-
free welcomes for Hitler in Linz and Vienna: "Austria's darkest hour was not her finest"). See
generally EvAN BuKEY, HITLER'S AUSTRIA: POPULAR SENTIMENT IN THE NAZI ERA, 1938-1945
(2000); Evan B. Bukey, Popular Opinion in Vienna After the Anschluss, in CONQUERING THE
PAST: AUSTRIAN NAZISM YESTERDAY & TODAY 151 (F. Parkinson ed., 1989).
27. The metaphor is Christopher Hitchens's. See HrrcHENS, supra note 7, at xix (writing
of a secular republic emerging within the carapace of Britain's fading imperial tradition).
28. Anschluss, "connexion" or "joining," is the historical euphemism describing Nazi
Germany's bloodless annexation of the post-World War I Austrian Republic. Under the
"Reunification Law" adopted without protest by the Austrian government on March 13, 1938,
Austria became a province inside the greater German Reich. See BROOK-SHEPHERD, supra note
26, at 323-33 (describing events leading to Anschluss). A month later, a plebiscite on the
Anschluss produced a 99.73% vote in Hitler's favor. See id. at 332.
29. See generally EIZENSTAT, supra note 12, at 279-80 (analyzing the pro-Nazi
sentiment in Austria which eased the path to Anschluss, and the period of "wild Aryanization"-
a phrase used by Austrians themselves-in the aftermath of the annexation).
30. Compare the experience of German post-war management of public memory of the
Nazi era, as recounted by German historian Norbert Frei. It began with a "voluntary silence,"
"ascribing the horrors of the Third Reich to Hitler and a small clique of 'major war criminals"'
who "seduced" the nation. FREI, supra note 13, at 311 (writing as though the West German
population evolved these ideas reflexively, thus leaving open the question of the managed nature
of memory). Frei also notes a post-war suppression of what he labels "the basic criminal
character of the German aggression, its barbarism and madness from the start." See id. at 311-
12. The visible result of this suppression, as a managed public memory would expect to
produce, was the "hyperstability" of the new West German State. Id. Then, outside pressure-by
Israel and the Eichmann trial, and by East German anti-fascist propaganda designed to demonize
and destabilize its Western rival-forced West Germany to recalibrate the idea of Nazism as an
alien regime and to become aware that the Final Solution (and the Nazis themselves) had a
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1. A New Legal Category: The State Treaty
Crucially for Austria, its public law transformation of memory occurred at both
international and domestic levels. The tripartite Allied Declaration on Austria, issued at
Moscow on October 30, 194331 "without fanfare or explanation, ' 3 2 committed the
United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union to a schizophrenic formula of
victimhood and responsibility that would, in the later Austrian self-interpretation, be
conflated into a unitary notion of victim status. The powers "agreed that Austria, the
first free country to fall victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German
domination" and that they regarded the "annexation imposed upon Austria by Germany
on March 15, 1938 as null and void.",33 The immediate purpose of the Declaration-a
purpose that was unmentioned in later construction of these events-was to galvanize
Austrian opposition to Hitler.
34
Simultaneously, the Allies "reminded" Austria "that she has a responsibility which
she cannot evade for participation in the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany." 35 But
the Allies drew some of the toxins from the accusation of responsibility with a pledge
(again directed to motivating Austrian opposition) that "in the final settlement account
will inevitably be taken of [Austria's] own contribution to her liberation." 36 The 1943
social anchoring among the wider German population. Id.; see infra text accompanying note 191
(considering these issues within the conceptual framework of "incorporation" of contestative
narratives).
31. Deklaration von Moskau betreffend Osterreich, 30 Oktober 1943 (Moscow
Declaration on Austria, (Oct. 30, 1943)), reprinted in BUNDESMINISTERIUM FUR AUSWARTIGE
ANGELEGENHEITEN, 2001 AussENPOLmscHE DOKUMENTATION: SONDERDRUCK,
OSTERREICHISCHE MASSNAHMEN ZUR RESTITUTION UND ENTsCADIGUNG VON OPFERN DES
NATIONALSOZIALISMUS, Wien 2001 (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 2001 FOREIGN POLICY
DOCUMENTS: SPECIAL ISSUE, AUSTRIAN MEASURES FOR THE RESTITUTION AND COMPENSATION OF
THE VICTIMS OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM, Vienna 2001), at 7 [hereinafter 2001 AUSTRIAN FOREIGN
POLICY DOCUMENTS].
32. EIZENSTAT, supra note 12, at 281 (reviewing the circumstances of the Allied
Declaration by the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union).
33. 2001 AUSTRIAN FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENTS, supra note 31, at 7. The annexation
date of March 15 used in the Declaration is inaccurate by two additional days. See supra note
28.
34. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 12, at 281 (commenting that, in this purpose, the
Declaration was a failure; its chief effect was on the post-war collective psyche).
35. 2001 AUSTRIAN FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENTS, supra note 31, at 7.
36. Id. The word "liberation" as an element of the vocabulary of official memory has re-
emerged in German public discourse on Nazism. The idea of the end of World War II as a
"liberation" of the German people from Nazism is a response scripted to overcome the typical
verdict of the collective defeat (and guilt) of Germany. The current German chancellor, Gerhard
Schr6der, expressing gratitude for Germany's inclusion in the sixtieth anniversary
commemoration of D-Day, said in an interview that the occasion was "important" to him
because it made clear the meaning of D-Day, namely, "the liberation from National Socialism,
which was not only the liberation of Europe, but also the liberation of Germany, or the
beginning of the liberation." John Vinocur, Just Whose Liberation Was Begun On June 6?,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 1, 2004, at 2. The historical counterpoint to this German "official
memory," of course, is the ferocious resistance of the German armies (unhindered by any
indigenous "Resistance") against the Allied offensive after D-Day. See id. (suggesting that this
use of the word "liberation" is a comfort word for a modem generation that identifies resistance
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Declaration would become the legal lodestone of Austria's official memory of the
Anschluss. Because of the Declaration's external provenance-and despite its strategic
purpose of arousing opposition to Nazism-it had the powerful effect of muting
criticism of Austria in the aftermath of Nazi rule,37 and of providing a significant legal
premise for an enduring official memory of a nation yoked against its will to Nazism.
38
Stalin's death in 1953 brought to power a collective Soviet leadership under Nikita
Khrushchev that signaled its desire to improve contacts with the West through the
policy it labeled "peaceful coexistence." 39 Although Moscow had formerly tied the
status of Austria to the fate of a peace treaty with Germany, the Soviets in 1955
announced that they stood willing to conclude a "State Treaty" restoring Austrian
sovereignty and to withdraw their troops from Austria without delay, provided that
effective safeguards against a future Anschluss could be devised, and that Austria
comply with the obligations of military neutrality.
40
In tracing the arc of Austria's official memory, the unexpected conceptualization of
a "State Treaty" in 195541 reprises and amplifies the dominating victimhood motif of
with "the few German Social Democrats, resistance fighters and gays" liberated from
concentration camps by the Allies).
37. See IWONA IRwtN-ZAREKA, FRAMES OF REMEMBRANCE: THE DYNAMICS OF
COLLECTIVE MEMORY 120 (1994) (commenting that forgetting the past "worked well" for
Austria within the larger vision of the fallen Habsburg Empire, "but it could not have been
possible without cooperation from both the United States and the Soviet Union"). As discussed
in the main text, see infra text accompanying note 46, Austria's ability to maintain what Irwin-
Zarecka calls a "morally purified narrative," id. at 129, was strongly attached to external support
for the post-war geopolitical imperative of restoring a functioning independent Austrian State.
38. But see EIZENSTAT, supra note 12, at 281 (characterizing Austria's victimological
identity as a "delusion").
39. See KONRAD GINTHER, NEUTRALITAT UND NEuTRAUITATSPOLITK (NEuTRAuTY AND
NEUTRALITY POLICY) 95 (1975) (defining "peaceful coexistence" as "an ideological struggle
with nonmilitary means, but moreover also through cooperation" (translation by author)).
40. Here is one author's perception of the Soviet gesture and Austria's perceived
geopolitical importance:
There were strategic as well as diplomatic advantages for the Soviets in conceding
Austria's neutralization at this time. For as well as conforming with the post-Stalin
"new look"-a diplomacy which was seeking a d6tente with Tito and improved
relations with the Asian neutralists-there were strategic advantages for the Soviet
Union in thus separating two NATO powers (Italy and West Germany) and seeing
the Swiss-Austrian wedge of neutral territory hindering the logistic consolidation
of NATO. And Austria's neutralization entailed the transfer of 5,000 American
troops from Salzburg to south of the Brenner.
PETER LYON, NEUTRALISM 168 (1963). So startling was the Soviet renversement, which by
October 1955 had led to the departure of the last foreign soldier from Austrian soil, that in
January 1984, in a review of the State of current East-West relations, the American news
magazine Time could still cite it as the most auspicious signal displayed by the Soviet Union
during the era of "peaceful coexistence." TIME, Jan. 2, 1984, at 42-43.
41. The Staatsvertrag betreffend die Wiederherstellung eines unabhdngigen und
demokratischen Osterreich [State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and
Democratic Austria], 217 U.N.T.S. 223 (1955), was prepared by a Conference of Ambassadors
at Vienna in early May 1955, and signed by the foreign ministers of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United
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the Moscow Declaration of 1943. The unusual nomenclature of the Treaty, in fact,
proves critical in demonstrating the role of law's conceptual categories in the shaping
of official memory. Germany and the other defeated Axis Powers were subjected to
"peace" treaties with all the victorious States. Austria's leaders, in contrast, achieved a
remarkable trifecta of negotiating successes in 1955: (1) an entirely novel public law
instrument, a "State" treaty rather than a "peace" treaty, confirming the Moscow
Declaration's implication that Austria was not perceived by the Allies as a hostile
belligerent; 42 (2) signature of the State Treaty only by the circle of four occupying
powers rather than by all victorious States;43 and, most powerfully, (3) excision from
the State Treaty of the equivocating reference to Austria's "responsibility" (moral and
financial) that the Allied Powers had placed into the Declaration." And Machiavellian
fortuna played its mercurial part. Although the Allies were aware of the reality of
Austrian complicity, the geopolitical advantages of restoring an independent and
neutral Austria overwhelmed their sensitivity to counter-narratives.4 5 "In 1955, 'one
second of world history moved in our favor. And we made good use of it,' wrote one of
Austria's most experienced joumalists."
States of America, and France--described collectively in the Treaty as the "Allied and
Associated Powers"-of the one part, and the Republic of Austria, of the other part, at the
Belvedere Palace in Vienna on May 15, 1955. See generally Hanspeter Neuhold, Background
Factors ofAustria's Neutrality, in NEUTRALITY AND NON-ALIGNMENTIN EUROPE 44,47 (Karl E.
Birnbaum & Hanspeter Neuhold eds., 1982).
42. See infra text accompanying note 115 (discussing Austria's mytho-legal use of the
State Treaty).
43. See supra note 41 (on the signatures of the State Treaty).
44. See HELLA PICK, GUILTY VICTIM: AUSTRIA FROM THE HOLOCAUST TO HAIDER 31
(2000) (noting Austrian foreign minister Leopold Figl's plea to the Allies that it would be unfair
to burden Austria with guilt about past behavior at the very moment of its revival as an
independent nation, a position that the Allies agreed to "[wlith little pause for reflection"); see
also MILLER, supra note 26, at 68 (noting that the image of Austrians as the "proto-martyrs of
Europe" was well-established in 1955 when the treaty was signed).
45. See supra note 40 (analyzing Austria's geopolitical importance from the Soviet
perspective); see also MILLER, supra note 26, at 68 (citing Austrian scholar's view that the
Allies deliberately supported a new "founding myth" in order to sponsor a new national identity
that broke from the perceived Austrian loyalty to the Third Reich).
46. Hugo Portisch, quoted in PICK, supra note 44, at 49. A similar view was expressed
by Austrian historian Oliver Rathkolb: "You gave us a historical out, and we grabbed it."
MI.ER, supra note 26, at 69. For Germany, too,fortuna proved favorable. But for the Germans,
the motion of the clock was in comparison almost a full hour. Eventually the so-called
Morgenthau Plan, which inter alia anticipated a complete ruralization and demilitarization of
Germany, as well as President Roosevelt's apparent willingness to drive the German people to
soup kitchens and poverty, no longer represented U.S. policy (under pressure from Churchill,
who wanted Germany as a bulwark against Russia), and Germany won its chance to create a new
foundation. See generally MICHAEL BESCHLOSS, THE CONQUERORS: ROOSEVELT, TRUMAN AND
THE DESTRUCTION OF HITLER'S GERMANY 1941-1945, at 108, 124, 148-49 (2002) (discussing
evolution of Roosevelt's position and its eventual abandonment; as Beschloss describes,
Roosevelt, in fact, denied that he could ever have endorsed a memorandum he initialed in
Quebec with Churchill in which both leaders endorsed the Morgenthau Plan). For a summary of
the Morgenthau Plan, see id. at 115; see generally JOHN DIETRICH, THE MORGENTHAU PLAN:
SovIET INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN POST-WAR POLICY (2002); WARREN F. KIMBALL, SWORDS OR
PLOUGHSHARES?: THE MORGENTHAU PLAN FOR DEFEATED NAZI GERMANY 1943-46 (1976). See
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2. More Legal Invention: Adopting Permanent Neutrality
In establishing the post-war independent Austria, however, the country's rulers
feared that their adoption of the Swiss model of a permanent neutrality47 would still be
perceived as a penalty imposed by the Allies on a former adversary.48 The claim of
victimhood, therefore, needed a domestic (and dominant) public law instrument to
confirm that independent Austria was renouncing external alliances, including any with
Germany, in the name of an autonomous and prudential foreign policy of a formerly
victimized people. In convenient support of this official effort to distance Austria from
the stigmatized Axis Powers, the instruments of Austrian neutrality were left messy and
somewhat ambiguous. They comprised a trio of documents: (1) a bilateral agreement,
the "Moscow Memorandum," signed in 1955 between an Austrian government
delegation and the Soviet Union49 (2) the State Treaty (the instrument ending the four-
power occupation5 °); and (3) a self-styled "constitutional" law on the neutrality of
Austria, adopted internally by the Austrian parliament in October 1955, after the last
foreign soldier had departed from Austrian territory.5'
Austrian diplomacy removed any explicit reference to neutrality from the State
Treaty, evidently in order to avoid the impression of a "neutralization" in its more
pejorative meaning of an imposed condition,52 even though adoption of neutrality was
patently the political price of securing Great Power unanimity on the long-deferred
infra note 110 and accompanying text (considering Austrian fear of imposition of a
Morgenthau-style settlement).
47. Permanent neutrality, prototypically practiced by Switzerland as a matter of custom
and treaty, as an institution of international law obligates a State adopting this status
prospectively to maintain classical neutrality in the wars of other States, and not to take part in
the wars of other States, irrespective of the identity of the belligerents or the geographical
proximity of the conflict. See Brian F. Havel, An International Law Institution in Crisis:
Rethinking Permanent Neutrality, 61 OIo ST. L.J. 167, 183 (addressing the paradox of an
institution that posits a "neutrality," a concept derived from the classical laws of war, as
operative in peacetime).
48. I have elsewhere suggested that the term "neutralization" carries a political
connotation of imposition that is inappropriate to a juridical term of art. I have proposed the
term "neutralitization" to indicate a juridical process of adopting neutrality, irrespective of
whether the political circumstances suggest imposition or discretionary adoption. See id. at 190-
92 (noting that the new coinage, because of its semantic match with the doctrine of neutrality,
eliminates the ambiguity in the root of the word "neutralization").
49. Under this Memorandum (a different document from the Allied Declaration
discussed in text accompanying note 31), the Austrian delegation undertook to "see to it" that
their government would "make a declaration in a form which will oblige Austria internationally
to practice in perpetuity a neutrality of the type maintained by Switzerland," submit the
declaration to the Austrian parliament, and seek international recognition for the declaration. As
noted by Alfred Verdross, the leading international law scholar on Austrian neutrality, the
Memorandum studiously avoided the impression of being a Soviet demand. See ALFRED
VERDROSS, THE PERMANENT NEUTRALITY OF AusTRIA 29-30 (1978). For the text of the
Memorandum, see id. at 26-27.
50. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
51. See Neuhold, supra note 41, at 44, 47.




State Treaty to restore the independence of the Republic. 53 The first article of the later
domestic constitutional law of neutrality accomplished Austria's goal of suggesting a
domestic law provenance for its new foreign policy: it asserted that Austria declared
permanent neutrality "of its own free will" and "[flor the purpose of the permanent
maintenance of external independence and ... the inviolability of its territory.'
54
Confirming its official narrative that Austria should not be counted among the defeated
powers, the Austrian government transmitted the text of the neutrality law to foreign
governments with a request for recognition.55
In sum, the Austrian government, with the implicit support of the Allies, used a
conjunction of domestic and international legal processes to assert claims of national
victimhood, non-complicity, and non-membership of the ring of defeated Axis Powers
as Austria's official recollection of the period of Nazi supremacy. Taken together, the
Moscow Declaration of 1943, the State Treaty of 1955, and the 1955 domestic
constitutional law on neutrality comprise the principal public law mechanisms that
Austria's rulers used after Nazism to construct this official public memory.
C. The 2000 Forced and Slave Labor Negotiations:
Redefining Responsibility for the Past
In April 2000, as the compensation campaign for victims of Nazi forced and slave
labor and property confiscation gathered momentum, 56 the recently elected Austrian
53. Austrian sensitivity to this question of imposition receded, however, after the fall of
the Soviet Union. In 1995, then-foreign minister (now chancellor) Wolfgang Schtissel warned
that "Austria must stop being a passive spectator hiding behind neutrality imposed after the
Second World War." BROOKSI-EPHERD, supra note 26, at 448 (emphasis added).
54. Bundesverfassungsgesetz iiber die Neutralitat Osterreichs [Federal Constitutional
Law on the Neutrality of Austria], reprinted in VERDROSS, supra note 49, at 28.
55. The Austrian government agreed to transmit the neutrality law to third States under
the terms of the bilateral Moscow Memorandum with the Soviet Union. See'supra note 49 and
accompanying text. The second article of the constitutional law was an undertaking by Austria,
consistent with the Swiss model of neutrality, "never in the future [to] accede to any military
alliances nor permit the establishment of military bases of foreign [s]tates on its territory." See
VERDROSS, supra note 49, at 28. By the end of 1975, over seventy-five States-including the
four "Allied and Associated Powers" which had co-signed the State Treaty-had complied with
the Austrian government's request for recognition, whether expressly (in the case of the four
occupying Powers), or by taking note without objection, or by simply confirming receipt of the
declaration of constitutional neutrality. See AUSTRIAN FEDERAL PRESS SERVICE, AuSTRIA TODAY
AND ToMoRRow 28 (1975). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Austrian government leaders
have self-consciously cultivated doubt as to Austria's fidelity to the instruments of
neutralization. The principal legal argument has been one of redundancy: German unity and the
Soviet implosion stripped meaning from most of the State Treaty's provisions (and abrogated
any lingering effect of the Moscow Memorandum). See Ian Traynor, A Question ofNeutrality in
a Changed World, GUARDIAN, Oct. 23, 1990, at 10. But the primary discourse has been one of
political expediency rather than legal necessity. One writer, sympathetic to Austrian history,
wrote of Austrian permanent neutrality in 1997 as having become "as impermanent as the Soviet
Communism which had imposed it." BROOK-SHEPHERD, supra note 26, at 448.
56. For background to the campaign, which began in 1998 with the filing of several
class-action suits against Austrian companies in U.S. federal court, see generally EIZENSTAT,
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chancellor (prime minister), Dr. Wolfgang Schiissel, delivered an important address to
the Austrian ministerial council in which he considered the "central idea" of
Verantwortung, the "responsibility" of Austrians for the "inheritance of our past."
57
Beneath the rubric of official public memory, the Chancellor confessed to a
consciousness that "many Austrians bore responsibility for the tragedy of the
Holocaust. 5 8 In these careful words, Schuissel was crafting an important conceptual
separation (expressible in legalistic terms) between the State of Austria (which had no
legal existence during the Anschluss), and individuals who had been Austrian citizens,
with respect to any direct responsibility for Nazi crimes.5 9 Schfissel, in other words,
supra note 12, at 283-89 (describing how Austrian companies, facing the costs of litigation and
reputational damage, pressed their government to seek a diplomatic solution). At the core of the
campaign was the problematical question of what the generations of today owe victims of the
past "when part of [today's] prosperity is based on their country having enslaved and robbed
them." Id. at 279. Filings in the U.S. federal courts in New York accused Austrian companies of
using slave laborers and of being "dishonest pimps for the Nazis." Id.; see, e.g., Class-action
Complaint, Elkan et al. v. Creditanstalt AG, No. 99 Civ. 0387, 1999 WL 33748771 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Jan. 14, 1999) (inter alia accusing the defendant Austrian banks of knowingly obtaining
economic benefits from and actively participating in the "illegal, inhumane and genocidal
system of slave and forced labor inflicted by the Nazi regime.., upon those people deemed
'subhuman' and used as disposable chattels and slaves or forced laborers" as well as the
"Aryanization" of Jewish-owned property in Austria and pervasive looting of assets held by
concentration camp inmates). In a media age, these kinds of unwelcome charges were calculated
to (and did) set off a panic reaction in Vienna. American Jewish leaders threatened that Austria
could expect "the Waldheim treatment" (i.e., complete ostracization) if it persisted in opposing
new restitution efforts. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 12, at 294 (noting that this was the treatment
meted out a decade earlier by the World Jewish Congress). But see id. at 346 (noting concern
expressed by Abraham Foxman, president of the Jewish Anti-Defamation League in New York,
about "monetizing" the Holocaust). For general background on the social and political reasons
for the spread of a pro-reparations mindset among German elites and their counterparts in
Austria and Switzerland in the late 1990s, see Ambassador J.D. Bindenagel, Justice, Apology,
and Reconciliation and the German Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future
9-10 (2002) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (noting that victim
restitution lawsuits in the United States posed risks to U.S.-German economic relations, and in
particular court judgments, regulatory sanctions, and boycotts against German companies,
triggering European Union retaliation, were distinct possibilities). On West Germany's early
post-war reparations policy, amounting to more than $60 billion to 500,000 Holocaust
survivors, see EIZENSTAT, supra note 12, at 14-15.
57. Erkldrung von Bundeskanzler Dr. Wolfgang Schissel vor dem Ministerrat zum 55.
Jahrestag der Wiederrichtung der Republik, Wien, am 28. April 2000 [Statement of the Federal
Chancellor Dr. Wolfgang Schiissel before the Ministerial Council on the 55th Anniversary of
the Reestablishment of the Republic, Vienna, April 28, 20001, reprinted in 2001 AusTRAN
FOREIGN PoLIcY DOCuMENTs, supra note 31, at 43 [hereinafter April 2000 Statement of Dr.
Wolfgang Schiussel].
58. Id. at 45.
59. Elite management of the past frequently resorts to another variation of the
State/citizen dichotomy, creating a distinction between the goodness of the citizens and their
malevolent leaders. This was the approach (an inversion of Austria's) adopted by Germany and
France in the aftermath of World War II and by the Soviet Union in the age of glasnost. The
West Germans maintained a conceptual distinction between the Nazis and the rest of the
German Volk, and indeed accompanied the dichotomy by a similar notion of "victimhood"
under Hitler. See FREI, supra note 13, at 1 (referring to the "standard distinction" between the
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reconceptualized victimhood as a property of the State, and in this sense purified of the
iniquities of identifiable members of its citizenry.
The rhetorical centerpiece of the Chancellor's address focused intently on this claim
of a morally upright State. Thus, the Chancellor rejected earlier remarks by
parliamentary deputies that linked the Federal Republic of Germany, the German
Democratic Republic (the former East Germany), and Austria as "drei
Nachfolgestaaten" (three successor States) of National Socialist Germany. "That is
simply not true! ... [t]his Austria is not a National Socialist successor State!" the
Chancellor exclaimed. 60 The premise for the Chancellor's vehemence with respect to
the dry issue of legal State succession was once again the official public memory of
Austria's subjugation to Nazism. The Chancellor cited the Moscow Declaration of
1943 (noting that it was explicitly referenced in the pending restitution legislation) as a
document "which came not from Austria, but from the Allies."6' The Allies had
installed an Austrian federal government in 1945, and Austria could not be viewed as a
successor State of Nazi Germany because "in October 1955 Austria received a State
Treaty and not a Peace Treaty!" 62 While the Chancellor spoke of these distinctions as
"only nuances" to the "unbiased observer," these "nuances" were nonetheless "a part of
our history and must not be overlooked., 63 Chancellor Schuissel's April 2000 address
also gave victimhood a more robust and less passive sensibility. Thus, the Chancellor
wove some new strands into the official master narrative, echoing the American master
Nazi leadership and the German people); see also Claudia Koonz, Between Memory and
Oblivion: Concentration Camps in German Memory, in COMMEMORATIONS: THE PoLrIcs OF
NATIONAL IDENTITY 258, 275 (John R. Gillis ed., 1994) (commenting on the emergence since
the 1980s of a German entitlement to describe their own "victimhood" under Hitler); infra notes
146, 382 (same). Similarly, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in the early years after the war referred
insistently to a corrupt and blind Fascist leadership and a new age of purification. See A. JAMES
McADAMS, JUDGING THE PAST IN UNIFIED GERMANY 138 (2001) (mentioning Adenauer's
commitment to atone for "the base acts perpetrated in the name of the whole German people").
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in a much later era, continued to cordon off the Nazi era as segregated
and atypical. See BILL NIvEN, FACING THE NAzI PAST: UNrrED GERMANY ANDTHE LEGACY OFTHE
THIRD REICH 242 (2002) (commenting on Kohl's policy to exclude any specific focus on
German crime and responsibility, "preferring to label all Germans as victims"). In similar vein,
French President Charles de Gaulle presented himself (and his post-war government) as the
essence of a France that had not collaborated. La France was reborn and recast as a collective
resister in contrast to the actions of the Vichy leadership. See ADAM NossIrER, THE ALGERIA
HOTEL: FRANCE, MEMORY, AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR 4 (2001) (observing that de Gaulle
incarnated the essence of France, and that his version of the war's aftermath, that France had
wiped out the vestiges of the Vichy dictatorship and been reborn as a democracy, was the
accepted one); see also ERNA PARIS, LONG SHADOws: TRUTH, LIES AND HISTORY 79 (2001)
(addressing the implausibility of de Gaulle's official post-war French history in which the entire
population was touted as having heroically resisted the Germans); infra text accompanying note
143 (on the existence of a particular French self-concept). Finally, with respect to the Soviet
Union, see FONER, supra note 3, at 77 (recalling how former Soviet President Mikhail
Gorbachev preached glasnost ("intellectual openness") to the Soviet people, while repeatedly
portraying past Soviet leaders "in the blackest hues").
60. April 2000 Statement of Dr. Wolfgang Schilssel, supra note 57, at 43.
61 . Id. (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 160 (emphasis in original).
63. Id. at 161.
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concept of great men and covenantal documents.64 In addition to fetishizing the State
Treaty as something utterly distinct from a peace treaty,65 Schiissel extolled his post-
war predecessors who "took responsibility for this country in their own hands" (a noble
kind of responsibility in contrast to the opprobrium of responsibility for Nazism) and
declared Austria's post-Nazi independence.
66
D. Conclusion
Forty-five years after the State Treaty, the Austrian master narrative of a nation
unshackled from terrible bondage continued to determine official perceptions in
negotiating the restitution agreement reached in 2000.67 Intransigence about restitution
had characterized Austrian decisions since the 1943 Moscow Declaration by the Allied
Powers first professed Austria's victim status and exempted the country from the
compensation requirements imposed on other defeated Axis States. 68 The externally
validated victimology became such an idieflxe in Austrian elite thinking that in 2000
the Austrian government felt comfortable drawing a distinction that recalled the honor
of an Austrian State that disappeared with the Anschluss, while condemning those
"citizens" of that non-existent State who allegedly collaborated with Nazi repression.69
64. See infra text accompanying note 136 (discussing the U.S. Constitution and its
"founding fathers" as elements of the U.S. official memory).
65. See supra text accompanying note 42 (noting that Germany and other defeated Axis
powers were typically subjected to "peace" treaties with the victorious States).
66. 2001 AUsTRrIAN FOREIGN Poucy DOCUMENTS, supra note 31, at 44. In a similar
attempt to create a common political consciousness, the architects of the so-called "July Plot" to
assassinate Hitler received post-war recognition in the new West German Republic. See FRET,
supra note 13, at 269 (discussing an idealization of the plotters, "who in the end emerged as
something approaching the fathers of West German democracy"). But see BEsCHLoss, supra
note 46, at 258 (explaining that the Truman Administration declined similar recognition,
preferring to emphasize the collective guilt of the German people rather than individual acts of
defiance).
67. Stuart Eizenstat, who led the Clinton Administration's efforts on Holocaust
restitution issues, recounts the perceived inadequacy of Austria's earlier efforts at compensation
for victims of slave and forced labor and seized property. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 12, at 281,
302, 304 (mentioning loopholes and deficiencies in prior laws). Eizenstat concedes frankly that
U.S. class-action lawyers forced the issue of past inadequacy into the open. See id. at 283
(discussing class-action suits on behalf of conscripted workers); see also supra note 56
(summarizing an example of a class-action filing).
68. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing post-war Austrian diplomatic
success at excising restitution obligations). A report of the American Jewish Congress,
published in 1999, traces the history of Austria's post-war policies on restitution and
compensation for Jewish victims and survivors of the Holocaust. ROBERT S. WISTRICH, AUSTRIA
ANo THE LEGACY OF THE HOLOCAUST 17 (1999) (summary available at http://www.ajc.org.)
[hereinafter AJC Report]. The AJC Report emphasizes how the 1943 Allied declaration of
"victimhood" remained a powerful disincentive to a reparations mindset. See id. at 8-12 (noting
that, for Jewish organizations in the post-war period, "[iut was not easy to claim reparations from
a 'victim"').
69. In fact, as the Report of the American Jewish Congress notes, the dichotomizing of
moral and legal responsibility that underlay Austria's approach to the 2000-2001 restitution
negotiations was already a mannerism of Austrian policy in 1953 when the Austrian
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For Austrian official public memory at century's end, the public law doctrine of
victimhood became fastened to a new legal distinction between a suspended State and
the actions of a hypothetical citizenry. This combination of victimhood and lack of
State responsibility defined official remembrance of the Nazi era even in the aftermath
of other recent contestative events such as the controversial presidency of Kurt
Waldheim 70 and the political rise of the reactionary governor of the province of
Carinthia, Jorg Haider.71
government, prompted by the British and Americans, offered a small amount of relief in
connection with "heirless property." See AJC Report, supra note 68, at 8 (indicating that the
relief was characterized by the Austrian government as strictly "humanitarian," a moral rather
than a legal responsibility); see also infra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing similar
Swiss characterization in recent restitution negotiations). Chancellor Schiussel's April 2000
address, see supra note 57, focuses on immediate post-war efforts by Austria to cleanse the stain
of Nazi collaboration. The Chancellor recounts a process of over 136,000 "investigations," over
28,000 "charges," over 13,000 judgments, and 30 executions, in addition to civil service and
corporate purges; in addition, he summarizes a variety of reparations and compensation laws.
April 2000 Statement of Dr. Wolfgang Schtissel, supra note 57, at 45-46. Yet the Chancellor
omits any mention of Austria's policies of reintegrating and amnestying former Nazis. See infra
note 155 and accompanying text (discussing these policies).
70. In 1986, Austria elected as State president former U.N. Secretary-General Kurt
Waldheim, who had admitted altering his biography to conceal his past service on the senior
staff of a Nazi army unit that had responsibility for concentration camp deportations.
Waldheim's "brown past" has never been completely explained. The allegations that he had
been involved in savage reprisals against Yugoslav partisans in the Balkans, and in the
deportation of Greek Jews from Salonika, were never proved. For discussion of how U.S. Jewry
reacted to Waldheim's potential elevation, see EIZENSTAT, supra note 12, at 56-57 (discussing
World Jewish Congress investigation that contradicted Waldheim's denial of his Nazi past). The
affair provoked some extreme and unsavory anti-Semitic rhetoric within Austria. It may be that
Austrians ultimately picked Waldheim as their president not primarily because of an anti-
Semitic backlash against his detractors but because he had a significant, if unremarkable, career
as a global diplomat. See MILLER, supra note 26, at 78-79 (describing Waldheim as a "terrible"
Secretary-General, but noting that how he "ran the world" was not important to the electorate,
but merely the fact that "the world was run by an Austrian"). The new Austrian president found
himself placed on the U.S. Department of State's watchlist and hence denied entry to the United
States. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 12, at 282 (noting how "painful" the Waldheim period was
for Austria). The United States and European Union also instigated a restricted contacts
diplomatic policy that, in Eizenstat's view, forced Austria into deepening its sensitivity to
Holocaust issues. Id. at 284-85. For a comprehensive overview of the Waldheim controversy,
including Austria's efforts to "correct" its image even as the country became more introspective,
see Melanie A. Sully, The Waldheim Connection, in CONQUERING THE PAST: AUSTRIAN NAZISM
YESTERDAY & TODAY 294 (F. Parkinson ed., 1989) [hereinafter CONQUERING THE PAST].
71. The period since 1986 also witnessed a huge rise in popular support for the
Freedom Party under its reactionary leader, Jorg Haider, the governor of the Austrian State of
Carinthia. The Freedom Party became part of Austria's ruling coalition from 1999. Although
Haider himself declined to join the cabinet, the new administration's international standing was
damaged from the outset by his past record of open xenophobia and covert and overt Nazi
apologias. Prominent among the elements of Haider's discourse that seeped into international
public consciousness during this period were his views that National Socialism eliminated
unemployment and created effective social policy, and that the Nazi concentration camps were
"punishment" camps. See J6rg Haider's Controversial Comments, Agence France-Presse, Feb.
2, 2000, Global Newsbank. Haider's party won the Carinthian State election in March 2004;
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II. CLAIMING SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE PAST: EXPOSING THE CHARACTERISTIC
PATTERNS OF OFFICIAL PUBLIC MEMORY
A. Introduction
The preceding account of how Austria managed its official memory of Nazism
reveals certain universal or prototypical issues that motivate the creation of official
public memory. Foremost among these issues must be the question of how any State
should approach official memory of an "ignominious" past.72 In the process of
reconciling itself with the State's history, does an official memory accentuate certain
aspects of the past and suppress others? What are the general or specific claims that a
State will make about past persons or occurrences? How should those claims be
formulated? Will certain claims be uniquely sanctified in a mythology of founding (or
re-founding)? Will a State leverage its monopoly on law and of the civil and criminal
legal processes to support those claims? Austria presents the problematic (and partly
legal) question of how a new governing elite accommodates itself to being a successor
to an ousted and internationally reviled predecessor. And the Austrian study also
invites consideration of how to manage contestative narratives that may emerge
decades after the initial claims of memory have been asserted and supported.
As will be seen in the next part, I have used the Austrian case study to reveal a
number of characteristic patterns that demonstrate how State elites can approach these
complex issues in the management of an official public memory. Because I have
chosen to articulate these issues empirically, however, I do not present the exposed
characteristic patterns as normative or directive. They reflect what appear to be
repeated sets of actions by States attempting to construct ideological representations of
their pasts, and in extrapolating these patterns from the Austrian experience I also
report (both in the main text and in footnotes) other examples from the experiences of
other States. The revelation of these characteristic patterns, moreover, suggests that
States do accept the power of officially managed memory, and that their cultivation of
an official public memory is therefore (from their own pragmatic perspective) a
rational act.
B. From Case Study to Characteristic Patterns
1. A Summary of the Characteristic Patterns
It will be useful to begin with a short conspectus of the characteristic patterns
identified in the following discussion. Official public memory primarily (but not
Haider Bounces Back, EIU V[EWSWIRE EUROPE, Mar. 15, 2004, available at http://db.eiu.com.
For a detailed account of Haider's early rise to prominence, see Max E. Riedlsperger, F.P. 0:
Liberal or Nazi, in CONQUERING THE PAST, supra note 70, at 257.
72. This is the precise word used by the German Consul-General in Chicago, Dr.
Alexander Petri, at a ceremony in Chicago on April 22, 2004, to confer the Commander's Cross
of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany on Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni for
services to the Rule of Law and the establishment of the International Criminal Court. Members
of the audience appeared stunned by the Consul-General's candor. (notes of speech on file with
the Indiana Law Journal).
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exclusively 73) controls the removed past that lies beyond the immediate cognition of
most or all of the present citizenry.74 This kind of memory is highly selective in its
treatment of the past, quickly partitioning past events and people into the memorable
(and, hence, the "memorializable") and the infinitely vaster provinces of the
unmemorable (the "not-to-be-remembered"). It is constructivist, since it treats the past
not as an archival finality (a fundamental conceit, as I discuss in more detail in Part III,
of the discipline of history) but as a series of claims for which supporting data needs to
be culled, organized, and often reformulated into centralized structures such as a
national legislative instrument. It is mythopoetic, since official claims about the past
are less concerned with historical fidelity than with creating adaptations and
extrapolations that simplify a complex past. It is, or strives to be, incorporative,
assimilating and attempting thereby to neutralize counter-narrative challenges to the
claims made by hegemonic memory. Finally, official public memory is presentist,
serving the pragmatic purpose of social control of existing and future populations and
ideologies. While I present these characteristic patterns separately for purposes of
exposition, collectively they supply a cohesive analytical texture to the study of why
official public memory can be said to be contrived and inauthentic, and each of them
will be regularly present in any empirical evaluation of official memory management.
2. Derivation of the Characteristic Patterns
a. Selectivity
Austrian official public memory emphasizes the Allied Powers' wartime recognition
of Austria's status as "the first free country to fall victim to Hitlerite aggression. ' 75 The
projection of victimhood has been used to vitiate the newsreel memory of the Austrian
Volk as willing votaries of Nazism. Even though, by the 1990s, new scholarship had
explored and confirmed the painful realities of the Austrian embrace of Hitler's own
mythology of Heim ins Reich,76 the State's official public memory still insists that
73. See, e.g, supra text accompanying note 16 (observing the "real time" evolution of
official memory in the context of the Bush Administration's response to the September 11,2001
terror attacks).
74. "Mass production" of memory, in the phrase borrowed by Mark Osiel, may have the
power to displace the memory of events, and even the memory of those memories held by the
descendants of the original witnesses. See MARK OSIEL, MASS ATRocrrv, COUECriVE MEMORY,
AND THE LAW 18, n.28 (1997) (suggesting that memory production by the State and its legal
institutions, after survivors are no longer available, becomes "a realistic possibility and, for
some, a terrible danger"). Indeed, the recession of the past need not indicate the passage of a
great deal of time. The events of September 11, 2001, created a much larger psychic barrier
between the presidency of Bill Clinton and that of his successor than the passage of nine months
would seem to justify. See Jonathan Alter, 'Life is Fleeting, Man,' NEWSWEEK, Apr. 8, 2002, at
42, 44 (quoting President Clinton's own observation that "the American people have moved on
to other things"); see also infra note 410 (discussing Proust's view that people in society lack
clarity about the timing and significance of past historical events).
75. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing the Allied Declaration on
Austria, issued in 1943, which is the source of this formula).
76. The Heim in Reich initiative (literally translated, "Home into the Realm") was Adolf
Hitler's policy, starting in 1939, to spread a revanchist gospel to people of German descent
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Austria, as the directoire of Allied Powers decreed in their Moscow Declaration, was
the first victim of Nazi belligerence. Official public memory, therefore, shows a
calculated selectivity in deciding what aspects of the State's past will be remembered,
and (no less tendentiously) how they will be remembered.
The selectivity considered here, it should be noted, is ideological rather than
pragmatic. Pragmatic selectivity requires no empirical deduction. It is a simple
recognition that there is so much to recall, over such long time frames, implicating a
profusion of national, local, and even tribal prejudices, that inevitably some narrative
threads must be (and become) privileged over others. More powerfully than we can
ever experience in individual memory, the nature of official public memory would
necessarily have to be reductive, evacuative, and selective. 77 It feels no compulsion to
try to remember everything that has ever happened in the national life. 78 As a
pragmatic matter, therefore, official memory would silence not just contested
interpretations of the past,79 but most interpretations of the past. No past event or
80person automatically self-selects to become part of the rites of official memory.
On the other hand, the characteristic pattern of selectivity, as the Austrian
experience demonstrates, is biased, intentional, and ideological. Official memory work
is saturated with power dynamics that determine what is remembered (or forgotten), by
what means, and for what objective.8' Selectivity's biases, in this sense, may just as
readily compel amnesia as commemoration for reasons that have nothing to do with a
pragmatic pruning of the historical record. In Nietzschean terms, official public
memory leans toward celebratory and nostalgic ("monumental") memory rather than
living outside Germany that they should strive to unite their countries with Germany-to bring
their regions "home" into a greater Germany. See generally Bukey, supra note 26, at 151
(describing how Austrians today have found it difficult to grasp the pervasiveness of Nazi
collaboration and anti-Semitism during Hitler's occupation); see also CHRISTIAN ZENTNER, HEIM
iNS REICH: DER ANscHLuss OsTERREicHS 1938 [HOME INTO THE REALM: THE ANNEXATION OF
AUSTRIA, 1938] (1988).
77. See infra note 371 and accompanying text (analyzing how individual memory
survives-and thrives-by its evacuative properties).
78. See YOSEF HAYIM YERUSHALMI, ZAKHOR: JEWISH HISTORY AND JEWISH MEMORY 11
(1989) (noting that biblical injunctions place Israel under no obligation to remember the entire
past, but only to recall "God's acts of intervention in history, and man's responses to them, be
they positive or negative;" "Zakhor, "incidentally, is the imperative mood of the Hebrew word
for "remember." See id. at xiii (from foreword by Harold Bloom).
79. See David Middleton & Derek Edwards, Introduction, in COLLECrIVE
REMEMBERING 1, 8 (David Middleton & Derek Edwards eds., 1990) (observing that
commemoration silences contrary interpretations of the past, so that the remembrance of those
who died in war also silences outrage at the courses of action that led to those losses)
[hereinafter COLLEcTIvE REMEMBERING]; see also EDKINS, supra note 18, at 21 (contemplating
the difficulty of challenging public ceremonials of World War I despite "private experience of
the war and its horrors").
80. See IRWIN-ZARECKA, supra note 37, at 133 (addressing the long-germinating and
intentionalist creation of a feminist critique of patriarchy).
81. See John R. Gillis, Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship, in
COMMEMORATIONS: THE POLTnCS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY 3 (John R. Gillis ed., 1994) (discussing
how "memory work" is, like any other kind of physical or mental labor, embedded in complex




the critical memory that judges and condemns.82 Celebratory public memory involves a
"creative forgetfulness," predicating memory of some aspects of the past on amnesia
about others.83 For Austria, celebratory memory recalls the glories of Empire and the
peacemaking contributions of an activist neutrality, passing over the intercalary Nazi
occupation as a period when the Austrian State was forcibly in hiatus. This is not to
suggest that governmental selectivity consciouslyfalsifies the past;84 but the capacity to
rework or suppress unpleasant history is omnipresent in offical structuring of past
events. 85 Nations pick and choose from their past, just as individuals do, s6 and the
lucidity of the public's memory (again, like that of individuals) is likely to decompose
over time.87 Thus, as the recent challenges to the Austrian master narrative have
demonstrated, the power of official public memory can prevail despite accessible
information that opposes it.88
82. See Austin Sarat, When Memory Speaks: Remembrance and Revenge in Unforgiven,
77 IND. L.J. 307, 325 (2002) (applying Nietzschean categories of memory in the context of a
motion picture critique, particularly (as Nietzsche writes) how "critical" memory "bring[slthe
past to the bar ofjudgment, interrogate[s] it remorselessly, and finally condemn[s] it"). Critical
or "realist" memory is anti-romantic, anti-heroic, and uncompromising in its "facticity." Id. at
328 (suggesting that critical memory comes closest to a kind of history, while monumental
memory is "steeped in the literary and political work of memorialization").
83. "Creative forgetfulness" is another Nietzschean expression. See FONER, supra note
3, at xii-xiii (placing this idea within the framework of how the United States-at various sub-
governmental levels-has effaced the legacy of slavery and the Civil War, to the point that what
Foner calls "public history" has a large void with respect to what scholarship has identified as
the "centrality" of slavery to the history of the United States).
84. But see MICHAEL KAMMEN, MYSTIC CHORDS OFMEMORY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
TRADITON IN AMERICAN CULTURE 3 (1991) (noting that "societies"-Kammen's conception of
the stakeholders of memory involves a much broader canvass than government elites-
reconstruct their pasts rather than faithfully record them).
85. But see MARGALIT, supra note 7, at 98-100 (demonstrating how the ontology of
State-managed memory can cause even seasoned critics to betray existential confusion, Margalit
expresses skepticism about "the immense power accredited by some writers to the elites, who
supposedly manipulate the masses by inventing communal stories to promote their own selfish
interests," while accepting that "nationalism" has tended to ensure that "collective" memory is
indeed manipulated by these same elites).
86. See HrrcHENs, supra note 7, at 85 (citing comment, B propos Britain, that it is
easier to remember Shakespeare and Churchill than Northern Ireland).
87. See KAMMEN, supra note 84, at 9 (citing numerous sources supporting the
perception that the public, notably the U.S. public, lacks a collective memory).
88. See id. at 26 (focusing on the endurance of cultural myths such as the supposedly
boundless economic opportunities in the United States that drove nineteenth century
immigration); see also Christopher Hitchens, Kennedy Lies, THE SPECTATOR, Nov.19, 1983,
reprinted in CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, PREPARED FOR THE WORST: SELECTED ESSAYS AND
MINORITY REPORTS 252-54 (1988) (attacking various alleged "lies" that underpin the
"grandiose absurdity" of the Kennedy myth, which Hitchens evidently perceives as supported by
official memory). Hitchens argues, for example, that Kennedy was not the author of his Pulitzer
Prize-winning book, Profiles in Courage, and that he kept Congress in ignorance of a
clandestine and ill-advised war against Fidel Castro's Cuba. See id.
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b. Constructivism
Artful legal interpretation was (and continues to be) the metric for understanding
Austria's management of public memory of the Nazi occupation. A few months after
Chancellor Schiissel's address (discussed above), Austria's Office of the Special Envoy
for Restitution Issues issued a detailed technical analysis of Austria's international
legal status between 1938 and 1945.89 According to this analysis, the "legal
responsibility" for which Austria as a State lacked capacity extended to the war crimes
and human rights violations perpetrated by the Nazi regime. 90 This emphasis on
Austria's disappearance as an independent State consolidated a public law construct of
functional incapacity (and ultimate victimhood), so that the responsibility of
"individual Austrians," and their associated "moral responsibility" for the crimes of




In December 2000, the same Office published a report on past Austrian measures of
restitution.92 Like the Chancellor's address, the report's introduction reveals a cautious
89. Ambassador Dr. Ernst Sucharipa, Office of the Special Envoy for Restitution Issues,
Austria's International Legal Status between 1938 and 1945 and Austrian Restitution Efforts,
August 2000, reprinted in 2001 AUSTRIAN FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENTS, supra note 31, at 48.
90. See id. at 50 (citing the laws of State responsibility, under which it is firmly
established that a State to which a violation of international law is to be attributed "must
always-in addition to the legal capacity which it has by definition-also possess the capacity to
act under international law" (citation omitted)).
91. Id. (emphasis in original). In keeping with the dominant construction, this technical
analysis also called on external statements of support. The term "State Treaty," the document
insists, was "deliberately chosen" by the negotiating powers. And a report of the U.S. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations on the Austrian State Treaty emphasized that Committee's
view that "the treaty before the Senate is not a peace treaty. This nation was never in [sic] war
with Austria. This treaty is, rather, the Austrian State Treaty which restores Austria to the status
of independence it occupied before the Anschluss." Id. at 52. In support of the proposition that
the Allied victors regarded Austria as a liberated rather than a defeated country, the Special
Envoy's analysis quotes a number of additional U.S. post-war pronouncements, including a
Department of State press release of November 10, 1946 ("[The U.S.] Government consistently
avoided any step which might be considered to constitute de jure recognition of the annexation
of Austria by Germany"); a radio address by President Roosevelt on May 27, 1941 (describing
the Austrians as the first of a series of peoples enslaved by Hitler); the text of the Moscow
Declaration of November 16, 1943, signed by the United States, see supra note 31and
accompanying text; and the judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg which
defined the invasion of Austria as a "a premeditated aggressive step in furthering the plan to
wage aggressive wars against other countries." 2001 AUsTRIAN FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENTS,
supra note 31, at 51-52.
92. Ambassador Dr. Ernst Sucharipa, Office of the Special Envoy for Restitution Issues,
Survey of Past Austrian Measures of Restitution, Compensation and Social Welfare for Victims
of National Socialism, December 2000, reprinted in 2001 AUSTRIAN FOREIGN POLICY
DOcuMENTs, supra note 31, at 64 (translation supplied). Article 21 of the State Treaty excluded
all claims of reparation against Austria, providing that "[n]o reparation shall be exacted from
Austria arising out of the existence of a state of war in Europe after I st September 1939." Id. at
53. The Treaty did provide in Article 26, however, for the making of restitution and
compensation with respect to forced transfer of property on account of the racial origin or
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reformulation of the official memory of victimhood, acknowledging the "moral
responsibility" of individual Austrians while still disclaiming national "legal
responsibility" and maintaining victimhood:
[O]n the one hand, Austrians were among the perpetrators of the most heinous
Nazi crimes.. . on the other hand, Austrians were among the victims of National
Socialism .... During the period of occupation by Nazi Germany in 1938 and
liberation by the Allied Powers in 1945, Austria, as a State, lacked capacity to act
and incur any legal responsibility on the international plane.
93
And this motif of Austria's legal non-existence (and hence putative blamelessness
and victimhood) was pursued into the final texts of the U.S.-Austrian agreements on
the restitution process. 94 In the joint statement on the signing of the bilateral agreement
on the reconciliation fund,95 the preambular clauses acknowledge Austria's "moral
responsibility" but recognize "the suffering of all victims of slave or forced labor who
worked on the territory of the present-day Republic of Austria ... which had been
incorporated into the German Reich. 96
The deliberate ideological purpose reflected in the Austrian statements (and,
consciously or not, in repeated U.S. endorsement) cannot be described as an incidental
by-product of administration. The remembering and forgetting of Austrian memory
management were (and are) highly constructed activities, not merely reproductions of
religion of the owner. See id. at 5. But see EIZENSTAT, supra note 12, at 312 (noting that, with
respect to property restitution claims, the negotiations proceeded far beyond Austria's original
position "that it had already done all that was required on property restitution").
93. 2001 AusTRIAN FOREIGN POLCY DOCUMENTS, supra note 31, at 64.
94. These agreements, in Stuart Eizenstat's words, comprised "one massive alternative
dispute-resolution process." EIZENSTAT, supra note 12, at 353 (summarizing the outcome as
"rough justice" to pay mass numbers of victims rather than the kind of "individualized justice"
that would be afforded by court review). The remedial procedures were primarily administrative,
including Austria's Fund for Reconciliation, Peace and Cooperation. See id.
95. Joint Statement on the Occasion of the Signing Ceremony of the Bilateral
Agreements Relating to the Austrian Reconciliation Fund, Vienna, October 24,2000, reprinted
in 2001 AUSTRIAN FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENTS, supra note 31, at 247 [hereinafter Joint
U.S./Austria Statement].
96. Id. at 247 (emphasis added). A parliamentary committee report responding to a
petition of members of parliament advocating a federal restitution law demonstrates the
coherence with which the founding mythology of victimhood and legal non-existence continues
to dominate elite analysis. Committee Report Concerning Petition 180/A of Representatives
Cap, Khol, Westenhaler, Stoisits, and Colleagues on the Subject of a Federal Law for the Fund
for Voluntary Payments by the Republic of Austria to Former Slave Laborers and Forced
Laborers of the National Socialist Regime (Reconciliation Fund Law), reprinted in 2001
AUSTRIAN FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENTS, supra note 31, at 201 (translation supplied). The report
veers slightly from the master narrative in acknowledging the "shared responsibility of Austria,"
id. at 201 (emphasis added), and indeed proposes "a particularly alert and critical discussion and
a necessary sensitivity to the structures and mechanisms of the National Socialist criminal
system." Id. at 202. But the report's conclusion corrects any deviation from convention. For the
victims, the report concludes, "the place where this [the "suffering of the victims of slave labor
and forced labor"] happened was Austria, even though [the State ofAustria] did not exist at the
time." Id. at 203 (emphasis added).
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the past97 or the mechanical retrieval of stored or archived information." Official
public memory involves the construction of a claim about a past occurrence or series of
occurrences (the claim, for Austria, is premised on instruments of national and
international law). Official public memory, in fact, is strongly constructivist.
An example from U.S. experience, the cult of Lincoln, is revealing. Lincoln's latter-
day apotheosis was surely a work of construction as opposed to retrieval.99 Although
construction involved public commemoration rather than (as in the Austrian case) a
specific set of legal instruments, the Progressive movement transformed Lincoln's
ambivalent post-Civil War image precisely to assist passage of legislation sponsored by
the movement. Sociologist Barry Schwartz, emphasizing this social construction
"shaped by the concerns of the present," develops a compelling essay on how all of this
happened.' e° Lincoln's death was not seen, in its time, as an irreplaceable loss.' 0'
Lincoln became interesting to the Progressive movement, which sought to deploy
federal governmental power in the pursuit of antitrust, food and drug law, child and
sweatshop laws, workmen's compensation, a progressive income tax, and political
reforms.102 So Lincoln became aggrandized. His colossal alabaster Memorial in the
center of Washington, D.C. demonstrates this deferential evolution (and mythical
separation) as the folk hero became the epic hero, 0 3 the declaimer of Gettysburg
97. See Sarat, supra note 82, at 311 (concluding that a memory, both private and
individual as well as collective and cultural, is "constructed, not reproduced ... in conversations
with others that occur in the contexts of community, broader politics, and social dynamics")
(citation omitted). The constructed nature of individual memory is discussed infra text
accompanying note 363.
98. See Alan Radley, Artefacts, Memory and a Sense of the Past, in COLLECTIVE
REMEMBERING, supra note 79, at 46 (again, emphasizing that memory is constructed activity
rather than retrieval, and involves a "putting together of a claim about past States of affairs by
means of a framework of shared cultural understanding); see also Gillis, supra note 81, at 3
(asserting that memories-and identities-"are not fixed things, but representations or
constructions of reality, subjective rather than objective phenomena").
99. Barry Schwartz, The Reconstruction of Abraham Lincoln, in COLLECTIVE
REMEMBERING, supra note 79, at 81, 103 (discussing complexity of"presentist" influences on
the process of construction).
100. Id. at 81. Schwartz also considers the "atemporal" views, inter alia, of Maurice
Halbwachs, which "relates things remembered in a given context to beliefs, interests, aspirations
and fears of the here and now." Id. at 82.
101. See id. at 83-84 (noting that Lincoln was opposed after his narrow reelection
success by a large percentage of the Northern population, who perceived him as too forgiving to
the South).
102. See id. at 93-94 (describing how the Progressives, hamessers of federal power,
pushed a complex economic reform agenda in pursuit of humane capitalism, but also demanded
democratic political reforms including direct elections of senators and women's suffrage).
103. See id. at 99-102 (analyzing how Lincoln, a man of relatively humble origin, was
thought to be the kind of accessible and responsive figure that allowed his character and life to
be merged with the promise of twenthieth-century political and economic reforms, yet also to
take on a second (and contradictory) set of characteristics as the more distant embodiment of the
State, the power and moral dignity of America; Lincoln thus personified both the priority of the
State and its elites and the entitlements of the masses, becoming a constructed figure who could
at once serve as a common person of uncommon insight (the folk hero) and as the avatar of the
greatness of the State and its authority (the epic hero)).
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whose adamantine words would almost a century and a half later be intoned on the first
anniversary of the September 11 attacks. °' Schwartz concludes that "the [S]tate,
through its own archival and commemorative enterprises, seeks to make the




For Austria, victimology has been the cynosure of the State's post-Nazi existence.
Austria's post-war leaders felt the need for a claim about Austria's Nazi complicity that
would shift the public memory (not just of Austrians, but of the wider world) to a story
of Austria that would dilute, and ideally expunge, the Nazi stain. Substituting a
pusillanimous neutrality for the Anschluss seemed to allow Austria to reach back in
time to the age of the Habsburg Empire, positioning the newly independent country as
a weakened but proud survivor with a glorious history, whose past radiances were
dimmed by Nazism. 1 6 Neutrality itself could hardly be presented as a noble burden,
given the moral ambiguity with which this concept has historically been associated. 0 7
104. But see Joyce Pumick, A Dissent on Hallowing 9/11 Ground, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
2002, at B I (mentioning criticism by historian Garry Wills that use of the Gettysburg Address to
commemorate 9/11 was inappropriate because it did not address the "specific tragedy" of the
victims); Susan Sontag, Editorial, Real Battles and Empty Metaphors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
1992, at A25 (attacking ritual citation and recycling of great Lincoln speeches, which empties
them of meaning). For a recent study of Lincoln's moral self-development, see WILLIAM LEE
MILLER, LiNcoLN's VIRTUES: AN ETHIcAL BIOGRAPHY (2003).
105. Schwartz, supra note 99, at 104 (noting comparison with "the Church"-
presumably the Catholic Church-which "supervises the revelation of Christ" to ensure its
immutability through the ages).
106. Discussing Argentina's reckoning with a brutal past of military repression, Carina
Perelli makes the candid and revealing argument that "the past is [a] central political commodity
in the 'has[-]been' countries," so that invocation of past glories becomes indispensable to the
social stability of the depleted present. Carina Perelli, Memorta de Sangre: Fear, Hope, and
Disenchantment in Argentina, in REMAPPING MEMORY: THE POLITICS OF TIMESPACE 39, 39
(Jonathan Boyarin ed., 1994) (describing Argentina as a "has-been country, where nostalgia
flourishes"). The possibility of analogy to Austria can seem tragic: Vienna, with its imperial
central boulevard, the Ringstrasse, is all too obviously the urban reliquary of a lost empire, and
a nostalgic recall of past glory is an understandable elite fixation and a means to hold fast to a
dignity based on a grand (but lost) heritage. See Richard Bernstein, Vienna's Grandeur Fails to
Mask a Sense of Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2003, at A8 (describing the "pathos" and
"unrecapturable past" of a place that was once the center of the world and has been reduced to a
lesser status). See generally PAUL HOFFMAN, THE VIENNNESE: SPLENDOR, TWILIGHT AND ExILE
(1988) (a history of the cultural elite of the city).
107. See Detlev F. Vagts, The Traditional Legal Concept of Neutrality in a Changing
Environment, 14 Am. U. INT'L L. REV. 83, 84 (1998) (tendentiously describing neutrality toward
a genocidal episode as "indifference, callousness, or a studied calculation of costs and
benefits"). For a more measured view, see Seymour J. Rubin, The Washington Accord Fifty
Years Later: Neutrality, Morality, and International Law, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 61, 80-81
(1998) (noting the quandary of choosing "evident and accepted" standards for choice in morally
conflicted situations). The moral attack on neutrality, as is well-known, is the product of recent
revelations concerning the European neutrals' continuing economic relations with the Nazi
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But it was a serviceable platform for clever political leaders (including long-time
chancellor Bruno Kreisky) to promote a sympathetic outside view of the country and,
in keeping with the official construction of memory, to escape the stigma of being a
defeated Axis belligerent.'
0 8
The Austrian ruling elite, in other words, became an "activist[] of memory"' 9 in
service to an official mythology of the modem Republic's founding and history. They
sensed an urgent geopolitical need to do so. A branding of Austria by imposed
demilitarization or the systematic ruralization that the unrealized (but threatened)
Morgenthau Plan advocated for Germany, 1 0 could have been one outcome of the post-
war settlements. A successful narrative, therefore, required Austria's leaders to find a
plausible means of restoring and preserving the country's independence even as it was
being "sucked into the 'strudel' of growing East-West conflict."l"l Although derided
by Austria's critics as a Lebensliige (a "life-lie")," 2 the externally validated mythology
of victimhood, coupled with Austria's conceded disappearance as an autonomous legal
and administrative unit after the Anschluss, would persist to the end of the century as
anchors of the official documents and speeches accompanying Austria's agreements on
compensation for victims of Nazi policies of slave and forced labor and property
dispossession."
3
At one level, the alignment of Austria's documents of mythopoesis (the Moscow
Declaration, the State Treaty, and the domestic constitutional law on neutrality)' 4
could be seen as technical and legalistic. On the empyrean planes of mythmaking and
official public memory, however, the State Treaty-foreshadowed by the Declaration
and foreshadowing the constitutional law-was a spectacular external ratification of
regime during World War II. On these topics, see generally JEAN ZIEGLER, THE Swiss, THE
GOLD, AND THE DEAD 13, 18, 133 (John Brownjohn trans., 1998) (asserting de facto integration
of Switzerland into the Reichsdeutsch-Greater German-economic area between 1940, upon
the defeat of France, and 1945). Ziegler's book is a blistering indictment of his country's
government, and of the Swiss banking community, for providing the gold laundering services
that helped to finance the Wehrmacht by giving Germany access to internationally disposable
foreign exchange to buy strategic raw materials. See id. at 48-49; see also Krister Wahlback,
Neutrality and Morality: The Swedish Experience, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 103, 107 (1998)
(discussing inter alia Swedish supply of iron ore to German munitions industry). Ironically, as
Wahlbdck is at pains to point out, much of this economic activity was not in violation of the
international law of neutrality. Rubin, supra, at 107.
108. For a commendatory account of Chancellor Kreisky's numerous initiatives to
enhance global respect for Austrian neutrality, see generally PICK, supra note 44, at 109-17
(noting in particular his efforts to promote human rights in the Soviet-dominated Eastern bloc,
including his sponsorship of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe).
109. OsiEL, supra note 74, at 3 (citation omitted).
110. See supra note 46 (discussing Carthaginian proposal hatched by Robert
Morgenthau, Treasury Secretary under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, to ruralize, demilitarize,
and dismember Germany).
111. GERALD STOURZH, EINE KLEINE GESCHICHTE DES OSTERREICHISCHEN
STAATSVERTRAGES [A SHORT HISTORY OF THE AusTRIAN STATE TREATY] 103 (1975).
112. AJC Report, supra note 68, at 19 (arguing that Austria's post-war identity was
constructed in part around a collective amnesia that denied any complicity in the Holocaust).
113. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the victiinhood-Statehood
dyad as the supporting arch of Austrian official public memory).
114. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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Austria's victimhood and has been treated as such in repeated official commemorations
of its signing. As one writer commented with respect to the controversy involving the
alleged Nazi past of Austrian President Kurt Waldehim, "[iut has ... shown that
politically self-serving myths resist being discarded, even when repeatedly confronted
by contradictory information."'
5
Accordingly, if constructivism demonstrates the artifice of official public memory,
mythopoesis, the manufacture of myths, reveals the fetishistic and cultish dimensions
of official memory production, what one writer embraces as the establishment of
Torah, a "teaching," '1 6 for a given people or nation. The Torah narrative, the master
narrative of nationhood, is canonical, shared, and commands consensus. "17 This is the
kind of memory making that aspires to mythology, implicating a quasi-Platonic quest
to extrapolate the ideal national prototype or essence.' 8 It posits a deterministic
unfolding of the national story, with readable patterns and a Hegelian progression
toward synthesis 19 and toward "the progressive embodiment of spirit in the State."' 2°
115. MILLER, supra note 26, at 63 (concluding that Waldheim's election actually made
anti-Semitism "respectable" again in Austria, even if only temporarily). But see EIZENSTAT,
supra note 12, at 290 (noting deep Austrian resentment to external identification as a "Nazi
country and a Nazi people"); supra note 88 and accompanying text (showing a similar
conclusion to the discussion of the characteristic pattern of selectivity).
116. See Torah, in THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JUDAISM 778-79 (Geoffrey Wigoder et
al. eds., 2002) (indicating that "[t]he word 'Torah' is derived from the Hebrew root yaroh ('to
teach') and is best translated as 'teaching' or 'instruction"'); see also GREAT JEWISH
QUOTATIONS 12 (1996) (quoting from Sefer Ha-Ikkarim (1428), "The Torah will never change,
for truth is unchangeable").
117. See YERUSHALMI, supra note 78, at 113 (observing that the teaching of "Torah"
may be either oral or written, but must become "tradition" to survive). In Yerushalmi's self-
consciously mystical perspective, Torah is "[T]he Path ... the Way, the 'Tao' ... the complex
of rites and beliefs that gives a people its sense of identity and purpose." Id. "Only those
moments out of the past are transmitted that are felt to be formative or exemplary for the
halakhah [the 'path'] of a people as it is lived in the present; the rest of 'history' falls, one might
almost say literally, by the 'wayside."' Id. On its own terms, this argument appeals more to a
religious sensibility, yet its presentist bias is also instructive for the (secular) presentation of a
Torah archetype for nation-States.
118. See generally Bommes & Wright, supra note 7, at 265 (discussing how the unity
of the "nation," its essence, tends to be projected as an ideological and poetic equivalent to the
more prosaic and functional unity of the modern State). One could say that States in pursuit of
this ineffable essence are practicing a form of civic Cou6ism, the now discredited form of
psychotherapy based on positive autosuggestion ("Every day, in every way, I am getting better
and better.").
119. See generally ALtN MUNSLOW, THE RoUTLEDGE COMPANION TO HISTORICAL
STUDIES 114-16 (2000) (providing a critical assessment of Hegel's idea of the deterministic
design of human activity, leading to a totalizing or grand narrative). See also BRYAN MAGEE,
CONFESSIONS OF A PHILOSOPHER: A JOURNEY THROUGH WESTERN PHILosoPHY 360 (1997)
(discussing Hegel's theory of dialectical change through thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, which
conceives history as a dynamic process of action, reaction, and resolution, but nonetheless
stipulates that change is always rational and not arbitrary, even though it manifestly arises out of
conflict).
120. Jonathan Boyarin, Hegel's Zionism?, in REMAPPING MEMORY: THE POLITICS OF
TIMESPACE 137 (Jonathan Boyarin ed., 1994) (presenting Hegel's absolute model that defines
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For pure Hegelianism, part of the State-building enterprise involves creating an
official, rational, and national history, distinct from localized traditional memory (and,
indeed, oral tradition).121 The segmentation of national and local memories is a self-
conscious denial of the Halbswachsian experience of a decentralized collective
memory. 22 The State creates a common river of memory and of memorialization,
sweeping all tributary streams and eddies into the mighty currents of its official
narrative.
2 3
The most potent myths, as Austria's experience has shown, are the foundation or
proto-myths of the State's creation. Most often these proto-myths have a legal
anchoring in the form of a constitution (or, in the case of Austria, a multipart
constitutional order that gives equal primacy to several mutually reinforcing documents
of State origin). Constitutions are themselves fetishized as the "full height of
nationhood," the "completest act of sovereignty."' 124 A constitution centripetally
reflects "the cult of new beginnings,"' 125 or, in a related formulation, the "genesis
myth."126 Constitutional seminality is reminiscent of the new time consciousness that
caused the year 1792 to be redesignated as Year 1,127 or the German effort to
"history" in these terms, and also as the progression of the world spirit); see also MUNSLOW,
supra note 119, at 113 (identifying in this context Hegel's "unreserved reverence for the
[S]tate," for which Munslow tendentiously expects to find "little appeal in a postmodern world
that has little time for such intellectual grandstanding").
121. Boyarin, supra note 120, at 148 (echoing Jewish historian Yosef Hayim
Yerushalmi's distinction between "Jewish history and Jewish memory," between "seeing
reality" and a series of "lulling tales"). Given that the play of these distinctions is much more
problematical in the making of an official public memory, it must be obvious that the Hegelian
references in the main text carry a measure of hyperbolic freight.
122. See infra text accompanying note 332 (examining a collection of sub-State milieus
that, in Halbwachs's thinking, are valid sources of socialized memory).
123. According to Boyarin, supra note 120, at 148, "[t]he history created for and in the
name of nation-States is a past intended to define a bounded territory. It has no room for
unofficial memory's 'overlapping jurisdictions."' These "overlapping jurisdictions" must
include, for example, the family and community traditions that Maurice Halbwachs locates at
the center of his model of socialized memory. See infra text accompanying note 333.
124. DARRELL FtGis, THE IRISH CONSTITUTION 11 (1921) (analyzing the draft Irish Free
State Constitution of 1921, untypical of its era in that it was not conferred by a suzerain act of
the British Parliament). The persistence of sovereignty, and successful implantation of a
Constitution, naturally presume State stability. Constitutions, after all, are as apt as ordinary
legislation to vanish into history as regimes founder and are replaced. Figgis mentions the
apocryphal tale of a bookseller declining a customer's request for a copy of the then-extant
French Constitution (Figgis's book was published in 1921) with the remark that "[w]e do not
deal in periodical literature." Id. at 15.
125. Gillis, supra note 81, at 12 (mentioning Japan's adeptness at treating World War II
as an "aberration" and reading Japanese history as if it had begun in 1945).
126. See ARTHUR G. NEAL, NATIONAL TRAUMA AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY: MAJOR
EvENTS iN THE AMERICAN CENTURY 24 (1998) (observing, en passant, that Canada has eschewed
a myth of spontaneous creation in favor of a historical tradition that recognizes the pluralism
and cultural differences that spawned the Canadian federation-ironically, as Neal implies, this
very tradition still threatens to split the nation).
127. See Gillis, supra note 81, at 7 (referring to the revolutionary French Republic's




recalibrate history to begin with the end of the Nazi era, speaking of Stunde Null.'28
The U.S. Constitution, anchor of the master narrative of an endowed American
spirit, 12 9 could be described as the epic model of constitution-making. 3 ° The U.S.
model acted (and was designed to act) as an historical caesura, cutting off what
preceded it and celebrating the foresight and fortitude of those who brought forth the
new nation.'
31
128. See Fritz Stem, Foreword to FREI, supra note 13, at ix (noting the unreality of this
approach in West Germany's geopolitical and domestic social circumstances after World War
II).
129. The narrative of American exceptionalism has gained increased currency in the
new century, as the collapse of the Soviet Empire has given way to an era when the United
States is the sole hegemon, the hyperpower. See, e.g., HUBERT VJUDNE & DOMINiQuE MoVsi,
FRANCE IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 2-3 (Philip H. Gordon trans., Brookings Institution Press
2001). Hubert V6drine, former French foreign minister, mentions his use of the word
hyperpuissance since 1998, insisting that although the English prefix "hyper-" has a negative
connotation, it is a neutral term in French-meaning very big or very much-and he did not
intend a critical attitude toward the United States. See id. Indeed, V~drine insists that America's
dominance has been "fueled by others' fiascoes, which seemed to justify the providential role-
so-called manifest destiny-they had ascribed to themselves." Id. at 2; see also France's Voice
in the World, THm ECONOMIST, Nov. 11, 2000, at 68 (cautioning that Vedrine's use of
hyperpuissance is not pejorative and accurately describes America's position as "more than a
superpower"). In David Brinkley's cognate expression (first used with reference to post-World
War II power), we have entered "the new American imperium." See BESci-iLoss, supra note 46,
at 89.
130. See NEAL, supra note 126, at 22-23 (contextualizing the U.S. Constitution as the
symbol of a post-Revolutionary national identity founded on popular democratic principles).
Epical narratives have been written into the American national consciousness, too, through the
Declaration of Independence, the cross-generational effects of which are captured in Daniel
Libeskind's evocative symbolism of a 1776-foot "Freedom Tower" on the site of the destroyed
World Trade Center towers. See Robin Pogrebin, The Incredible Shrinking Daniel Libeskind,
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2004, Sect. 2, p. 1 (noting that Libeskind's concept, though it remains the
signature emotional cue for the rebuilding plan for the World Trade Center site, has acquired a
new architect). The idea of a "national consciousness" suggests the response of a population to
the prompts of an official public memory. While this Article eschews empirical assessment of
the success or failure of exercises of official memory-making, it is often possible to appreciate
that a particular public consciousness exists, and that it has been strongly influenced by the
structures of official memory. Despite these empirical testimonies, this Article resists collapsing
these two concepts (official memory and "national" or "public" consciousness) into a single
analytical category. Official public memory is deliberately made; a public consciousness, which
lacks corresponding deterministic features, is at least partly the population's uncritical response
to official memory's prompts.
131. Thus, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, commenting on the new South
African Constitution which entered into effect in 1997, insists that the document reflects a
"radical and decisive break," and thus in no sense could be a codification of a legitimate past.
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do (flysheet) (2001).
The privilege of self-definition adheres most effectively when the newly-constituted State has
rebelled against a foreign oppressor and claims its independence while bathed (however briefly)
in the aura of revolutionary righteousness. Self-definition can be a legacy of post-colonial
domination, as it was for Ireland when it adopted its constitutions of liberation in 1922 and
again in 1937, proclaiming its "inalienable, indefeasible, and sovereign right to choose its own
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The U.S. Constitution, on its launching in 1789, had much pretense. The numinous
language of the Preamble, those iconic pledges of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness, might have been exposed as empty trumperies in a nation that professed
itself the cradle of liberty while incubating the fierce practice of race-based slavery. 32
(Indeed, that contestative trope-of slavery-resonated for later generations, long after
manumission, who opposed wage slavery (the union movement) and sex slavery (the
feminist movement)). 33 Moreover, the Constitution omits any reference to a preceding
governmental order, a record of injustice, or even a legacy of pressing social or
political concerns that must be attended to by the new dispensation.' 34 In this sense, the
form of Government, to determine its relations with other nations, and to develop its life,
political, economic, and cultural, in accordance with its own genius and traditions." Art. 1,
Constitution of Ireland, 1937. The 1937 document was promulgated to signal Ireland's formal
withdrawal from membership of the (then) British Commonwealth. Oddly, although the 1937
Constitution created a national presidency, Ireland did not formally declare itself a republic until
1949. Darrell Figgis, a contemporary of the 1922 Constitution, wrote poetically of Ireland as an
"empire of memory and love" rather than a military power. FIGGIS, supra note 124, at 12. Thus,
Ireland is an ancient nation and a mother-country in her own right. She has herself
peopled the earth with her children. Her empire is as far-flung as England's. And if
it is not based on military might, but linked by ties of memory, pride and love, it
has not therefore proved itself any the less powerful internationally at times of
crisis and danger for the mother at home.
Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
132. And the U.S. Constitution studiously avoids the word. See FONER, supra note 3, at
172 (emphasizing that, "in deference to the sensibilities of some delegates," the words "slave"
and "slavery" were omitted from the text of the Constitution; the document uses coded
expressions such as persons "bound to service" or "held to service or labor") (emphasis
omitted).
133. See id. at 56 (writing of how "freedom" has been defined and redefined by slavery,
its putative opposite, in crusades by the labor and women's rights movements). The ironies of
America's slave legacy are multiple, not the least of which (as Foner points out) being the
presence of a Holocaust Museum on the Washington Mall yet not a single institutional
acknowledgment of the centrality of slavery to U.S. history. See id. at xiii (emphasizing that
historical scholarship has not neglected this topic, but that "public perception" has). The
constructed mythology of "freedom" is so powerful that it has swept aside most efforts at
reinterpretation or degradation. It has barely been disturbed, for example, by revelations of
slave-owning by Thomas Jefferson and others. See, e.g., CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN, THE LONG
AFFAIR: THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 1785-1800, at 22-23,258-67,293-
94, 315-25 (1998) (considering Jefferson as a racist and a slaveowner). The prestige of the myth
(won through its nation-binding attributes) has become more important than the specific frailties
of its inventors. This is precisely because the public memory of iconic figures has undergone a
"constructive process" rather than historical "retrieval." Lewis A. Coser, Introduction to
HALBWACHS, ON COLLECTIVE MEMORY, supra note 9, at 30 (commenting on Barry Schwartz's
essay on the reconstruction of President Abraham Lincoln, see supra note 99 and accompanying
text). At least since World War H, the more the United States has engaged itself with world
events the more its own founding history and traditions, but particularly the official public
memory of American "freedom," have become the object of reverence at home. See generally
KAMMEN, supra note 84, at 532 (suggesting that World War II helped to enhance reverential
regard for the history of the United States).
134. See Eduard Fagan, The Constitutional Entrenchment of Memory, in NEGOTIATING
THE PAST: THE MAKING OFMEMORY IN SOUTH AFRICA 249, 250 (Sarah Nuttall & Carli Coetzee
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gradual mythicization of the founding fathers 35 and of their documentary handiwork,
the Constitution of 1789, implanted a coherent juridical and ideological reading of the
founding that thoroughly displaced the messier, and bloodier, history of the failed
constitutional order and Revolutionary War that preceded it.' 36 The United States,
accordingly, has prided itself on being a written country, founded on documentation,
and therefore abstracted from the specific internecine polemics of its citizenry.'37 And
scholars are complicit in this documentary mythicization, inventing jurisprudential
theories (such as Sunstein's conception of constitutions as "[i]ncompletely theorized
agreements"' 38) that legitimize rather than contest the sense that the U.S. Constitution
and its interpretive acquis have become "sacralize[d]" and "removed from the category
of debatable."'
139
eds., 1998) (discussing how the new South African Constitution "seeks expressly to capture the
history and context of its creation"). The American Constitution, in contrast, is "forward-
looking." Id. at 252. But see SUNSTEIN, supra note 131, at 67-68 (classifying the U.S.
Constitution as primarily "preservative," in that it protects long-standing practices, and the
South African Constitution as "transformative," representing a "decisive break" from the culture
of apartheid and racism).
135. See NEAL, supra note 126, at 24 (commenting on the mixed secular and religious
connotations of Fourth of July celebrations as an hommage to the "Founding Fathers"); see also
Gillis, supra note 81, at 9 (examining how the past offers a screen on which desires for unity
and continuity can be projected, so that the foundational moment at Philadelphia "took on
mythic proportions in the eyes of succeeding generations").
136. Interestingly, the American Republic was founded in reaction to the mythology of
monarchy. It seems ironic that a similar mythologizing process should affect the leaders of the
democratic polity. See KAMMEN, supra note 84, at 18-19 (noting that the elevation of
democratic "heroes" has been seen as "antithetical to popular sovereignty"). But see id. at 27
(suggesting that the Revolutionary leaders "worried about the mythicization or distortion of
what they had done," but that paradoxically their reticence encouraged an upsurge of adulation
during "the sectional crises of antebellum times"). The genuflection has taken some bizarre
turns. See, e.g., a new book which conflates the founding tradition with present-day America's
"self-help" publishing industry. ScoTrTHORPE,REVOLUTIONARYSTRAEGIESOFTHEFOUNDING
FATHERS: LEADERSHIP LESSONS FROM AMERICA'S MOST SUCCESSFUL PATRIOTS (2003) (premised
upon the conceit that "revolution" is essential to survival in the modern competitive business
climate).
137. See HrrCHENS, supra note 7, at xvi (considering it important that the founding
documents are subject to continuous revision and interpretation). Later, Hitchens expresses
amazement at how historical enemies like the Ulster Presbyterians and Celtic Catholics
abandoned differences under the "larger sky" of the United States and under the "great roof' of
the Constitution, which "stubbornly refuses to make any mention of any god of any kind
whatsoever." Id. at 87.
138. SuNSTEIN, supra note 131, at 56 (noting that these kinds of agreements "play a
pervasive role in constitutional law and in democracy generally"). The conceptual advantage of
constitutions, with respect to their general acceptability, is that they largely lack explicit detail.
Complete theorization of any subject is rare, Sunstein argues, and so what we encounter is a
general theory and a series of steps toward concrete conclusions, deciding what it entails in
particular cases--"casuistical judgments." Id. This deductivist bias certainly informs the process
of constitution-making-in fact, it may be a sine qua non for the creation of constitutions-and
in turn generates a huge amount of derivative law to elaborate the "incompletely specified
standards" of constitutional texts. Id.
139. Sally Falk Moore, Introduction to MORALIZING STATES AND THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF
THE PRESENT 1 (Sally Falk Moore ed., 1993).
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Mythopoesis, patterned with selectivity and constructivism, focuses relentlessly on a
master narrative-and, at times, more precisely on a master concept--of the State. For
the United States, that master concept is a fetishized document-based beginning guided
by an enlightened assembly of wise philosopher-governors. France and Britain have
long idealized a national identity,1 40 cultivating a Durkheimian "theory" of the State1
4
'
that operates to color present(ist) consciousness. 42 France imagines herself as the
bearer of the Revolutionary Spirit and heroine of Gaullist resistance, and even the
legacy of Vichy has not been allowed to revalorize a gallocentric La France as a
supine collaborationist with Nazism. 43 In her own sometimes confabulatory scripting
of World War II, Britain portrays herself with Whiggish hauteur as a brave island race
led by a great leader (Churchill). 44
140. See generally Boyarin, supra note 120, at 141 (considering Hegelian theory of the
State). A deracinated transnational system like the European Union, in contrast, finds it difficult
to imitate the amour propre of nationalism. Indeed, the existential traumas of the European
Union throw into bolder relief the success of nation-states in building law-based foundation
mythologies, notably through the granitic narrative device of a constitution. All the more
disappointing, then, that the current draft of a proposed "constitution" for the European Union is
open to criticism as a bureaucratic moflange of interest group claims rather than the global icon it
might have been, "a belated Old World response to the achievements of the new," a
counterbalancing answer to the hegemony of the United States. Edward Rothstein, Europe's
Constitution: All Hail the Bureaucracy, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2003, at A17.
141. See Mary Douglas, Introduction to HALBWACHS, THE CouLECrtvE MEMORY, supra
note 9, at 16-17 (discussing Durkheim's unitary notion of society as a "psychical unit" akin to
the individual).
142. See generally Boyarin, supra note 120, at 144 (suggesting that the State presents
itself within an ahistorical grand r6cit, counterfactually revealing an absolute, inevitable,
inexorable, teleological unfolding of destiny) (quotation omitted).
143. See RICOEUR, supra note 7, at 450 (noting "the establishment of a dominant myth"
of resistance "in the orbit[] of the... Gaullist party"); see also Mark Osiel, Comments at the
Canadian Academy of Humanities and Sciences on Mass Atrocities, Collective Memory, and the
Law (on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (noting that it is impossible that two-thirds of French
males over the age of 65 participated in the Resistance, "even though surveys make claim to
that"). The French State, through its public institutions, has always seen itself as the chien de
garde of the national memory. See Sudhir Hazareesingh, Guard Dogs of Good Deeds:
Remembering Badly and Forgetting Well-History and Memory in Modern France, TIMES
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Mar. 21, 2003, at 12 (noting that memory is an ideological category in
France, used instrumentally to celebrate the heritage of the Republic, so that, although there has
been some "reassessment" of the Resistance myth and of Vichy, events such as the post-war
prosecution of State torture and violence during the Algerian War are still not recalled in the
"pantheonization" of French national memory).
144. See Bommes & Wright, supra note 7, at 213 (observing that this historical
perception, a "popular conservative historiography," has been useful to governments reminding
Britons to "pull together" in times of national crisis). Churchill, the epitome of "great man"
mythopoesis, has been subject to revisionist reinterpretation. See, e.g., Kevin Myers, An
Irishman's Diary, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 11, 2002, at 15 (writing of Churchill's "Machiavellian"
obsession with his place in history, and his "ceaseless misrepresentations of particular events");
see also JOHN CHARMLEY, CHURCHiLL: THt END OF GLORY 648-49 (1993) ("Churchill had
nothing to offer the British people in 1945, and no one has been prepared seriously to argue that
he did. His thinking on foreign and domestic policy was stuck firmly in the past. Even when he
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Austria and Germany, in unhappy contrast, are countries almost wrecked by history.
Their self-concepts are defined unheroically under the shadow of a despised "other":
Austria is not Nazi Germany, and Germany is not its former self.145 The Austrian
government asserts a claim of victimization and of a legal vacuum that insulated
Austria from complicity as a State in Nazi crimes, supporting the master concept of a
State that threw off its shackles of foreign occupation and rejoined the community of
civilized (and victorious) nations after World War II. On the Apollonian side of its
historical ledger, Austria consciously reaches backward to imperial splendor and
forward to its post-war contributions as a neutral State. Germany has oscillated among
amnesia, painful recollection, and has latterly experienced (though only tentatively as
part of official memory) a revalorization of World War II and its aftermath to
emphasize Germans as themselves victims of the Nazi incubus.' 46 In broad terms,
grasped new ideas like 'Europe,' it was to do little more than deliver impressive speeches.");
Bommes & Wright, supra, at 239 (describing Churchill's solipsistic account of his role in the
Second World War, an account that is largely lacking in self-consciousness since it is inspired
by a mythical "Conservative" version of national character and history). But see GADDIS, supra
note 8, at 137 (recollecting Churchill's arch observation that "[history will treat me kindly ...
because I propose to write it"). "Whiggish" history, incidentally, might be best defined as the
history of great men and their great deeds, but focused on the nation-state, rather than the
"world," as the object of providential interest. See generally FONER, supra note 3, at 102 (noting
dominance of nationalist Whiggish history in European scholarship); MARGALrr, supra note 7,
at 67-68 (writing of the commemorative "civic cult of the great men").
145. One risk for German official memory, implied by Novick, is that Nazism has
secured a posthumous victory in making pain "a tradition" of the German State. PETER NOviCK,
THE HOLOCAUST AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 281 (2001) (discussing
the power of the Holocaust, as the emblematic Jewish experience, to endorse Hitler's definition
of Jews as "despised pariahs").
146. Revalorization has two perspectives, one that identifies the German people
generally as hostages of a deranged regime. See supra note 36 (discussing narrative of
Germany's "liberation" from Nazism, and another, increasingly visible perspective that
remembers Germans as victims of Allied air assaults and forced repatriation as World War II
ended). The second perspective has strong cultural underpinnings but is also attracting official
attention. See, e.g., GONTER GRASS, CRABWALK (Krishna Winston trans., Harcourt, Inc., 2003)
(2002) (meditating on how the Intemet has facilitated a revalorization of the Nazi era and legacy
for young Germans). The historical process of atonement, for many young citizens of Germany,
has yielded to a fascination with (and, Grass seems to imply) a rising bitterness toward the
Allied destruction of the Nazi State. The protagonist's teenage son, for example, creates (and
becomes obsessively identified with) a website which aims to launch "a much overdue
discourse" on the Allied sinking of a German passenger ship during World War II. Id. at 159.
The protagonist himself, occupying a complex intergenerational role-which he depicts
metaphorically as a scuttling "crabwalk"-between his mother (a survivor of the ship sinking)
and his Internet-savvy son, is himself mindful of the Allied air assaults on Dresden, Berlin, and
other cities, just as his mother recalls mass rape and murder by advancing Russian soldiers. See
id. at 105, 167. The post-war German generation remained silent about these and other
depredations, the protagonist suggests through the voice of one member of that generation,
"merely because its own sense of guilt was so overwhelming, merely because for years the need
to accept responsibility and show remorse took precedence." Id. at 103. The main text, supra,
mentions that national victimhood is only tentatively a component of German official memory.
While it is true that the claim of victimhood is primarily a cultural phenomenon in Germany, its
incipient presence in official statements should not be overlooked. Thus, it is worth noting a
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however, Germany's recent leaders have continued the process of shaping an identity
of self-catechization (discussed later in this Part), 47 symbolized in the early twenty-
first century (architecturally) by the construction of a Holocaust memorial within sight
of the gates of the rebuilt Reichstag in Berlin,148 (economically) by adoption of the
euro as a mercantile synecdoche for European unity, and (juristically) by fealty to the
bureaucratic vapidity of a new European Union constitution. 149 But for all of these
countries, whether they see their histories as enchanted or unenchanted, 5 0 the claims
and interpretations asserted about the State's past have achieved their mythopoetic
status through the operations of official memory management.
d. Incorporation
(1) Reflections on the Empirical Study
In addition to the contentious rise to power of both Kurt Waldheim and Jorg Haider,
in recent years Austria (along with Germany and Switzerland) faced a long-deferred
international campaign to compensate Jewish victims of Nazi slave and forced labor
recent speech by former German Federal President Johannes Rau-particularly in the shadow of
my earlier assessment of the Federal Presidency as an institutional locus for national regret. See
infra text accompanying note 199. In September 2003, Rau condemned Allied policies which
forced twelve million ethnic Germans to flee their homes in Eastern Europe after World War II,
commenting that "Hitler's criminal policies do not exonerate anyone who answered terrible
wrongs with terrible wrongs." Peter Conradi, Allies Blamed for German Suffering, SUNDAY
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2003, at 24. Rau's speech, though largely unreported in Germany, suggests
nascent efforts (powered by the increasingly influential Bund der Vertriebenen, "League of
Expellees") to reorient official memory toward establishment of an Opferkultur, "victim
culture," with respect to Allied policies toward Germany during and after World War II. See
also infra note 382 (discussing recent German public attention to Allied firebombings of
German cities).
147. See infra text accompanying note 198 (postulating a German self-concept of
"national regret" for its Nazi past).
148. See Bartosz Jalowiecki, Lies the Germans Tell Themselves, COMMENTARY, Jan.
2004, at 43 (mentioning Peter Eisenman's "Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe," which
will consist of "2700 concrete steles arranged in a terror-inspiring maze... situated adjacent to
Berlin's Brandenburg Gate ... within eyeshot of the Bundestag"); see also EDKiNs, supra note
18, at 133 (recalling journalist Leah Rosh's searingly-phrased initial demand for a memorial: "'I
demand of this country of perpetrators a memorial ... a site of remembrance, something that
recalls THIS DEED"') (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
149. See Rothstein, supra note 140 (contrasting unfavorably the laconic and enduringly
influential U.S. Declaration of Independence with the rights-intensive "language of interest
groups" that has bloated, and threatens to diminish the symbolic power of, the EU Constitution).
For Germany, the European Union, the embedding institution sought by Adenauer, offers an
alternative to its problem of being unable to have a "normal" perspective on positive State
achievements. See also Jack Rakove, Europe's Floundering Fathers, FOREIGN POLIcY, Sept.-
Oct. 2003, at 28, 31 (criticizing new EU Constitution for preferring "shopping lists" of social
rights to expression of "restrictions on the authority of the State designed to foster... individual
liberty and autonomy").
150. For an articulation of this Weberian contrast, see infra text accompanying note
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and property expropriation policies. 15 As these events unfolded, Austrians seemed to
react defiantly, electing Waldheim and Haider's Freedom Party while enduring
counter-narratives of latent anti-Semitism (including accusations that they still feared
and hated the ludeus ex machina of international conspiracy theories) and continuing
Nazi sympathies.' 52 These manifestations of counter-mythology crested in the late
winter of 1999 when the American Jewish Committee published Austria and the
Legacy of the Holocaust, a searing indictment of Austria's behavior toward Jews and
the Holocaust during and after the Second World War. 5 3 The report, written by an
academic historian, was published with the explicit purpose of breaking the "spell of..
.collective amnesia and the comforting image first accorded [to Austria] by the Allied
nations in 1943 as the 'first victim State' of the Nazi war machine."' 54 The report
castigated Austria for an allegedly ingrained anti-Semitism that antedated the war and
did not abate in the post-war era, and for its systematic integration and amnestying of
former Nazis after 1948.155
Austria's response to these challenges can be seen as an official attempt to expose
the "wound of memory,"' 56 the self-evident damage of Nazism, while reconfiguring the
master narrative to allow certain qualifications to acceptance of national responsibility.
151. Austria's sluggish record of dealing with Jewish claims of restitution is considered
in PICK, supra note 44, at 202-21 (in a chapter captioned "The Restitution Go-slow"). Pick's
analysis mentions the anti-Jewish comments of some of Austria's early post-war cabinet leaders
who favored delay and obfuscation of the restitution question. The comments came to light in
1983 when the cabinet minutes were accidentally discovered by a British historian researching
in the Austrian National Archive. See id. at 206-7,214 (quoting the comment of Minister of the
Interior Oskar Helmer, who said that he "'detect[ed] Jewish expansion all around"' and
accordingly found the Jews an unsympathetic case for restitution measures).
152. Sarcastic humor can be a wounding agent of counter-memory. The Austria Watch
website, maintained by the Jewish Agency for Israel/World Zionist Organization, commented on
the rise of the Freedom Party by paraphrasing Oscar Wilde, stating that "to elect one Nazi is
unfortunate, to elect a second looks like carelessness." See Austria Watch, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20000919224514/http://www.austriawatch.compast.htm (archived
by the Internet Archive) (last visited Sept. 27, 2004). Austrians (and outsiders) were also startled
by the notorious comment of their own Chancellor Fred Sinowatz, who remarked during the
Waldheim campaign that "Waldheim wasn't a Nazi, only his horse was." JAMES E. YOUNG, THE
TEXTURE OF MEMORY: HOLOCAUST MEMORIALS AND MEANING 91 (1993).
153. See supra note 68 (summarizing report).
154. Press Release, American Jewish Committee, Austria and the Legacy of the
Holocaust (Feb. 12, 1999).
155. After 1987, as Kurt Waldheim's presidency focused global attention on Austria's
wartime history, Austrian political and religious leaders developed a greater receptivity to the
need to accommodate the forces of contestation. Speeches by Cardinal Franz K6nig, former
chancellor Franz Vranitzky, and former President Tomas Klestil set a tone of elite sensitivity to
issues of culpability and the moral responsibility of restitution. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 12, at
282, 289 (noting these various expressions of awareness). Nonetheless, although President
Klestil in 2000 indicated that, in the name of the Republic of Austria, he "'bow[ed] with deep
sorrow before the victims of that time,"' during the restitution negotiations there was never
anything resembling a formal State apology for past official crimes. Id. at 301 (describing
ceremony in which Klestil told victims of Nazism that "' [w]e Austrians are finally looking in the
eye of the historical truth-indeed the entire truth').
156. April 2000 Statement of Dr. Wolfgang Schiissel, supra note 57, at 45.
[Vol. 80:605
IN SEARCH OF A THEORY OF PUBLIC MEMORY
These qualifications have been made apparent earlier in this discussion. They include
the legal distinctions made between post-Anschluss Nazi Germany and the suspended
Austrian State, emphasis on the State Treaty and its expressions of victimhood, the
attachment of victim status to the absent State of Austria rather than specifically to its
citizens, and celebration of the avowedly heroic acts of the post-Nazi leadership in
winning independence.5 7 What Austria has done, in effect, is to incorporate counter-
memory into its official rhetoric of the past, acknowledging the complicity of some
Austrian citizens but ring-fencing the State itself against similar charges.' 58
Interestingly, Austria continues to be aided in this effort by external endorsements. On
January 17, 2001, the United States issued a joint statement with the Austrian
government, Austrian companies, American and Austrian Jewish organizations, and the
U.S. attorneys who had launched class-action compensation lawsuits against Austria in
the United States. 5 9 The statement, which opens with an anodyne reference to the
"light and dark sides" of Austria's past, accepts the official dyad of moral blame
cohabiting with legal innocence. Thus, the statement acknowledges "Austria's legal
status during the period of occupation by Nazi Germany ... and liberation by the
Allied Powers in 1945.' '16I With these public declarations, the United States has
bestowed external validation of Austria's incorporation of the counter-narratives of
guilt and responsibility that track U.S. statements of support during the period of
official memory construction from 1943 to 1955.162
157. And, as discussed infra, text accompanying note 230, an assertion of the collective
temporal distance of modem Austrians from the turpitudes of Nazism. This rhetorical
conditioning of the past remains part of the elite agenda in Austria. See infra note 190
(reviewing report of Austrian government historical commission on Austria's record on
restitution).
158. In recommending passage of legislation setting up the new special fund to
compensate descendants of forced and slave labor, Chancellor Schissel delivered an address to
the Austrian parliament that again revealed his government's inclination to preserve the
founding myth while seeking to assimilate recent counter-narratives. See Rede des
Bundeskanzlers Dr. Wolfgang Schiissel vor dem Nationalrat, Wien, am 31 Jdnner 2001 [Federal
Chancellor Dr. Wolfgang Schtissel, Speech Before the National Assembly, Vienna (Jan. 31,
2001)], reprinted in 2001 AUSTRIAN FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENTS, supra note 31, at 157. The
compelling aim of the legislation, according to the Chancellor, was Rechtsicherheit, "legal
security," but not necessarily moral closure, "a moral final stroke." Id. at 160.
159. Joint Statement and Annexes, Washington (Jan. 17, 2001), reprinted in 2001
AuSTRIAN FOREIGN PoucY DOCUMENTS, supra note 31, at 86; see also Bindenagel, supra note
56, at 9 (drawing particular attention to the unprecedented role played by the class-action
attorneys in international diplomacy); Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiffs
Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 102, 109 (saluting the restitution negotiations
for having "effectively headed off prolonged litigation that would have had a corrosive effect on
important U.S. diplomatic relationships").
160. Joint Statement and Annexes, 2001 AUSTRIAN FOREIGN PoucY DOCtMENTS, supra
note 31, at 86.
161. Id. at 87. The participating attorneys agreed to dismiss with prejudice all claims
arising out of or related to the National Socialist era or World War II that had been or might be
asserted against Austria and Austrian companies. See Joint Statement and Annexes, Annex A I
10, 2001 AUSTRIAN FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENTS, supra note 31, at 100.
162. See supra note 91 (discussing statements). Ultimately, the U.S. and Austrian
governments reached an agreement concerning the establishment of a restitution fund with
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Incorporation, therefore, is a characteristic pattern of official public memory that
seeks to mitigate the socially disruptive challenges of counter-memory by absorbing
respect to slave and forced labor and other claims. Central to Austrian corporate participation
(as was also true in the German context) was a resolution of the issue of "legal peace," the
dismissal of all pending lawsuits against Austrian corporations. See Bindenagel, supra note 56,
at 12 (referring in this context to negotiations with German companies). The U.S. government
agreed that, whenever a claim is filed against Austria in the future, it will file a so-called
"Statement of Interest" indicating that it would be in the foreign policy interests of the United
States for the fund to be the exclusive forum and remedy for the resolution of all claims asserted
against Austria and Austrian companies involving the use of slave or forced labor during the
National Socialist era. See Agreement Between the Austrian Federal Government and the
Government of the United States of America Concerning the Austrian Fund "Reconciliation,
Peace and Cooperation," art. 2, reprinted in 2001 AUSTRIAN FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENTS,
supra note 31, at 232, 235 [hereinafter Agreement Concerning the Austrian Fund]; see also
Bindenagel, supra note 56, at 13 (noting that the U.S. legal system does not permit the giving of
any absolute guarantees by the U.S. government with respect to dismissal of privately-initiated
lawsuits, nor would the United States as a matter of policy wish to bar Holocaust survivors who
were U.S. citizens from having their cases litigated in U.S. courts). While the filing of a
Statement of Interest, as the two governments acknowledge, is not a guarantee of a successful
dismissal, plaintiffs do face other substantive and procedural hurdles caused by foreign
sovereign immunity, justiciability, international comity, statutes of limitation, jurisdictional
issues, forum non conveniens, difficulties of proof, certification of a class of heirs, and legal
precedent, which all complicate their claims. In light of the uncertainty of the litigation
prospects, attorneys in pending cases against Austrian interests undoubtedly took the more
prudent course of action and agreed to file motions or stipulations to dismiss these claims with
prejudice. See Joint U.S./Austria Statement, supra note 95, at 250. The approach of the U.S.
administration was entirely consistent with the public law record to which the Austrian
leadership has pointed since the Allied victory in 1945: recognition that an Austrian proposal,
whether on neutrality in 1955 or a restitution fund in 200 1, would be consonant with American
foreign policy interests. Then and now, the Austrian government wanted to achieve "legal
peace," and the American government responded by granting precisely that. See Agreement
Concerning the Austrian Fund, 2001 AUSTRIAN FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENTS, supra note 31, at
233 (noting that "both parties desire all-embracing and enduring legal peace with respect to all
claims asserted against Austria and/or Austrian companies involving or related to the use of
slave or forced labor during the National Socialist era or World War I, to advance their foreign
policy interests"). The use of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000), to found
federal class-action jurisdiction over foreign corporations in U.S. courts has been roundly
criticized by Anne-Marie Slaughter, who refers disparagingly to a beckoning era of "plaintiff's
diplomacy." Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 159, at 103; see also EIZENSTAT, supra note 12, at
345 (putting the Holocaust cases in the context of the "broader excesses of the class-action
system the United States uses to resolve mass injury cases, which is spinning out of control and
exerting a drag on the U.S. economy"). As Eizenstat notes, other victim categories have used the
Holocaust "model," including Korean comfort women against the Japanese and anti-apartheid
class-action suits against a number of American employers, financiers, and insurers of slaves
during the American Civil War. See id. at 350-51. Eizenstat's view, unsurprisingly in light of
his stewardship of a very different, bureaucratized mass restitution system, is that U.S. courts are
not ideal fora to resolve disputed historical and political questions. See id. at 341. But see Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004) (instructing U.S. courts to exercise caution in
hearing claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act, requiring that any claim should rest on a norm
of international character accepted by the civilized world, but in any event insisting that only a
"modest" number of causes of action should be allowed).
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them into the State's master narrative.163 It is evident (although subtly) in a January
2001 speech by the Austrian Special Envoy for Restitution Issues, Dr. Ernst Sucharipa,
who spoke of a "side effect" of the restitution negotiations as being "the intensive
discussion that has been started in the Austrian media on Holocaust issues."' 64 The
official claim is that the intensive discussion is a side effect, an unintended but
acceptably therapeutic consequence of adjustments to the master narrative.
The incorporative reflex is evident, too, in Switzerland's treatment of Holocaust
issues and a contested past as revealed in the Swiss government's official final report
on Holocaust restitution published in 2001 .65 The tone struck in this report is one of a
calm, considered humanitarian response in the face of "impassioned polemics" by
outsiders.166 The word humanitarian appears to serve as the shibboleth for Swiss
official public memory in the same way that victim is a shibboleth for Austrian official
163. Recent German commentary displays a similar sensibility to the distancing (and
incorporative) capacity of time. Helmut Schmidt, West German chancellor from 1974 to 1981,
borrowed Austria's strategy of collective temporal distance when he said (at Auschwitz in 1977)
that "' [wle Germans of today are not guilty as individual persons, but we must bear the political
legacy of those who were guilty. That is our responsibility."' JEFFREY HERE, DIVIDED MEMORY:
THE NAZI PAST IN THE TWO GERMANYS 346 (1997) (citation omitted). Herf notes that Schmidt's
address included the claim that Hitler's first victims were Germans. See supra note 36
(commenting on recent German appropriation of victim status with respect to Nazism). Herf's
work, which conducts close readings of multiple political texts of post-war West and East
Germany, is replete with expressions of an official German distancing from Nazism (while
accepting the moral obligation of articulating a memory of the Holocaust). Chancellor Schmidt's
successor, Helmut Kohl, spoke in 1984 in Israel of a generational change in Germany and Israel,
propounding that "[a] young German generation did 'not understand German history as a
burden but as a task for the future... [and] refuses to admit collective guilt for the deeds of its
fathers."' Id. at 351 (citation omitted). In 1985, in ceremonies marking the fourtieth anniversary
of the end of World War II, West German Federal President Richard von Weiszacker rejected
the idea of "'the guilt or innocence of an entire nation,"' since guilt is personal, while accepting
an obligation among younger Germans "'to keep alive the memories,"' and to seek
reconciliation with the Jewish nation, a reconciliation that "had to pass through the memory of
the Holocaust." Id. at 357-58 (citation omitted). But see id. at 387 (recalling a tradition of
public recollection, begun by certain Social Democratic leaders in the Adenauer era, "in which
the Holocaust eventually found an enduring place in the dominant West German public
narratives of the Nazi era").
164. Special Envoy for Restitution Issues Dr. Ernst Sucharipa, Statement on the
Occasion of the Signing of the Joint Statement, Washington (Jan. 17, 2001), reprinted in 2001
AUSTRIAN FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENTS, supra note 31, at 104, 105.
165. See FINAL REPORT OF THE Swiss FUND FOR NEEDY VICTIMS OF THE
HOLOCAUsT/SHOA (2002) [hereinafter Swiss FUND REPORT]. The Swiss have attracted their
share of strong criticism for pro-Nazi actions during the Second World War. J.D. Bindenagel
and Stuart Eizenstat, the two senior U.S. negotiators in the Holocaust settlements of the late
1990s, each candidly refers to a "myth" of Swiss neutrality during the war period. See
Bindenagel, supra note 56, at 8; see also EIZENSTAT, supra note 12, at 108. Eizenstat is scathing
about Switzerland's role as Hitler's "business partner," whose elites insisted on maintaining
foreign trade relations with Germany "almost to the bitter end" of the war, id. at 103-105, and
indicts the Swiss banking community as "Hitler's foreign exchange dealers." Id. at 105.
166. Swiss FUND REPORT, supra note 165, at 24 (commenting also on "the highly
emotionally charged atmosphere reigning in the public").
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memory. It does duty throughout the report as the adjective of choice to describe Swiss
reparations policy.'6 7 And the report decouples Switzerland's humanitarian gesture
from any historical moorings, casting it as an ex nihilo act of goodwill toward the
"human race" rather than a specific action taken in atonement for Swiss complicity in
Nazi abuse of Jewish Holocaust victims. Indeed, Switzerland's self-regarding
perspective mirrors that of German corporations, which have insisted that their
participation in reparations is a moral gesture without legal liability, while insisting all
the time on U.S. government fireproofing against future class-action lawsuits.' 
69
(2) The Incorporative Devices of Public Memory
Incorporation is surely the most complex, yet indispensable, task of official public
memory. The State's unique capacity rhetorically to fix national identity, 70 using
patterns of selectivity, constructivism, and mythopoesis, and sustained, in turn, by
iteration (exercised not least through its lawmaking function), as well as the likely
endurance of the State organism, are several bulwarks against contestations of official
public memory. But how much fixity can be achieved? Competing sources of memory
do not typically parade together under a synergistic banner. Halbwachs's syncretic
notion of a system of ideas, 7 1 if envisaged more capaciously as all the cultural white
167. See, e.g., id. at 25 (stating that creation of the restitution fund is in keeping with
"Switzerland's longstanding humanitarian tradition"); id. at 27 (stating that the fund was
"conceived as a humanitarian initiative"); id. at 30 (stating that "one of the most crucial
challenges was to convey the idea of [the fund] as being humanitarian support").
168. It is fair to assert that Swiss official public memory continues to project a
perception that Swiss sympathies in World War II lay overwhelmingly on the Allied side. This
perception includes an implicit contrast with Austria and the Anschluss, premised on the
(unprovable) assertion that if the Swiss had been as sympathetic to Hitler as is sometimes
suggested, "the country would have been easily annexed to the Third Reich." Delegation of
Switzerland, Switzerland and World War II: A General Presentation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
WASHINGTON CONFERENCE ON HOLOCAUST-ERA ASSETS, 349,351 (U.S. Dep't of State Pub. No.
10603, 1999).
169. See E1zENSTAT, supra note 12, at 217 (noting that the corporations, which are not
"social welfare institutions," wanted to appease their shareholders by "dispos[ing] of the class-
action suits as cheaply and expeditiously" as possible, maintaining access to the American
marketplace unburdened by the Nazi stigma).
170. See Jonathan Boyarin, Space, Time, and the Politics of Memory, in REMAPPING
MEMORY: THE PoLIcs OF TIMESPACE 1, 16 (Jonathan Boyarin ed., 1994) (arguing, in
connection with the State-created identity, that States look inward to their national collective
space, and "map history onto territory," an imaginary perimeter of "intellectual fenceposts")
(citation omitted). Figures of rhetorical reification include associating the nation to the "body."
Id. at 24 (viewing the "collective" as a "superorganic representative of all the individual
consciousness that it comprises"). The State, in this understanding, commands an allegiance
analogous to that owed to parents and repels threats to its organic integrity. See id. at 25 (tying
the success of the modern State to "two paradoxical yet complementary means of legitimation..
• a rhetoric of 'kinship' or 'community,' an assumption of common interests rooted in the
putative 'memory' of common origin (but in fact at least as often rooted in the shared forgetting
of a common violence) ... [and] as guarantor of the individual's rationality and freedoms from
the shackles and demons of the past") (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
171. See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 80:605
IN SEARCH OF A THEORY OF PUBLIC MEMORY
noise of a modern inorganic society,172 is itself in flux and susceptible to multiple
influences. Memory, in such a context, may become not a fixed object of rhetorical
veneration but a site of struggle, a flashpoint of competition over the distribution and
dynamics of power in society. 73 Each time the well of memory is revisited (as it will
be) by non-governmental entities as well as by citizens, fresh water is drawn.
174
172. A distinction between organic and inorganic societies is Novick's construct. See
NOVICK, supra note 145, at 267-68 (presenting an "organic" common memory, the memory of
traditional, homogeneous communities, as the peasant grandparent handing down rustic lore to a
grandchild in sardonic contrast to the amnesiac, fragmented, and expendable texture of modem
American urban life).
173. Memory, as Barahona de Brito writes, becomes a struggle "over power and who
gets to decide the future." De Brito, supra note 14, at 38 (concluding that "[w]hat and how
societies choose to remember and forget largely determines their future options"). This
intersectionality of power and memory has been expressed as "the politics of memory." Id at 37
(conceiving of the "politics of memory" narrowly as "policies of truth and justice in transition
regimes," and more widely as how a society interprets and appropriates its past to mold its
future). Such a politics, Jonathan Boyarin contends, involves "rhetoric about the past mobilized
for political purposes." Boyarin, supra note 170, at 2 (linking this mobilization to "the modem
identification of a nation with a sharply bounded, continuously occupied space controlled by a
single sovereign State, comprising a set of autonomous yet essentially identical individuals").
Peter Novick suggests, as an example of this process (although there are many), the totemic
appropriation of Holocaust memory by American Jewish leaders in order to return Israel to a
central place in U.S. public policy. See NOVICK, supra note 145, at 280 (tracing critically the
evolution of the Holocaust in U.S. political ideology, and concomitantly Israel's status in U.S.
foreign policy, from marginal status to a central position).
174. Certainly, a government's use of its power to inscribe (as opposed to describe) a
particular memory is pervasive. See Gillis, supra note 81, at 4 (noting how "identities and
memories are highly selective, inscriptive rather than descriptive, serving particular interests and
ideological positions"). Gillis explains further that remembered events are more political and
social constructs than objective facts, and therefore must be treated not as natural objects with
an independent existence outside language but essentially as vectors of thought that determine
our politics, our social relations, and our histories. See id. at 5. They are inherently plastic, open
to construction and reconstruction in the service of other ideological motivations. Ritualistic
commemoration compels public attention, as in the designation of September 11, 2001, as
"Patriot Day." This commemoration is highly politicized, a question of construction rather than
reproduction that takes place "in the contexts of community, broader politics, and social
dynamics." See Sarat, supra note 82, at 311 (citation omitted). Neal writes of a kind of gloss that
commemoration puts on the past, for example, extrapolating a glorification of war, a higher
meaning of sacrifice, from the tragedy and horror that otherwise is war's truth. See NEAL, supra
note 126, at 207 (noting how death and destruction are "camouflaged" by emphasizing the
sacred task of defending the State). It is self-consciously celebratory, since the officially
prescribed association is with triumph over adversity. And the memory work of government, of
course, may coexist with alternative selections from the past, or more intensive interpretations of
the officially selected narrative, that are produced in other fora in society. In a free media
society, for example, the decision of the New York Times newspaper to research and publish (in
the daily newspaper, in book format, and on the paper's website) capsule profiles of more than
2300 victims of the World Trade Center attacks reinforces a government narrative of
randomized terror meriting widespread limitations on civil liberties. See, e.g., Portraits of Grief
Glimpses of Some of the Victims of the September 11 Attacks, N.Y. TIMES at
http://www.nytimes.com/pages/nationallportraits (last visited Sept. 30, 2004) (indicating that
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What, then, if there is a conflicted past? Inherent in the celebratory (or at least self-
regarding) successions of Hegelian moments is the potential for narrative corruption
and eventual entropy. The danger to a Platonic self-portrayal is that it, or strands of the
narrative supporting it, becomes contestable. Unresolved past events have a habit of
resurfacing, even if only in benign mnemonic recapture: Auschwitz, Vichy Syndrome,
Vietnam complex. 175 Resuscitation of the past can be destabilizing, and may threaten
the new relationships that are necessary to build successful postconflict
communities.' 76 Mark Osiel suggests a postmodernist, enlightened rationalist's
understanding of how memory's conflicts should be reconciled. He describes the
establishment of a "procedural republic," where adversaries advance toward mutual
empathy, embraced in the rule of law, and where trust is assured by the State as the
price of solidarity. 177 Osiel's multipolar rapprochement would generate solidarity
through the "dissensus" that happens routinely in democratic politics, 7 8 since
democracy "begins in conversation" and "presupposes a measure of respect for the
rational and deliberative capacities of one's interlocutor."' 7 9 Osiel's is a discursive,
"[a]ll profiles will remain on NYTimes.com indefinitely"); N.Y. TuMEs, PoRTRArrs 9/11/01: THE
COLLECTED 'PORTRAITS OF GRIEF' FROM TiiE NEW YORK TImEs (2d ed. 2003). This well-
intentioned effort to give "faces" to the victims also serves governmental functions. It appeals to
visceral feelings, preserving a national animus, so to speak, because the capsulized biographies
are so familiar, so paradigmatic, so typical of the calendrical cycles of ordinary American lives
at this moment in history. This process of conversion of the past is quintessentially the province
of government. The State seeks to universalize the remembered experience, as the United States,
for example, has previously done for the Holocaust. See IRWIN-ZARECKA, supra note 37, at 37.
The lessons for all humanity are expected to reside in this memory, so that the specific roles of
specific players (e.g., Polish Christians and the Catholic Church) are not as deeply scrutinized.
See id at 37-38 (discussing a perceived Polish reluctance to accept collective responsibility, as
a bystander community, for Jewish persecution; Poles, therefore, treated the Holocaust as
"completely accountable within the history of Germany" and allowed themselves to "remember
the Holocaust without reflecting on it"). But see NovICK, supra note 145, at 278 (provocatively
questioning the honoring of the Holocaust as deeply inconsistent since it did not occur in the
United States, and speculating why Hispanics, Asians, and African-Americans should "sense
either guilt or responsibility for what white Christians did to Jews in the Europe of the 1930s
and 1940s") (citation omitted).
175. See De Brito, supra note 14, at 37 (describing how such "[tlerms emerge to
describe the effects of past events on national culture"; these terms, argues De Brito, "indicate
that the past is a disease of sorts, a burden on the present"). As Nossiter points out, mnemonic
mechanisms have an "incantatory, minimizing effect," designed to soothe and contain the
damage of the remembered event. NossrrTER, supra note 59, at 110 (suggesting that the "malign
import" of Vichy France is somehow tempered (and thus distanced), for later generations, by
deliberate association with the name of the town).
176. PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND
ATRocrry 185 (2001) (warning that destabilization can occur because exposing "truth" comes at
the expense of emotional pain to victims).
177. OSIEL, supra note 74, at 44 (contending that, while the notion of a "procedural
republic" has been disparaged by some as "limited[,]... such a republic would be better viewed
as a noble aspiration and hard-won achievement" for post-conflict societies).
178. Id. at 44. Paul Ricoeur describes Osiel's theme as "the civic education of the
collective memory by dissensus." RICOEUR, supra note 7, at 323 (emphasis in original).
179. OstEL, supra note 74 at 45 (quoting John Dewey and Jiirgen Habermas); see also
JoHN DEWEY, DEMoCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
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syncretic, optimistic organization of solidarity, contrasting pointedly with Emile
Durkheim's oppressive, mechanical solidarity, which denies or actively suppresses
differences between individuals and sub-groups "in the service of a single normative
order."' 8 In Osiel's polycentric version of the contestation process, we encounter a
naive view of a society engaged in conversation within itself, and disagreeing within
itself, about the nature of justice and good, and yet nevertheless presuming (and relying
upon) common schemes of "association and cooperation."
' '8
Osiel's model (which is advocated by other writers) 8 2 allows public space to many
stories, so-called "little narratives," that impede or preclude the coalescence of a grand
rcit as the official public memory of an event (or a people). 8 3 His conception that
official memory be regularly and complexly contested,184 whatever its naivet, suggests
to Osiel that he is positioning himself halfway between a true postmodernist
celebration of perpetual disruption as an end in itself, and a Durkheimian exaltation of
consensus about moral fundamentals, which categorically denies "continuing
disagreement among reasonable people."'' 85 Osiel's essentially normative model sits
uneasily beside John Gillis's descriptive confidence. Though he shares Osiel's ethos,
Gillis contends that public history in the "post-national era" has already become
"democratized" and that the State (or the "nation") no longer functions as the principal
site or frame of memory for most people. 86 Thus, the emergence of more nuanced
histories of particular societal groups should (and, in Gillis's view, has) become a
EDUCATION 101 (Macmillan 1916) (writing that "[a] democracy is more than a form of
government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicative
experience"); 1 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE AcTION 99 (Thomas
McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1987) (arguing that "[tihe concept of communicative action
presupposes language as the medium for a kind of reaching understanding, in the course of
which participants, through relating to a world, reciprocally raise validity claims that can be
accepted or contested").
180. OSiEL, supra note 74, at 49-51 (discussing three forms of societal solidarity, each
of which has its privileged institutional locus: thus, mechanical solidarity evokes core values
and authoritative interpretation through the symbolic resonance of an organization such as an
established church; organic solidarity is reflected in the division of labor of a modem economy;
and discursive solidarity rests on the freedoms of press and speech integral to democratic
politics).
181. Id. at 51 (finding that "rules requiring civility in the management of
disagreements"-a criminal prosecution, for example-provide a useful device for discursive
exchange in society).
182. See, e.g., IRWIN-ZARECKA, supra note 37, at 79 (arguing that the "emotional
temperature... of a conflict is a product of both sides' involvement; the defining matters at
stake" should not be the exclusive property of the victims). Celebrating the memory of
Columbus, for example, need not involve a denial that Native Americans suffered greatly, so
that "commemorat[ing] 1492 as the beginning of a genocide [denies] any worth to American
society and its cherished values and myths," and ignores how the "challenge to America's sense
of self-worth can be made to testify to it, provided serious memory work is done." Id.
183. OSIEL, supra note 74, at 51 (ascribing power to "the cacophony of alternative tales
about the same large-scale event").
184. See id. at 53 (valuing civil dissension, and the "contested character" of collective
memory, as a means for developing some solidarity in a deeply fractured society).
185. Id. at 53.
186. See Gillis, supra note 81, at 17 (suggesting that national history, therefore, is no
longer a correct "measure of what people really know about their pasts").
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metronome to measure the disruption of a dated Westphalian orthodoxy. 18 7 In this
sense, Osiel and Gillis make common cause with the archival view of history
(chronique, a concept considered further in Part III), advocating (as part of the
vernacular of democracy) the continual recovery of a more accurate past, a perpetual
process of correcting the lenses of official memory.'
88
But Osiel's polycentrism, and Gillis's less ideologically laden view, surely account
only for the margins of discourse even in the modem liberal secular State. Understood
as a part of the institutional apparatus of any State-centered system, official public
memory is ontologically incapable of allowing polyphonous voices from a contested
past.1 9 If it were to do so, it would be obviating its central power and its stabilizing
purpose. What official memory does seek to do, as the Austrian and Swiss experiences
have shown, is to incorporate other voices into a dominant master narrative.' 90 The
187. See id. at 19 (arguing that the nation-State has been "desacralized" because the
collective self-worship that spurred two world wars led to an iconoclasm opposing the
impersonal, totalizing, and alienating representations of the State, and thus to a search for
"usable pasts capable of serving the heterogeneity of new groups ... [such as] racial and sexual
minorities, women, youth, and dozens of new nations and ethnic groups aspiring to
sovereignty").
188. See OstaL, supra note 74, at 55, suggesting that accuracy in relation to the past is
"an integral aspect of democratization." Indeed, it is precisely the argument of more accurate-
one might say archival-recovery that appears to recommend history (on first acquaintance) as a
powerful counter-discourse to official memory. See infra text accompanying note 363
(comparing history and official memory with respect to factual authenticity).
189. See, e.g., Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism,
Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLuM. L. REv. 1992, 1998 (2003)
("In modern liberal democracies, where sovereign power operates on the principles of consent,
public accountability, and constitutional restraint, [stable and coherent] national narratives also
confer political legitimacy [and] define the discursive space for the negotiation and justification
of political power by regulating the collective memory of a nation's fundamental commitments.
Collective memory, then, has deep legal and political salience. It is arranged, deployed and
contested not simply on commemorative days and through public monuments and rituals, but in
and through the institutions of State power.") (emphasis in original).
190. As part of the Holocaust restitution settlement, see supra note 56 and
accompanying text, for example, the Austrian government established the Salzburg Seminar as a
forum for expressing the values of tolerance, see Bindenagel, supra note 56, at 19, and an
Historical Commission to examine the country's record on Nazi-era confiscation of the property
of Jews and other victims, on slave and forced labor, and on post-1945 efforts at compensation
and restitution. See Press Statement, Austrian Press & Information Service, Washington D.C.,
Final Report by Historical Commission: Expropriation in Austria During NS Era and
Compensation After 1945, (Feb. 28, 2003), available at http://www.austria.org/press/318.html
[hereinafter Press Statement on Historical Commission] (summarizing content and findings of
report by Historical Commission). The broad mandate of the Commission, according to the
proposal to the Cabinet by the Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor in 1998, was to conduct "an
objective, transparent, independent and comprehensive clarification of one of the most painful
chapters of [Austrian] history." Wolfgang SchUssel & Viktor Klima, Joint Proposal to the
Cabinet (Oct. 1, 1998), in REPUBLiC OFAUSTRIA, HISTORICAL COMMISSION: WORK PROGRAMME
1, 3, available at http://www.historikerkommission.gv.atl/pdf/arbeitsprogrammn-e.pdf (last visited
Aug. 14, 2004). The massive 800-page Report of the Commission, published in German in 2003
(and available at www.historikerkommission.gv.at), deflects criticism that Austria had done
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German experience with the legacy of Nazism can help to explain this critical
distinction between allowing contestation and incorporating it. Post-war West German
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer sought to entrench his country as the re-Christianized
anchor of a restored Western alliance, and rarely addressed the Nazi past. 19' The
Wehrmacht (German Army) was retrospectively mythicized as part of a deliberate
"Nazism without Nazis" disjunction.192 The post-Adenauer persistence of what German
historian Norbert Frei calls a "just leave it behind us mentality"1 93 can be seen in the
nothing to aid victims, but cites ambiguous laws and regulatory obstacles as explanations for a
"half-hearted" approach to the issue. See Press Statement on Historical Commission, supra. A
supervening tone of self-exculpation, consistent with official public memory, is thematically
strong in the Report. There is explicit reference to Austria's acknowledged status as a "victim"
State, see supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text, to the Moscow Declaration, see supra note
31 and accompanying text, and to the State Treaty, see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
See also REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA, HISTORICALCOMMISSION, INFORMATION 16 (2003), available at
http://www.historikerkommission.gv.at/pdf/INTENGLISCHEPRESSEINFO.pdf (noting victim
status of Austria as recognized by the Moscow Declaration); id. at 23 (recalling the State Treaty
as "the prime objective of Austrian foreign policy"). At the same time, there is incorporative
recognition of the "broad involvement of the Austrian population" in the destabilization of
Jewish life in Austria, id. at 2, and of sections of the local population in the "wild Aryanization"
of Jewish real estate and moveable property that followed the Anschluss, id. at 4. Ultimately,
measurement of Austria's restitution efforts is expressed to be a "value judgement [sic]." Id. at
31 (expressing concern that the "monetarisation [sic] of history, the conversion of guilt into
debts ... may itself ultimately involve deflecting guilt and attempting to draw a line under the
issue"). The phenomenon of "historical" commissions has spawned commissions of this kind in
more than twenty countries to investigate the national relationship with the Holocaust. See
Bindenagel, supra note 56, at 6-7 (also mentioning the U.S. Presidential Advisory Cormmission
on Holocaust Assets, which reported early in 2001); see also HAYNER, supra note 176, at 17
(referring to these kinds of official inquiry into long-past human rights abuses as "historical
truth commissions"); Cf EIZENSTAT, supra note 12, at 348 (describing how the appointment of
historical commissions has influenced corporations-Daimler-Chrysler and Deutsche Bank, for
instance-to appoint their own court historians to document their involvement with Nazism).
191. See HERF, supra note 163, at 220, 299 (noting Adenauer's focus on embedding
Germany in Western supranational institutions, a strategy that emphasized the need to create no
new sources for mistrust of German foreign policy while never being specific about the Nazi
past). Herf borrows a brutal metaphor to explain Adenauer's predicament of silence: "in the
house of the hangman, one ought not talk about the rope." Id. at 300 (commenting on
Adenauer's fear of provoking the lingering support for Nazism that existed among sections of
the post-war German public); see also John Keegan, Gone with the War, TIMES LITERARY
SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 2, 2004, at 9 (noting, in response to German renunciation of militarism fora
"consensual and legalistic internationalism," a cynical response which holds that Germany has
not abandoned its national aim of dominating Europe, only altered the means). Stuart Eizenstat,
reflecting on post-war German public policy into the 1950s, writes of a "deafening silence" with
respect to the Nazi past. EIZENSTAT, supra note 12, at 13. The silence was broken, according to
Eizenstat, only when Israel decided to start reparations negotiations with the Federal Republic
of Germany in 1951. Id. For German post-war denazification policy, see supra notes 14, 59,
(discussing a specific "policy for the past" that emphasized silence over memory).
192. FREi, supra note 13, at 232 (suggesting a prevalent attitude among West Germans
in the 1950s that regarded Nazism as a "crime without perpetrators").
193. Id. at 25 (explaining support for an amnesty law adopted in 1949 that marked an
important stage in the abatement of an initial policy of denazification).
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fact that there has never been a general debate in the German parliament on the Nazi
past. 194
Despite that dominant trend (or wish) for amnesia, however, the German State has
more recently included in its official memory a constructed process of self-
catechization, a controlled sequence of remembrance with respect to German
responsibility for the Holocaust. 95 What could Germany do with a legacy that
encompasses "shame, doubt, feelings of guilt"?' 96 Should the national narrative be a
patchwork of mistakes and failures? 197 Germany rejected a narrative of an ingrained
lesion in the national character, but its desire to have a restored place in the world, its
re-Christianized Europeanism, made it imperative (after Adenauer's time of amnesia)
that its elites incorporate a narrative of national regret for Nazism. 198 In this delicate
process, the senior elective office of the State, the German Federal Presidency, has
become the instrument for national rituals of conciliation and apologetics. Federal
President Theodor Heuss self-consciously kept the Jewish Holocaust and the Nazi
actions to the forefront even in the guarded Adenauer era, stating in 1952 that "Diese
Scham nimmt uns niemand ab" ("no one will lift this shame from us!"). 199 In more
recent times, Richard von Weiszicker has embraced "a memorial of thinking and
feeling within ourselves, ' 20° and Johannes Rau, in the presence of Holocaust survivors,
knelt to "beg forgiveness. ' ' 2st These public statements of official contrition have been
194. That is to say, a debate held "independently of specific legislative goals." Id. at 1.
195. Unlocking these associations required grave caution in a country beset by what
Christopher Hitchens describes as "repressed woes." HrrcHENS, supra note 7, at 85.
196. IRWIN-ZARECKA, supra note 37, at 94 (posing the dilemma of German history as
"the integration of [the horrors of Nazism] into what should essentially be an inspiring
narrative").
197. See id. (questioning the degree of presence that should be granted to "a morally
problematic, challenging past"); see also Spaulding, supra note 189, at 1998 (asking how, given
the imperative of the consolation and inspiration of a shared memory, a State recites, much less
commemorates, the litany of its misdeeds, making them part of its reason for being).
198. Mark Osiel offers the cynical view that the German elites describe themselves as
the "worst offenders in history," but do so in the framework of "something to teach the world-
how to grapple with the past," and that this self-conscious approach has become "an export
market... a new nationalism based on how to deal with the past." Osiel, supra note 143, at 14.
For Osiel, "victims are the judges and.., should be the ones who decide whether the project of
grappling is successful, not the perpetrators." Id.
199. HERF, supra note 163, at 321 (quoting Federal President Theodor Heuss, Speech at
the Bergen-Belsen Concentration Camp (Nov. 30, 1952)). According to Herf, Heuss's greatest
accomplishment as Federal President was "to make the memory of the crimes of the Nazi era a
constitutive element of national political memory." Id. at 312 (arguing that Heuss made the
office of Federal President into "a political center of national memory and liberal conscience").
200. NIVEN, supra note 59, at 107 (quoting Richard von Weiszacker, Speech delivered
in Federal Parliament (1985)); see also ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED: INSIDE SOUTH
AFRICA'S TRUTH AND RECONCIUATION COMMISSION 366 (2000) (noting that von Weizsacker' s
speech marked the 40th anniversary of Germany's defeat in World War H).
201. Bindenagel, supra note 56, at 14; see also EIZENSTAT, supra note 12, at 251, 260
(noting that post-war Germany had a succession of "outspoken" presidents whose solicitude for
attending to the Nazi past may have balanced, in Eizenstat's estimation, "the historic scandal of
Hitler being legally chosen as chancellor by the president of the Weimar Republic, Field
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matched, on the legal plane, by a normative separation of the post-war Republic from
the so-called Unrechtsstaat ("unlawful State") of Nazism. 20 2 This official memory
work in the service of the reborn German State reached its apogee when former
Chancellor Helmut Kohl marked the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II by
visiting Allied capitals, causing one impressed critic to remark that Germany had
"matured post hoc into one of the Allies." 2 3
Marshal Paul von Hindenburg."). But see supra note 146 (noting President Rau's predeparture
focus on Germans as victims of Allied repatriation policies after World War II).
202. This ideological gulf is most explicitly visible in Article I(1) of the German
Constitution, which provides, with expressive rhetoric: "The dignity of man is inviolable. To
respect and protect it is the duty of all State authority." GRUNDGESETz [GG] [Constitution] art.
I(1) (F.R.G.). In a more technical sense, one should also emphasize the central importance of
Article 1(3), which explicitly binds the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary to observe a
lengthy sequence of enumerated basic rights which appears in subsequent Articles, in
combination with Article XCIII, which creates a Federal Constitutional Court endowed with a
pre-enactment power of judicial review of legislation that is accessible to every citizen. See id.
arts. 1(3), XCIII. For an account in English of the drafting of the Grundgesetz, see PETER
MERKL, THE ORIGIN OF THE WEST GERMAN REPUBLIC (Oxford Univ. Press, 1963). For a
theoretical exploration of how constitutional courts police the rhetoric of rights adopted in
"post-horror regimes," see Kim Lane Scheppele, Regimes of Horror and Not-That Constitutions
(April 10, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (arguing that
the new courts police the border between past and present governments by establishing that the
new regime is "not that" past one, for example, in the approach of the German Constitutional
Court which regards the human dignity clause of the Grundgesetz as paramount in the whole
constitutional order). A later revised version of Professor Scheppele's manuscript elaborates her
"not-that" construct into a "negative theory" of constitutional interpretation, which postulates
that post-horror constitutional courts focus more on evils to be avoided (old, discredited
practices) rather than on a "coherent theory of the ideals to which a community may aspire." See
Kim Lee Scheppele, Constitutional Interpretation After Regimes of Horror, in STUDIES tN LAW,
POLITICS AND SOCIETY (Austin Sarat & Patricia Ewick eds., forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at
23, available at http://www.northwestern.edulegalstudies/Scheppele.html).
203. NIVEN, supra note 59, at 109 (noting that critics of Kohl attributed this process of
identification to his lack of humility as he planned Germany's new place in the European and
global "constellation"); see also supra note 36 (discussing the revisionist attitude of current
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder with respect to the 60th anniversary celebrations of D-
Day, staged in 2004). Other countries have also adopted a schema of regret when confronted
with unpleasant history. The United States, for example, has adopted apology as a national
reflex. Congress in 1988 passed legislation framing an apology to citizens of Japanese ancestry
who were incarcerated in detention camps after the Pearl Harbor attack. See Bindenagel, supra
note 56; see also HAYNER, supra note 176, at 18 (noting that legislation provided $1.2 billion in
compensation to survivors). Indeed, President Gerald Ford had offered a similar apology in
1976. See BORAIN, supra note 200, at 368. Stuart Eizenstat, reflecting on his mission to win
apology and compensation for Holocaust victims, offers the view that the United States should
apologize for slavery. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 12, at 352 (arguing that such an apology
"would help salve the wounds of generations of African-Americans"). The United States has not
done so, although President George W. Bush condemned slavery as "one of the greatest crimes
of history" when he visited Senegal in 2003. Richard W. Stevenson, Bush, in Africa, Promises
Aid But Offers no Troops for Liberia, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2003, at A8. Bush also commented
that "[a] republic founded on equality for all became a prison for millions." Id.
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The success or failure of elite efforts to incorporate counter-narrative challenges is
again a matter for empirical study, and cannot be resolved here. 204 What can be
posited, however, is the existence of structures of official memory work that
accommodate counter-narratives and that are a rational attempt to limit potential
fissures in the social consensus. Alex Boraine, a leading member of the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, has asked how governments can truly create
what he calls "a space for the victims."20 5 Boraine poses this question along an
Osiel/Gillis axis of authentic contestation. Viewed within the terms of the characteristic
patterns of official public memory, however, governments have developed
incorporative devices, typically devices of public law, that manage, rather than create
empathic spaces for, threats to the official narrative.
Thus, U.S. Ambassador J.D. Bindenagel (prime author of the restitution agreement
with Austria), in a guileless exposd of incorporative strategy, proposes a tripartite
sequence of apology, compensation, and formal remembrance as a methodology to
propitiate victims of past official infamies. 206 And Boraine, visiting the United States to
publicize the work of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, noticed
that the most frequent question he was asked by university and college audiences
was-in relation to the perseverance of U.S. denial and misunderstanding with respect
to slavery-"Do you think that the United States should have a truth commission?"
207
The question reveals not only that there is a lingering need to resolve what Boraine
calls "unresolved tensions and questions" with respect to slavery,208 but more acutely
(for present purposes) that governments have successfully promoted the formula of a
truth commission as a mechanism of incorporation that is already familiar to potentially
affected populations. 209 So much so, in fact, that Priscilla Hayner (in her important
204. See supra note 6 (explaining that, despite judgments that can be made of particular
public responses to official memory management, empirical assessments of success or failure lie
beyond the scope of this Article).
205. BORAINE, supra note 200, at 396 (citation omitted).
206. See Bindenagel, supra note 56, at 3, 18. Thus, Bindenagel presents a formula that
will combine reconciliation with a specific program of action that includes, in addition to
monetary payments, an undertaking to preserve memory. Accordingly, reconciliation is seen as a
process, not a singular event (as might be construed from a single compensation settlement).
207. BoRAiNE, supra note 200, at 380 (noting that, "without exception, the question was
asked by an African-American"). The reach of the question posed to Boraine need not stop at
truth commissions. Christopher Hitchens, for instance, provocatively queries why the United
States has not established a national museum of slavery. See HrrcHENS, supra note 7, at 84-85
(speculating as to why the presumed purgative effects of a National Holocaust Museum in
Washington, D.C., including creation of an "educated memory [to] begin the work of intelligent
forgiveness," were not thought equally applicable to the issue of slavery).
208. BORAINE, supra note 200, at 380.
209. But see Benjamin N. Schiff, Do Truth Commissions Promote Accountability or
Impunity? The Case of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in
POSTCONFLICr JusTicE 325, 341 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002) (identifying a "truth
commission fatigue" that followed two years of testimony before the South African
commission). In this respect, I disagree with the empirical premise of Mark Osiel's view that the
public is aware of the constructed nature of, for example, "collective memory of human rights
abuse," while accepting his normative proposal that an authentic shared memory can be
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study of the phenomenon of truth commissions) seems to accept the normativily of a
truth commission, in effect a customary international law right of transitional societies
to have official truth-seeking after a period of authoritarian rule. 210 Thus, while Boraine
insists that the South African model cannot be imposed in other contexts, 2 1 a "South
African-style truth commission" is already part of the ideational trappings of managing
public memory.
Governments, in other words, have habituated themselves to formulas of
incorporation and expiation, and Bindenagel and Boraine are describing two
instantiations of this incorporative process. But to postulate a formula is to doubt the
authenticity of any redemptive capacity that a formulaic revival of memory can reliably
achieve. 212 Indeed, we can go further in recognizing that there is a well-developed
taxonomy of the available forms of post-conflict official justice, spanning a continuum
from highly retributive (the criminal trial) to the most apparently restorative (the truth
developed only by ventilation and addressing disagreement rather than concealing it or
suppressing it. See Osiel, supra note 143, at 8-9.
2 10. See HAYNER, supra note 176, at 183 (indicating that policy statements of both
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have promoted the right to a truth commission
in terms of an international law "right to the truth"). Principles to combat impunity (proposed in
1997 by United Nations Special Rapporteur Louis Joinet) declare, inter alia, that, "[a] people's
knowledge of the history of their oppression is part of their heritage," and that the State (in
pursuance of its "duty to remember") should take measures to preserve "the collective memory
from extinction," including "guarding against the development of revisionist and negationist
arguments." Louis Joinet, The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees,
Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Violations of Human Rights (Civil and Political),
Final Report of the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, U.N. GAOR, Hmn. Rts. Comm., 48th Sess., Agenda Item 10, at 10, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/18 (1996). More recently, the Guiding Principles for Combating Impunity
for International Crimes provide in Principle 11 that investigative commissions such as truth
commissions "can play a crucial role" in scrutinizing violations of international humanitarian
law. Schiff, supra note 209, at 255. The Principles, however, stop short of endorsing a
normative view of such commissions (apparently out of concern that past investigative
commissions have been used deliberately to circumvent the punitive force of criminal
prosecution). Id.
211. BORAINE, supra note 200, at 381 (indicating that this is the response given to the
question posed in the main text with respect to truth commissions in other countries and for
other contexts). Boraine cautions that the decisive factor in choosing a mode of transitional
justice is not in fact international law, and not necessarily legal or moral considerations. The
choice among "trials, truth commissions, ad hoc international tribunals, [and] amnesty," in
Boraine's view, is made by the political climate of the particular transition. See id. at 381-82.
Hence, choices as different as those made in Germany (facing full defeat in an armed war), Chile
(following a dictator's electoral loss), South Africa (following compromise and negotiations),
and Eastern Europe (transitioning from longstanding communist regimes) are explicable by the
political conditions-and incorporative necessities-that created them, see id. at 382, but not
(presumably) by any anterior theory of method.
212. See LAWRENCE L. LANGER, HOLOCAUST TESTIMONIES: THE RUINS OF MEMORY 165
(1991) (criticizing the vocabulary of redemption and salvation that frequently attaches to
memory; Langer regards such notions as illusory in the context of the searing and unredeemable
memories of Holocaust survivors); see also LAWRENCE L. LANGER, ADM1TNG THE HOLOCAUST
35 (1995) (contending that the phrase "redeeming power of memory" is meaningless to
recuperate the despair experienced by Holocaust survivors).
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commission) but including also the bestowal of total impunity. 213 Because of pressures
of incorporation, the seemingly cathartic and justice-driven work of criminal trials and
truth commissions,214 for example, can be reconceptualized as incorporative devices-
contrivances of public law-to assure future social stability and the continued integrity
of official narratives. 215 Certain watchwords will need to rank in the process of
213. See BORAINE, supra note 200, at 382 (offering typology of forms of post-conflict
justice). Boraine's classification (a continuum from retribution to restoration) is the stuff of
theories of transitional justice, but not of the actual polemics of political debate. See supra note
211 (explaining Boraine's view of the pragmatics of transitional justice); see also FONER, supra
note 3, at 95 (analyzing the modem study of "transition theory" in the context of South Africa).
214. While it lies beyond the scope of this Article to consider the rationale of selection
of forms-the important question for the present discussion is who is making the selection, not
why a particular mode of official justice is selected in lieu of another-the complexity of
selection is well-canvassed in the literature. It is often accompanied, as noted in the main text,
by a rhetoric of justification. Depending on how empowered the revolutionary victors feel, a
Jacobin mood of retribution may prevail, leading to perpetrator-focused criminal trials (and even
show trials). See WoLE SOYINKA, THE BURDEN OF MEMORY, THE MUSE OF FORGIVENESS 17
(1999) (in relation to the Ghanaian experience); see also De Brito, supra note 14, at 19-20
(examining how "the nature of the [past] repression will shape the kinds of policies adopted";
thus, "[d]isappearances will require different responses to mass detainment and torture"). A
system of trials and prosecutions only, warns Boraine, fails to appreciate that the situation in
many transitional societies is "ambiguous and traumatic," so that alternative models for different
situations must always be in contemplation. BORAINE, supra note 200, at 400. A victim-centered
approach, suggesting a desire to engage in truth-finding and reconciliation, may carry what
Margalit considers a large empirical assumption that truth by itself will promote reconciliation
rather than a societal implosion. MARGALrT, supra note 7, at 5-6 ("[Mlemory breathes revenge
as often as reconciliation, so that the hope of catharsis may be illusory.").
215. The literature supporting truth commissions attributes to them the markedly
superior characteristic, rarely apparent in criminal trials, of systematic consideration of the
victims of the investigated oppression. See Martha Minow, The Hope for Healing: What Can
Truth Commissions Do?, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE 235,251 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson
eds., 2000) ("When a democratic process selects a truth commission, a people summon the
strength and vision to say to one another: Focus on victims and try to restore their dignity; focus
on truth and try to tell it whole. Redefine the victims as the entire society, and redefine justice as
accountability.... Honor and attend in public to the process of remembering."). But see Susan
Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361 (1996)
(discussing the fairly recent phenomenon in U.S. criminal trials of the "victim impact
statement," which allows victims of convicted defendants to influence the judicial sentencing
process). Moreover, the truth commission concept may be celebrated as "heroic," in Soyinka's
words, "because forgiveness is a value far more humanly exacting than vengeance." SOYINKA,
supra note 214, at 33-34. As Martha Minow observes, "[i]f the goals of repairing human
dignity, healing individuals, and mending societies after the trauma of mass atrocity are central,
truth commissions offer features that are often more promising than prosecutions." Minow,
supra, at 236. And the creation of that forgiveness, in Christopher Hitchens's view, has to be
intelligent: an "educated memory" produces such a response. HrrcHENs, supra note 7, at 84. For
Michael Ignatieff, the truth commission tackles the political reality that the past is an
"argument," so that truth commissions, "like honest historians," serve to "narrow the range of
permissible lies." Michael Ignatieff, Articles of Faith, in 25 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP: WOUNDED
NATIONS, BROKEN LIvEs, at 110, 113 (Sept. 1996). Ultimately, truth commissions are said to
enable a "symbolic break" from a "dark past," while criminal trials can act as a form of
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choosing an appropriate incorporative strategy, and many of these words (such as
accountability, victimhood, and reconciliation) are the legacy of the international
human rights culture.216 The selection process will also be a product of the specific
historical circumstances. 2 " And, in the ferment of postconflict upheaval, for example,
it may be less a reverence for honest memory work than a pragmatic desire to quell the
feral motive of vengeance which determines what kinds of responses a State in
transition can tolerate.21t Memory, after all, can provoke revenge as easily as
reconciliation.
21 9
But a stocktaking of available options cannot disguise the reality that ultimately the
selection of an incorporative strategy is elitist: someone is making that deliberate
choice and the choice-maker is the central government, the public sector.
220
"political theater" to provide "collective lessons in justice." De Brito, supra note 14, at 26. Both
mechanisms are "opportunities for mythmaking." Id. (noting, however, that this view of
commissions and trials is not uncontested, and that official reports can obscure and marginalize
other accounts of past violations). See Brandon Hamber & Richard Wilson, Symbolic Closure
Through Memory, Reparation and Revenge in Postconflict Societies (1999) (paper presented at
the Traumatic Stress in South Africa Conference hosted by the Center for the Study of Violence
and Reconciliation) (copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal), for a more critical perspective
of the truth commission process that explores divergences between individual psychological
processes and national processes of remembering (as represented by truth commissions). See
also HAYNER, supra note 176, at 139-42 (noting psychologists' doubt as to whether a "one-time
catharsis" constitutes authentic healing, and analyzing the danger that truth commissions pose of
"retraumatization" without follow-up support: "The circus comes to town and the circus
leaves").
216. See BORAINE, supra note 200, at 6 (writing in the context of the establishment of
the South African truth commission).
217. See HAYNER, supra note 176, at 7 (arguing that the specific needs and context of
each country prevail over "universal guidelines"); see also McADAMs, supra note 59, at 12
(emphasizing the "importance of historical context in weighing a government's options in many
transitional settings"; Argentina in the late 1980s, and Chile and South Africa in the 1990s, for
example, "confronted acts of shocking cruelty and savagery" that far exceeded most of the
crimes of Communism with which postcommunist Eastern European regimes had to grapple).
218. The selection of forms can be conceptualized as a reflection of the broader
juridico-philosophical underpinnings of modern tort law. Thus, the suppression of rage and
revenge is arguably also what tort law seeks to achieve. See generally J. M. Kelly, The Inner
Nature of the Tort Action, 2 IRISH JURIST 279, 287 (1967) (describing compensation for tort
victims as a matter of "ransom from vengeance," so that the plaintiff is put in possession of a
sum of money which in the court's judgment "ought to be enough to satisfy his vindictive
feelings against the wrongdoer"). Michael Ignatieff refers to a "dream time of vengeance":
"Crimes can never be safely fixed in the historical past, they remain locked in the eternal
present, crying out for blood." MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR's HONOR: ETHNIC WAR AND
THE MODERN CONSCIENCE 186 (1998); see also Sarat, supra note 82, at 308, 310 (discussing
how revenge is, in a sense, objectified and transmuted through the operations of a State
bureaucracy, so that personal animus is removed in favor of controlled retribution administered
dispassionately).
219. MARGALIT, supra note 7, at 5 (noting that the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission was established in the hope of a social catharsis that Margalit
believes may be an illusion).
220. See Rodolfo Mattarollo, Truth Commissions, in PoSTcoNFLicr JUSTICE, supra note
209, at 295, 341 (distinguishing truth commissions as public sector bodies from
nongovernmental organizations which carry out background work supporting the commissions).
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Consequently, as creations of the State, truth commissions and criminal trials are
"subject to the same encouraging or discouraging influences that successful or failed
legal measures are likely to produce. ' 221 This is the essence of incorporation as a
characteristic pattern of official memory. The State organs select, and then organize,
the commission or the trial. An official report or judgment becomes itself an historical
account which, to a greater or lesser degree, will obscure or marginalize competing
222
narratives of past misdeeds. The compiled record of the national administration
acquires an authority that is legally dispositive, and this new history is inscribed into
the official State liturgy.223 And, however distasteful it may be to incorporate legacies
of violence or dishonor in the grand rdcit, the elite calculation must be that initial
tolerance, and the legal mechanisms of tolerance, can yield later to official revisionism
once the social consensus is stabilized.2 24 That was precisely the experience of
denazification described in Norbert Frei's masterful new study of post-Nazi German
reconstruction, the very title of which-Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past: The
221. Schiff, supra note 209, at 337.
222. See De Brito, supra note 14, at 26 (noting that the salvific view of truth
commissions and criminal trials as agents of consensus and collective justice is "not
uncontested"); see also BORAINE, supra note 200, at 388 (warning against the danger, inherent
in investigative processes, of creating "conflicting versions of the truth" that may inspire future
conflict) (quoting Neil J. Kritz, Is a Truth Commission Appropriate in the Former Yugoslavia,
Speech at the International Conference on War Crimes Trials (November 1998)).
223. See Schiff, supra note 209, at 338 (describing inscription of South African truth
commission findings into a "new history" of the State, and as such a "step in nation-building").
The practice of truth commissions, in conformance with their bureaucratic origin, is to generate
massive reports. The 2003 Peruvian truth commission, for example, issued a nine-volume report
comprising many thousands of pages. See Juan Forero, Truth Commission Leaves Many Indians
in Peru Unsatisfied, N.Y. TnMEs, Aug. 31, 2003, at A12. Given the limited literacy of many of
the populations directly affected by these reports, it is strange that even compact, simplified
summaries of truth commission findings are typically not created.
224. Truth commissions have also encountered criticism in terms of their handling of
the evidence they gather and, subsequently, evaluate. See Schiff, supra note 209, at 338
(discussing mixed experience of truth commissions in this respect); see also HAYNER, supra
note 176, at 22 (commenting on the real but unrealistic pressure to be "perfect and
comprehensive"). The massive task of compiling names of victims and perpetrators, dates and
locations of acts, has been accurately described as an exercise in "acontextual logical
positivism." Id. at 81. Where a commission focuses mainly on gathering factual information
regarding particular violations, it may fail adequately to address the causal or structural nature of
a conflict and to present a meaningful qualitative analysis of the reasons for the conflict, the acts
perpetrated, and the broader significance of severe political violence. In one view, this tendency
focuses excessively on what happened, yet may fail to explain why the events took place. Id.
Daniel Rothenberg, an anthropologist who was on the staff of the Guatemalan truth commission,
has questioned the excessive reliance on a solely legal focus in the development of truth
commission methodologies. His work considers the broad interpretive role of truth commissions
for assisting post-conflict societies in reckoning with the meaning and structure of past political
violence, a process that may require greater integration of social science, ideas, and methods.
See id. at 81-82; see also BORAINE, supra note 200, at 290-91 (distinguishing the
"microscopic" truth of criminal trials from "dialogical" or "social" truth, the "truth of experience
that is established through [transparent] interaction, discussion, and debate," and that may be,
Boraine implies, the kind of truth that a "truth" commission is most apt to uncover).
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Politics of Amnesty and ntegration 225--conveys the Potemkin-like nature of the post-
war German efforts to lustrate the bureaucracy and political life.
e. Presentism
Austria's prolonged deferment of any response to the victims of Nazi policies
caused its eventual decision to proceed with reparations to be viewed cynically as a
public relations gambit rather than as an expiation of national shame "over its moral
standing emanating from a confrontation with its past. '226 But, if this is so (and there is
no doubt that Austria acted under pressure from U.S. class-action lawsuits), it is an
unsurprising outcome of the bias of official public memory toward a State's living and
future citizens. What, after all, was the effect on Austria's post-war population of the
claim of victimhood? Probably it encouraged the spread of a broad social amnesia.
More pointedly it acted as a national tranquillizer. 227 The population could exploit the
public law mythology to ease the harshness of a Halbwachsian community memory.
228
In the words of one commentator, "Austria quietly accepted the mantle of martyrdom
as its own.,, 229 Remembering the innocuously titled State Treaty became a secular ritual
of commemoration that blunted the hard edges of a past so closely associated with the
most terrible regime in modem history.
In a similar display of presentist bias, Chancellor Wolfgang Schiissel, in his April
2000 address to the Austrian ministerial council, applied a qualification of collective
temporal distance to responsibility for Austria's Nazi past: "[t]he majority of us did not
225. See FREI, supra note 13, whose book examines how the Adenauer administration
progressively reversed or recast West German denazification policies of the immediate post-war
period. See supra notes 14, 59, for further consideration of this issue.
226. MILLER, supra note 26, at 91 (referring to an earlier, more parsimonious allocation
of $4 million in reparations for Nazi victims voted by the Austrian Parliament in 1988).
227. Although the focus of this Article is primarily on juristic mythmaking, it is
also true that Austria benefited in the post-war era from myths extruded by the contrivances
of popular culture. The Sound of Music, a spectacularly successful motion picture that
appeared in 1965, introduced the world to "a previously unknown Austria of singing
nuns, heroic children, and noble officer(s], defying and outwitting Nazi thugs while an
emotional Austrian audience collaborated by roaring out the Austrian national anthem in
patriotic defiance of the assembled Nazi top brass." Austria Watch, supra note 152, at
http://web.archive.org/web/20000919224514/http://www.austriawatch.com/past.htm; see also
MInER, supra note 26, at 61 (observing, in connection with popular reception of The Sound of
Music, that "history, as opposed to Hollywood, tells us that the overwhelming majority of
Austrians preferred the German national anthem to their own").
228. The bias of presentism reflects also the majoritarian biases of official memory-the
purpose of social control would not succeed, presumably, if the constructed memory overplayed
the responsibility of the general population. Official memory will seek to avoid an imposition of
collective guilt-or, where that becomes problematical (as in the case of Germany) to
"incorporate" a process of regret into the institutional actions of the State. See supra text
accompanying note 199 (considering the role of the German Federal Presidency as the
institutional conduit for official apology).
229. YOUNG, supra note 152, at 91 (writing of a "nervous decorum" that characterized
post-war Austrian treatment of the events of the Holocaust).
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consciously live through these events." 23° Moreover, to maintain the social solidarity of
the Austrian people, as discussed earlier, Austrian official memory splices together the
ideas of victimhood and the legal and moral purity of the interrupted Statehood of
Austria. In so doing, it licenses the present and future population to reclaim a glorious
pre-Nazi history and to esteem the post-war successes of neutrality, economic revival,
and membership of the European Union-and, concomitantly, allows each living
Austrian, distanced by the Chancellor's words from the horrors of Nazism, to escape a
derivative historical responsibility for the actions of their predecessor fellow citizens.
The Austrian government, in fact, engaged hardly at all in the incorporative truth-
seeking strategies of the post-war era such as criminal trials or the more recent
phenomenon of a national truth and reconciliation commission. 231 The shaping of
public memory through victimhood and suspended Statehood, therefore, was truly an
exercise in preserving social solidarity even at the risk of ignoring past dishonor, and
perhaps even the rights of true victims.23 2 The creation of a public law mythology, a
compressed history of Empire-to-neutrality, might have been a distortion of the true
past but could act as a social balm that would preserve the Austrian nation and its
233identity in the post-war world. Chancellor Schiissel's address in 2000 was explicit on
this point. He noted the persistence of an "Austrian identity" (again, a noble identity)
that survived the Anschluss with Germany.234 This is the better identity, in the
Chancellor's reasoning, to which Austrians should lay claim today.235
230. April 2000 Statement of Dr. Wolfgang Schiissel, supra note 57, at 43. The
Chancellor's insertion of the word "consciously" (bewusst) responds to the fact that, as he next
indicates, "[m]ore than two-thirds of our people were small children at that time or were born in
the following decades." Id.
231. Some of the paraphernalia of postconflict justice, including criminal trials,
lustration, and restitution, did appear in Austria for a time but were superseded by systematic
reintegration and amnesty policies favoring former Nazis. See generally PICK, supra note44, at
41 (discussing demise of Austrian denazification program as the Western powers concentrated
on containment of communism and deterrence of a feared Soviet invasion of Austria). See also
supra note 40 (noting Austria's geopolitical significance).
232. See, e.g., OsIEL, supra note 74, at 6-7 (striking a warning, from a liberal's
perspective, that even the "salubrious" purpose of enhancing social solidarity to prevent a
recurrence of genocide can easily permit a criminal trial to trample on the rights of defendants).
For Germany's similar post-war experience with denazification, see supra notes 14, 59.
233. As Eizenstat mentions, the juristic draperies of victimology accompanied other
sociocultural eccentricities such as the wearing of peasant hats and the cultivation of a
distinctive Viennese accent. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 12, at 281.
234. April 2000 Statement of Dr. Wolfgang Schussel, supra note 57, at 43.
235. While a moral evaluation of the interplay of Austrian narrative and counter-
narrative lies beyond the scope of this Article, the posture of State noncomplicity that Austria
has adopted in the decades since it regained independence has come under increasingly critical
scrutiny from outside observers. James E. Young, in a recent study of Holocaust memorial
practice, casts a cold eye on Austrians' longstanding willingness "to let the Germans do the
memorial dirty work," and on the bitter disputes surrounding memorialization projects in Graz
and Vienna. See YOUNG, supra note 152, at 92. Controversies surrounding the Vienna
memorial, Alfred Hrdlicka's Monument Against War and Fascism (unveiled in 1988), were
stoked by the Austrian artist himself, whose provocations of officialdom included the prank of
building a giant wooden horse, bearing the colors of a Nazi stormtrooper, which he wheeled into
Vienna's central plaza for Kurt Waldheim's inauguration in 1987. See id. at 104-06. In Young's
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Presentism, therefore, adds an important coda to this process of deriving
characteristic patterns of official public memory. Selectivity, constructivism,
mythopoesis, and incorporation would be hollow exercises if pursued only to freeze
and canonize an official master narrative (an ingenuous explanation for cultivation of
that kind of official public memory would simply be the inspiration of a genuine amour
d'stat). Governments are rationally interested in goals of stability and social order,
what Middleton and Edwards describe straightforwardly as "socially organized
remembering and forgetting., 236 The value of the nation-State, after all, is its ability to
ensure the political and social welfare of the peoples it embraces. To maintain the
continuity of the Hegelian enterprise (at least to the governmental mind) requires that
the individuals who comprise a particular State/society respond to a particularized view
of how that organism has emerged and is continuing to evolve. 237 Governments are at
least in the business of what has been called historical engineering, 238 of a kind of
valorization of aspects of the past that will suit their purposes in the present.2 3 9 This
positivistic, instrumentalist thinking rejects the literalism of archivistic history (a
notion of chronique), ° which implicitly exalts the past over present and future policy.
Official public memory, therefore, has propagandistic and incantatory properties,
allowing a benign social control of populations who are placed in thrall of a distinctive
and self-regardingly important version of national history.
C. Official Public Memory and the Power of Law
As the discussion in this Part has repeatedly demonstrated, the State's lawmaking
power is central to Halbwachs's notion of society as a "system of ideas. 241 The
concluding words on the controversy, "Some wondered why it had taken forty-three years to
build any kind of monument at all, and whether it was a gesture to memory or to a guilty
conscience . . . . Was it a nobly inspired mourning place, or only a gloss for foreign
consumption?" Id. at 111.
236. Middleton & Edwards, supra note 79, at 10 (noting how, in addition to "social
organization" in the sense of creating minutes, archives, and financial audits, socially organized
remembering and forgetting relates to the large-scale "manipulation" of what should or could be
remembered).
237. See KAMMEN, supra note 84, at 693 (concluding that the "common ground" in the
manufacture of traditions, including those imposed by governments, is "ideological necessity
and the political manipulation of myth as an integral part of the State-building process").
238. Keith Wilson, Introduction: Governments, Historians, and 'Historical
Engineering' to FORGING THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY: GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL
HISTORIANS THROUGH Two WORLD WARS 1, 2 (Keith Wilson ed., 1996) (explaining that
"historical engineering" operates through the withholding and releasing of archival material).
239. See Bommes & Wright, supra note 7, at 266 (describing a process of "public
valorization" of a British "National Heritage" that honors past incidences of elite leadership);
see also Boyarin, supra note 120, at 147 (noting the focus of the liberal State on its living
residents). In Irwin-Zarecka's phrasing, a "mythical structure" (including a "myth of the origin")
may be needed "to sustain a people." IRWIN-ZARECKA, supra note 37, at 58.
240. See infra text accompanying note 263 (defining chronique in terms of an
exhaustive, archivistic exploration of the past).
241 HALBWACHS, ON COLLECTIVE MEMORY, supra note 9, at 188 (examining how
teachings, notions, and symbols penetrate societal traditions); see also infra note 235
(commenting on Halbwachs's use of the term "society").
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Austrian Republic's restitution policy for forced and slave labor and property
confiscation, for example, shows how government superintendence of lawmaking
creates a dominating capacity for representational idiom in the arena of a population's
memory. Legal and quasi-legal devices that are useful to the mythmaking of
officialdom (including constitutions, legislation, treaties, truth commissions, criminal
trials, and the making of official statements) channel the evocation of public memory
using law's distinctive role as an a posteriori conceptual apparatus. 242 Law, in other
words, rationalizes the experience of the past. 24 3 Using categories such as
parliamentary legislation, constitutional principles, or a spectacular device like the
Austrian State Treaty, for example, law allows access to the past to be organized
through familiar and replicable structures, and thereby stabilizes social expectations. 244
These stabilizing and repetitive characteristics of public law are precisely what makes
it valuable to governmental elites.
While some critics promote a vigorous contestation of collective memory,
permanently unsettling the attempt to impose monolithic interpretations on the past,
245
to the extent that law muffles the full echo of the past (aided, no doubt, by Proustian
selectivity and forgetfulness), it checks the play of these contestations and promotes
closure where counter-narrativists would prefer openness and disruption. 246 At least
analogically, Cass Sunstein's conception of law's "cascade effects" is appropriate,
since it suggests that people believe what relevant others believe in the absence of
private competing information.247 Mark Osiel writes of a consensus in memory and a
242. See Emilios A. Christodoulidis, Law's Immemorial, in LETHE's LAw: JusTICE, LAW
AND ETHICs IN RECONC.IATON 207, 218 (Emilios Christodoulidis & Scott Veitch eds., 2001)
(explaining that, as an a posteriori system, law (or more precisely, "legal memory") summons
events as relevant to its current needs of classification and as relevant to expectations of how
events will be classified in the future). The past, Christodoulidis maintains, must always be
"reconciled with the present," and he seems to suggest that law's familiar categories allow, and
demand, precisely that. See id.
243. See id. at 218 (arguing that law reconfigures the past as appropriate to current and
future legal decisions).
244. See id. at 218-19 (describing law's recall as taking place along "specific pathways
determined by structures of expectations").
245. See, e.g., OstEL, supra note 74, at 53 n.65 (discussing postmodernist theories of
actively supporting permanent disruption as an end in itself); see also YAEL ZERUBAVEL,
RECOVERED RooTs: COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND THE MAKING OF ISRAELI NATIONAL TRADITION 10
(1995) (suggesting that occasionally the fragile coexistence between divergent interpretations of
the past breaks down, the capacity of the "myth" to mediate between these divergent readings is
lost, the past becomes openly contested, and alternative commemorative narratives operate as a
"countermemory" to the master narrative).
246. See Christodoulidis, supra note 242, at 220 (concluding that law's preselection of
the past creates a compulsion in the way law works, and necessarily excludes openness and
disruptability). In Christodoulidis's view, we cannot ask the system "to remember what it forgot
and to remember that it forgot it... a (double) recall that is impossible for it to perform." Id.
247. SuNSTEiN, supra note 131, at 20-21 (postulating the existence of "information
cascades" that exploit the absence of private, competing information on the part of many or most
people to influence views on political, legal, and moral questions, and the direction of
judgments about the appropriate course of government regulation or constitutional law).
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consensus in oblivion.248 Either of these approaches, if one assumes a contrived
consensus, in a milieu of civic trauma (and, later, as in Austria, in a milieu of civic
complacency), can serve the purpose of forestalling disintegration.
249
D. Conclusion
Official public memory, finally, is the construction of a claim that seeks to
supersede actual memory, and to displace or at least assimilate competing sources of
memory production such as the work of historians, the streaming output of news media
and popular culture, and the unrequited expectations of groups whose own victimhood
has not been recognized in the formation of a national hagiography. 250 Official public
memory seeks to force a shift in perception so that all future consideration of the past
takes place within the official paradigm. In a Freudian sense, official memory's
bipolar actions of suppression and emphasis are fused into control over the State's
248. See OsiEL, supra note 74, at 26 (arguing, using the example of French memory of
the collaborationist Vichy regime, that political conditions may make social solidarity more
achievable through a modus vivendi of deliberate amnesia).
249. See id.
250. Yael Zerubavel writes of the "highly subversive" character of what he terms
"countermemory," which typically occurs when minority groups oppose hegemonic
interpretation and seek to perform competing commemorative rituals or to win recognition of
past injustices. ZERUBAVEL, supra note 245, at 10-11 (discussing phenomenon of
countermemory). Zerubavel views the tensions caused by countermemory as helpful in
transforming and recharging collective memory into a dynamic cultural force rather than a static
body of "survivals" that modern societies merely tolerate. Id. at 11-12 (noting that
countermemory can eventually win hegemony, as in the French and Bolshevik Revolutions).
Zerubavel' s argument resonates with Mark Osiel's embrace of a collective memory that accepts
cognitive and moral ambiguity within a common framework of association and cooperation. See
supra note 177 and accompanying text; see also MUNSLOW, supra note 119, at 116 (considering
post-Hegelian rejection of grand or totalizing narratives in favor of accepting othemess,
alternatives, and constantly deferred meaning). But the empirical study of Austria considered in
this Article demonstrates that countermemory efforts may simply encourage elites to reinterpret
or recalibrate selected features of the master narrative rather than to transform it. (Indeed,
Zerubavel himself betrays the persistence of elite memory work in another context when he
argues that the Zionist master collective memory "assigned to oblivion" the centuries of life that
were central to the Palestinians' collective memory of their homeland. See ZERUBAVEL, supra
note 245, at 215.)
251. See supra note 6 (segregating the question of the success or failure of exercises of
official memory from the conceptual analysis pursued in this Article). Halbwachs, in writing
about "society," refers both to the subgroups (family, nobility, religion, etc.) that comprise a
society (his usual planes of analysis), and globally to a broader encompassing "society" that
comprises these groups. His references to a general society (the State), and hence to the
possibility of an official collective memory, are infrequent. Nonetheless, it is probably this
broader meaning that he has in mind when he remarks that "society can live only if there is a
sufficient unity of outlooks among the individuals and groups comprising it." HALBWACHS, ON
COLLECTIVE MEMORY, supra note 9, at 182-83 (arguing further that "society" tends to erase
from its memory "all that might separate individuals or that might distance groups from each
other," in pursuit of the social need-that is, the State's need-for unity).
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past.2 5 2 Official public memory, backed by the centrality of law and the voices of State
policy, is therefore a pervasive apparatus of State control (and, for that reason,
undoubtedly a powerful one). It is not a characteristic pattern of this kind of memory
work that it is concerned with either a recovery of a literal, true past, or the individual
lived experiences of the population at which it is directed (even though, in the cases of
the countries I have examined in this discussion, the populations largely embrace the
official message). 3
Having demonstrated that official memory is contrived memory, this Article
proceeds now to the search for a discourse of public memory that would allow a more
contested (and therefore a more authentic) account of the past. While writers like Osiel
and Gillis certainly seek to open official memory to contestation, their arguments are
framed entirely within the existing State-centered apparatus of law and policy. In
contrast, the remainder of this Article looks for a public memory that might also be
informed by analytical sources outside the conceptual framework of public law and
policy. To do this requires broadening the analysis to include more than legal and
policy considerations and to consult other disciplines whose discourses may not be
beholden to the collectivizing, mythologizing, and generalizing biases of law-based
official public memory. In this search for authenticity, this Article pursues two
dialectical approaches derived from the conceptual understanding of official memory
presented in the preceding paragraph. The first approach proposes the restoration of
simple accuracy to the past, and looks to history as the informing discipline. The
second approach seeks to counter the generalizing bias of official public memory
through a focus on individual lived experience, and in particular on the autonomous
condition of individual affective memory. This approach will be informed by social
philosophy, and also by literature and by science. I will begin with the approach of
restoring simple accuracy to the past, and with the discourse of history.
HI. EXPLORING AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF PUBLIc MEMORY:
THE DisciPLINE OF HISTORY
A. Introduction
The search for authenticity, in the context of this Article, could be considered here
as a search for a restoration of simple accuracy to the past, something that eludes
official memory because it is ontologically incapable of treating the past as anything
other than a construct that serves ideological purposes. A search for accuracy, on the
other hand, also presents a "democratic" possibility in the sense favored by Osiel and
Gillis in their models of continuing contestation and disruption. Peeling away the
glosses of official memory (the work of selectivity, constructivism, mythopoesis,
252. See GADDIS, supra note 8, at 137 (describing how historians, too, impose
themselves on the past and are prone to construct memories that make the past "controllable"
through Freudian emphasis and suppression). The role of history (and of historians) in shaping
public memory is considered further in Part HI, infra.
253. The successful reception of the official message probably also implants a durable
"collective memory." See supra note 4 (distinguishing, for purposes of this Article, the concepts
of "official public memory" and "collective memory").
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incorporation, and presentism), might we uncover an authentic discourse that exists as
a sustained (and sustaining) contrast to the claims of official elites?
If we pursue Michel-Rolph Trouillot's paradigmatic distinction and try to elevate
"what happened" over "that which is said to have happened, ' 254 perhaps we can trust
the discipline that (we may think) most obsessively adopts Trouillot's paradigm, the
discipline of history, to transcend the fixed boundaries of an officially inscribed public
memory. Trouillot discusses (although he does not in any degree endorse) the Western
scholarly model of the role of the historian as being "to discover or, at least,
approximate the truth.' 255 That definition more comfortably embraces history than
other contributors to general public information, including the media (disqualified-at
the least-by transience) and organized religion (which is dogmatic in the manner of
official memory itself). In this Part, therefore, I will test whether the epistemic model
of history could be appropriated as an unmediated (and therefore, presumably, more
authentic) source of public memory.
B. History as Chronique
History and official public memory would appear to have a vexed relationship.256 If
official memory appropriates and manages contestable claims about the past, history
stripped to its essence purports to be the very antithesis of managed memory.25 7 But
why should this be so? Is it possible to have a complexly rendered, archivistic
accounting of the past, or is it always necessary to expect the dominance of an
established image of the past, even a past that never existed, which serves the purposes
of the living present? 258 The historian, it would appear, is perceived to be immune from
the "imagined communities" forged by systematized, elite-driven remembering and
254. MICHEL-ROLPH TROUILLOT, SILENCING THE PAST: POWER AND THE PRODUCTION OF
HISTORY 2 (1995). Trouillot writes later of "the interplay" between what he calls "historicity 1"
and "historicity 2," "between what happened and that which is said to have happened." Id. at
106.
255. ld. at 5.
256. See Harold Bloom, Foreword to YERUSHALMI, supra note 78, at xv (arguing that
memory and history typically fail to "inform" each other). In a similar vein, Margalit contrasts
history and memory as bipolar opposites analogous to common sense and science. See
MARGALrr, supra note 7, at 63 (discussing the idea that science is regarded as a systematic and
critical common sense, while history is seen as a systematic and critical collective memory).
257. See Sarat, supra note 82, at 310-11 (contrasting the "truth" of history to "the
slippery terrain on which individuals and groups invent traditions and record partisan versions
of the past on the basis of which they seek to construct a new present"); see also KErrIT
WINDSCHUTTLE, THE KILLING OF HISTORY: How LITERARY CRITICS AND SOCIAL THEORISTS ARE
MURDERING OUR PAST 1 (1994) (explaining that history is the gift of the Greeks, who invented
the notion of history, recording "the truth about the past" in place of mythical tales); Sarat,
supra note 82, at 311 (discussing intellectual and secular orientation of history).
258. See FONER, supra note 3, at xv (suggesting that narratives emphasizing the glories
of American development (for example), sit uneasily with the broader canvas of "new" histories
which disrupt "an unalloyed saga of national progress toward liberty and equality").
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forgetting.259 Historians, according to this reasoning, understand this cognitive distance
as their scientific objectivity, which allows them to stand apart from the living concerns
of societal groups.2 ° History's principles of selectivity, in other words, are said to be
internal. 26' On its face, this argument for conceptual segregation of the historian holds
much appeal.
There appears to be, therefore, a visceral ontological distinction that separates
official public memory from history, namely, the difference between ritualistic recall
and detailed archivistic rendering (what I call chronique262). History work, as opposed
to official memory work, is expected to be obsessional about discovering a literal
"true" past, an orientation on display for example in recent investigative work on the
attitude of the Papacy toward the Jews or the hidden medical pathology of President
John F. Kennedy.263 The idea of a canonical, closed past,264 in this understanding,
259. De Brito et al., supra note 14, at 38, 330 (concluding, based on research, that the
question of false or accurate memories is subordinate to how people "imagine" their
communities).
260. See YERuSHALMI, supra note 78, at 114 (observing a progressive detachment of the
historian, after the nineteenth century, from the societal group and its memory). History became
a discipline with an independent, accelerating momentum, and its measurements of what is to be
remembered have become endogenous to the discipline rather than determined by the
"commonality of values" that comprises group memory. Id. Without group identification and
value-generation, the historian (Yerushalmi surmises) cannot "transform history into memory"
or "tell us what should be forgotten." Id. at 115.
261. Id.
262. This use of the word-which is imbued with notions of an annalistic rendering of
past events--could easily be impregnated with more controversial doctrinal meanings. Historian
John Lewis Gaddis, exploring the tension between "particularization" and "generalization,"
warns that there is danger in using the word chronicle to describe historical research. In his
view, the word naturally suggests a mass of detail, but the mere unsorted accumulation of detail
will not make for worthwhile history. "Abstraction" and "narrative" are two dynamic techniques
of dealing with the assembly of facts, so that an instructive generalization emerges. See GADDIS,
supra note 8, at 15. Generalizations then become incorporated into the narrative (not the other
way around). See id. at 106 (citing, as an expressive example of the likely superfluity of
chronicle, the historian who traces how each of the Japanese pilots who bombed Pearl Harbor
learned to fly). Gaddis may be suggesting that history performs no more or less effectively than
public or private memory-Lhistory, too, is abstract and constructed. With respect, however, I
find this view of history to be constrictively dogmatic. Why should the historian-any
historian-be discouraged from investigation of how a Pearl Harbor pilot learned to fly? This
epistemological apriorism would tend to devalue historical treatment of how the World Trade
Center terrorists "learned to fly," which, as we now know, was critical to an informed
understanding of their attack and its planning. The salient difference between history and
official public memory-which is reflected in my use of the specialized word chronique-
remains that the former sees nothing in the past as inherently alien to its discourse, while the
latter sees the past as an arena for reductive manipulation.
263. See SUSAN ZUCCOTTI, UNDER His VERY WINDOws: THE VATICAN AND THE
HOLOCAUST IN ITALY (2001); JOSE M. SANCHEZ, PIus XII AND THE HOLOCAUST: UNDERSTANDING
THE CoNTRovERsy (2001); see generally DAvID KERTZER, THE UNHOLY WAR: THE VATICAN's
ROLE IN THE RISE OF MODERN ANTI-SEMITISM (2002) (discussing the issue of Jews and the
Papacy). For a much more tendentious and polemical treatment of the same subject, see DANIEL
JONAH GOLDHAGEN, A MORAL RECKONING: THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE
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should be anathema to the diligent historian. Margalit, indeed, suggests a Weberian
contrast between the world as an enchanted place (as in the American hagiography of
the "founding fathers"), and the world as an unenchanted place (the inclination of
history, for example when it challenges Austria's alleged delusion of Nazi
victimhood).265 Government-sponsored memory work has been described as yielding a
patriotic history266 that plots a convincing and even stirring portrait of the State's
emergence from some condition of prelapsarian innocence.26 And history, a discipline
torn these days between academic insularity and media popularization, cannot in either
of these guises challenge the dominating role of government. 268 In any case, however,
HOLOCAUST AND ITS UNFULFILLED DUTY OF REPAIR (2002) (condemning the Church for its "anti-
Jewish supersessionist creed"). For an account of President Kennedy's concealed health
problems, see ROBERT DAtLEK, AN UNFINISHED LIFE: JOHN F. KENNEDY 1917-1963 (2003)
(drawing on previously unavailable records to frame arguments about the severity of Kennedy's
medical condition and its effect on his actions as President). See also Richard Reeves,
Kennedy's Private Ills, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 21, 2002, at A37 (arguing that, by current "rules" of
politics, Kennedy's medical complications would prevent him from being elected President);
N.R. Kleinfield, The Real Story: Heroes, but Human; Firefighters' Accounts Give Sept. l Ithe
Complex Nuances of History, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb., 3,2002 (discussing how historians' relentless
search for accuracy and detail produces narratives that seek to disturb received understandings).
According to Kleinfield, for example, detailed examination of transcripts of hundreds of
investigative interviews with New York firefighters after September 11, 2001, reveals how
deeply their actions on that day were determined by rampant fear and confusion rather than
unalloyed heroism. See id. As Kleinfield points out, these more complex assessments of the
record are not always welcome: "People want a simple narrative, and they give it up
reluctantly." Id. (citation omitted).
264. See MARGAJJT, supra note 7, at 60-61 (observing, in an attempt to distinguish
history from a "shared" community of memory, that even if, for example, the Jews' shared
memory of their exodus from Egypt is indeed memory of a true historical event, it is a closed
memory of the event, since the only line of memory leading to this event is the one sanctioned
by the community-presumably through its rabbinical leaders-as its canonical line of
memory).
265. See id. at 64 (arguing that enchantment connotes myth and disenchantment is the
viewpoint of critical history). Margalit has the impression that a kind of "Gestalt switch" has
been thrown in "secular modem nation-states," turning them from enchanted to disenchanted
worldviews, but he argues that this bouleversement has not prevented even these States from
cultivating modernized rituals and myths through commemorative ceremonials of great men or
the cult of fallen soldiers. Id. at 67-68.
266. See Wilson, supra note 238, at 2 (adding that governments try to ensure that
anyone granted special access to official documents must be a "patriotic historian").
267. See FONER, supra note 3, at 102 (taking the view that governments expect
historians to contribute to a "nationalization of the consciousness," with the State as the focus of
analysis and preordained end of historical development); see also RcoEuR, supra note 7, at 271
(recognizing that "the nation State remains the organizing center for the ordinary referents of
historical discourse"). Again, governments have rational expectations. The "historian-patriot,"
after all, is a common actor in many cultural traditions. See id. at 301 (mentioning the French
and German historical schools).
268. See Wilson, supra note 238, at 2 (concluding that "in the forging, or shaping, of
the collective memory, the role of governments has always been greater than that of historians,
and is likely to remain so"). Wilson marshals Lord Salisbury's conviction that democratic
systems subject the government to the aura popularis, so that history which popularizes
government can be immensely powerful. See id. at 18. Thus, "[a] collective memory of the
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for the reputable (albeit Westernist) historian, a sycophantic air-brushing of the past
would be a disciplinary abnegation.269 Chronique captures this sense of professional
self-regard. History's own ontological and ideological conceit is that it should be
linear, passive, and observational .270 In its purest form, it might perceive the historical
fact as differing very little from the empirical fact in the experimental natural
sciences. 27' Unlike official public memory, therefore, traditional history does not
pretend that the past can be altered and managed, only discovered.7
recent past created by historians whose first and only allegiance [is] to the truth" is a collective
memory not wanted by governments. Id. at 20. But clearly historians have some power, because
their versions of the past can supersede firsthand memories over the course of time. See GADDIS,
supra note 8, at 136 ("[H]istorians impose themselves on the past... as suffocatingly as States
do on territories they seek to control."); see also Wilson, supra note 238, at 22 (stating that the
archival disclosure reveals "wickedness," and "destroys idols and scatters theories"). Wilson has
concerns about government manipulation of archival records which are well-understood by
professional historians: if governments only selectively release documents, scholarship is
deprived of what have been called the "secret and central documents" that reveal a government's
true purposes. Id. at 23. The thirty-year nondisclosure rule that applies to State papers in the
United Kingdom and Ireland, and the efforts made by succeeding US. presidents to guard the
confidentiality of certain records of their administrations, attest to elite preoccupation with
manipulation of the historical record. See id. at 2; see also Elisabeth Bumimer, Bush Orders a 3-
Year Delay in Opening Secret Documents, N.Y. TtMEs, Mar. 26, 2002, at Al 5 (discussing a
U.S. executive order delaying release of millions of government documents, and for the first
time extending the power of classification to the vice-president). But see Middleton & Edwards,
supra note 79, at 9 (emphasizing that the "truth" of the past is not found unambiguously
deposited in some objective social record or archive but is an epistemological enterprise created
in dialectic and argument between the contrary positions of "fact" and "invention").
269. Even Yerushalmi, a determined critic of the discipline, concedes that the "dignity"
of the historical vocation persists. His rationalization of this position, therefore, merits a brief
quotation:
[l]t is no longer merely a question of the decay of collective memory and the
declining consciousness of the past, but of the aggressive rape of whatever
memory remains, the deliberate distortion of the historical record, the invention of
mythological pasts in the service of the powers of darkness. Against the agents of
oblivion, the shredders of documents, the assassins of memory, the revisers of
encyclopedias, the conspirators of silence, against those who, in Kundera's
wonderful image, can airbrush a man out of a photograph so that nothing is left of
him but his hat-only the historian, with the austere passion for fact, proof,
evidence, which are central to his vocation, can effectively stand guard.
YERUSHALMI, supra note 78, at 116.
270. The linearity of history is reflected in the Judaeo-Christian tradition of creation,
redemption, and the promised end. See A. S. BYATT, ON HISTORIES AND STORIES: SELECTED
ESSAYS 170 (2001).
271. See RiCoEUR, supra note 7, at 178 (warning against the illusion that a designated
historical "fact" coincides with what really occurred, or with the living memory of eyewitnesses,
"as if the facts lay sleeping in the documents until the historians extracted them").
272. Deconstruction of this idea of "discovery" is essential to understanding the
pretensions of history as a discipline. What, after all, is so-called "historical truth"? There are, to
be sure, no "transcultural or transhistorical iron laws of human behavior," MUNSLOW, supra
note 119, at 216, with which to assess the unfolding of past events, so that any evaluation of the
past must occur within conceptual frameworks that exist in the present. When speaking of
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C. Weaknesses of the Chronique Model of History
But history, despite the appealing premise that chronique might counterpoint the
biases of official memory, is not necessarily a more authentic model of public memory.
History, in fact, has characteristics which it make it both very unlike official public
memory and very similar, and in each of these respects it is a weaker model (both in
terms of performing the societal function of official memory and in exposing the truth
of the past) than might be expected. Thus, its mission of chronique makes it
ontologically dissimilar to the constructed product of official memory, but an unending
revisionism is unlikely to serve the purposes of social control through consensus that
give officially managed memory its apparent power and prominence. More critically,
however, history is very similar (and therefore not inherently superior) to official
public memory in that historians are no less immune than governments from the viral
effects of interpretive fallacy. I will discuss each of these apparent weaknesses in more
detail.
1. History and Contestability
In postulating chronique as history's obsessive doctrine, we also recognize that this
doctrinal impulse must produce contestability, a cycle of perpetual challenge (whether
by simple accretion, by correction, or by reinterpretation) to received accounts of past
events.273 And precisely because (unlike official memory) it necessarily promotes
contestability about the past, history is inherently more likely to occupy the
marginalized space of endless contestation that I earlier assigned to the normative and
descriptive theories of Osiel and Gillis. Good history discovers hitherto unsuspected or
unarticulated information about beatified events or personalities (to mention two recent
examples, Roy Jenkins's patient reconstruction of Churchill's strategic distrust of the
"class," for example, are we imposing on the past a conceptual category that had no meaning to
past societies? See id. Nor is there any point in suggesting an absolute one-to-one
correspondence between what is written as history and what actually occurred in the past. See
GADDIS, supra note 8, at I 11. Like the mind itself, history cannot be a looping videotape
recording of the past. See infra text accompanying note 364. The best approximation of
historical truth, according to Munslow, is that it should have a coherence that fits with the
descriptive consensus writing about a particular event or era. See MUNSLOW, supra note 119, at
217. Thus, the failings of history as a mechanism to establish truth are balanced by the
"falsifiability principle," which holds that "historical interpretations are provisional propositions
(or hypotheses) to be falsified in light of the evidence." Id. at 218. After the point of maximum
falsifiability has been attained, the "residue" is historical truth. Id.; see also RICoEJR, supra note
7, at 328 (suggesting that a factual interpretation of the past is only verified "in the sense that it
has not been refuted at the present stage of accessible documentation"). The "consensus," argues
Gaddis, "can incorporate contradictions," GADDIS, supra note 8, at 10, but it must be replicable
by other practitioners of the discipline. See id. at 107. In any case, the so-called "holist fallacy"
operates to protect the historian from the mistaken idea that historians should select significant
details from a sense of the whole universe of events and facts. Such a rigid protocol would
prevent the historian from knowing anything until he knows everything. That would be "absurd
and impossible," contends Gaddis, because the evidence is "always incomplete." Id. at 26
(emphasis added).
273. "[History ... [is] destined to revisionism." RicoEuR, supra note 7, at 342.
20051
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Normandy landings in 1944,274 or Michael Beschloss's documentary unveiling of
Franklin Roosevelt's poor administrative skills275), or disturbs the grain of traditional
historical analysis using new conceptual categories such as class, race, or gender . In
doing so, it serves a useful function of contestation, but not the paramount purpose of
277
social control that gives official memory its centrality and power.
274. RoY JENKINS, CHURCHILL: A BioGRAPHY 714-23 (Pan Books 2002) (discussing
Churchill's sustained advocacy of a Mediterranean strategy that was inconsistent with
Roosevelt's proposed landings in France).
275. See BEscHtoss, supra note 46, at 88 (describing Roosevelt's "harum-scarum
delight in pitting people against one another"). The historian, therefore, has acquired some of
the characteristics of the investigative journalist (or vice versa). Demystification and debunking
have become the au courant methodologies of contemporary historical work. Arthur Neal, in his
profile of major American public events of the twentieth century, comments on the post-
assassination "idealization" of the Kennedy presidency (anchored in the mythmaking apparatus
of the eternal flame at Arlington Cemetery). See NEAL, supra note 126, at 117-18, 126. Neal
also notes a counter-narrative, which he labels a "cultural milieu," that debunks its heroes (so
that Kennedy has been redefined as a serial philanderer, a ruthless opportunist, and a beneficiary
of clever "impression management"). See id. at 126-27.
276. The pressures on history as a discipline have been particularly challenging in the
last twenty or thirty years as the rise of presentist ideological concerns-feminism, minorities
discourse, sexuality, nationalism, class-have created a metric of contestability that compels
attention to what Columbia historian Eric Foner calls "new social history." FONER, supra note 3,
at xi; see also NEAL, supra note 126, at 214 (discussing rise of feminist history). For a
contrarian view of these trends, see generally WINDSCHUTrLE, supra note 257 (rejecting
fragmented cultural histories which no longer investigate the pastfor its own sake). The neglect
of these issues in past historical research is being corrected, but at some cost to the "Whiggish
history" that once dominated the discipline. See supra note 144.
277. See, for example, supra note 46 (disscussing the fate of President Roosevelt's
Morgenthau Plan to dismember and ruralize Germany, and the speculations of presidential
historian Michael Beschloss as he analyzes what must now be recalled as the chatter of history,
a memorandum supporting the plan exchanged between Roosevelt and Churchill, which
Roosevelt later denied having seen). But Roosevelt endorsed the Morgenthau Plan as a way to
mollify Stalin. See BESCHLOSS, supra note 46, at 131, 132 (considering Stalin's fears that the
Western Allies would strike a separate deal with Hitler); id. at 149 (discussing Roosevelt's
disavowal of any endorsement of the plan); id. at 287 (suggesting that Roosevelt used his
support for the plan tactically to reassure his allies that he intended to transform Germany). As
well as the fact that Beschloss's access to caches of official and private documentation is a
chastening reminder that modem government operates rather differently, by e-mail, his work is
also to some extent an example of the "lonely scholar" foraging in fields that are not of general
interest to the public and drawing nuanced (and revisionist) conclusions that do not measurably
alter public memory. See Michael Bommes et al., Popular Memory: Theory, Politics, Method, in
MAKING HISTORIES: STUDIES IN HISTORY-wRITING AND PoLITcs 205,210 (Richard Johnson et al.
eds., 1982) (commenting on the ill-matched powers of political ideology-including media
reinforcement of ideology-and scholars producing small numbers of monographs). And, even
though Beschloss's book sold moderately well, it could not (and did not), by itself, cause a
perceptible shift in the popular perception-and official public memory--of the salvific
Roosevelt presidency. Thus, the newly-dedicated Roosevelt Memorial in Washington, D.C.,
which mythicizes Roosevelt through quotations from his wartime speeches, is likely to have a
far more enduring impact than Beschloss's painstaking assessment of Roosevelt's tactical volte-
face on the Morgenthau Plan.
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And history could not be expected to serve this purpose. Unlike official memory, it
is not cognitively a mythologizing, archetyping, or liturgical enterprise. It is anti-
hegemonic and schismatic, and while ironically these characteristics make it just as
conceptually dogmatic as official memory or organized religion, they also exclude the
canonical certainty and centrality of either of those sources of public memory. Official
public memory, in contrast, is reductionist, confident that the past (or, more accurately,
a specific rendering of the past) can be stabilized by interweaving of the characteristic
patterns of reconstruction that I have earlier described. The actions of the past, in this
understanding, are subject to the meaning they are given by official action in the
present.278 History, not only because of its lack of centrality but also because of the
implications of chronique, competes unequally against these powerful syncretic forces
of elite memory. While history accurately judges the past to be conceptually open, the
choices for investigating and explaining the past are not. Structures are placed on the
past, most powerfully by the centralized actions of official memory, and those
structures thicken into a received interpretation that may prove impossible to
dislodge. 279 Historians pursue a kind of forensic pointillisme, creating an ever more
detailed depiction of the past. This process will certainly nurture contestability, but it
also means that history will remain a marginal voice in the consensus that congeals
around the patterning of official public memory.
2 0
278. See Boyarin, supra note 170, at 12-13 (observing that considerations of changing
consciousness cannot be separated from changes in the world that consciousness construes, so
that (cynically) the German elite's moral concern for the legacy of Nazi genocide helps
Germany's success in international commerce).
279. See HERF, supra note 163, at i (commenting that "writing history is a matter of
reconstructing the openness of past moments before choices [congeal] into seemingly inevitable
structures").
280. The sundering of history and memory is nowhere more explicit than in
Yerushalmi's extended meditation on Jewish collective memory. See YERuSHALMI, supra note
78. This canon of memory, to Yerushalmi, comprises the liturgical traditions of Judaism. Thus,
his skepticism that historians (who he describes, with some facetiousness, as a "guild," id. at 6)
can provide an alternative shared tradition is anchored in this mystique of a faith whose
narrativizing and archetyping properties are comparable to the privileging impulses that generate
official public memory. Yerushalmi, for example, sees in many cultures (including his own
Israeli tradition) a preference for "mythic" over "historical" time. Id. This preference is reflected
in, for example, "paradigmatic first acts," "the dream-time when the world was new, suffering
unknown, and men consorted with the gods." Id. In these cultures, the "present historical
moment possesses little independent value." Id. The present only achieves meaning and reality
when, in a Proustian act, it subverts itself through ritualistic repetition or reenactment, historical
time is shattered, "and one can experience again, if only briefly, the true time of the origins and
archetypes." Id. at 6-7. History, in this light, is not a "restoration of memory," but a "truly new
kind of recollection." Id. at 94. History, in its exhaustive searching, uncovers texts, events, and
processes, that "never really became part of Jewish group memory even when it was at its most
vigorous." Id. Historians do not come in simply to replenish the gaps of memory, Yerushami
infers, but to challenge "even those memories that have survived intact." Id. In Yerushalmi's
conception of a fastidious chronique, the historian seeks recovery of a "total past," and no
subject, no document, no artifact lies outside his attention. Id. Thus, to Yerushalmi, "the notion
that everything in the past is worth knowing 'for its own sake' is a mythology of modem
historians, as is the lingering suspicion that a conscious responsibility toward the living
concerns of the group must result in history that is somehow less scholarly or 'scientific."' Id. at
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2. The Interpretive Fallacy
The second and more conceptually critical weakness of history and of chronique as
a potential model of public memory is that historians, themselves part of a society
anchored in images projected by offical memory, are cognitively unable to liberate
themselves from a disciplinary interpretive fallacy. Infused with a contemporary
sensibility, they have to triangulate among the present, the past, and themselves.2 This
triangulation requires an intellectual dialectic between their present selves and the
thought processes of past actors, 2 82 and cannot be described as simply a forensic
collage of persons, events, and ideas. But in composing this dialectic, the historian
remains a prisoner of her own context and times, and that context can precisely affect
what subjects are researched, what ideology is used to do so, and indeed how past
thought can really be reconstructed.283
Faced with presentist concerns, unyielding objectivity must be hard to attain,2 84 not
least because historians, too, are affected by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle (of
physics) which holds that we change what we observe. 285 Historians, therefore, not
only deal with the contestability of their disciplinary assertions, but as critical
intellectuals they also do battle with the idges fixes of their own time and sometimes
even with their inherited professional orthodoxies. 286 As history evolves, its
100. Jews who focus on tradition, or return to it, find history irrelevant: they seek, "not the
historicity of the past, but its eternal contemporaneity." Id. at 96. Jewish rabbinical tradition was
rooted in the Bible as both a repository of past history and a revealed pattern of the whole of a
salvific history. See id. at 21. In effect, Yerushalmi argues, the rabbis had all the history they
needed, and mundane chronique would be supererogatory. As Harold Bloom notes in his
foreword to Yerushalmi's text, Jewish memory moved not through contemporary historical
writing but through ritual and liturgy, and in rabbinical custom and law, largely fixed after the
year 500 of the Common Era when the Talmud achieved its definitive form. See Bloom, supra
note 78, at xviii.
281. See GADDIS, supra note 8, at 128 (recognizing that, in the process of triangulating
the past, the historian cannot stand aloof from moral judgments, and inevitably becomes
engaged with the morality of his or her time; that engagement, however, must be distinguished
from the morality of the individual or the age that the historian is writing about).
282. See In Depth: Niall Ferguson (C-SPAN2 television broadcast, May 2, 2004)
(stating that "historians are engaged in the [very complex task of] reconstruction from
documents of past thought").
283. See Bommes et al., supra note 277, at 220, 224 (discussing the historian's amour
propre as creator of history, and privileged status as "bearer of the scientific canon"; Bommes
contends that a socialist history of Britain is imperfectly constructed by middle-class academic
historians).
284. See GADDIS, supra note 8, at 29 (noting that historians' "modes of representation,"
necessary because generalization is often the only available option in delineating the past,
inevitably determine what is being represented and therefore exclude objectivity).
285. See ALEXANDER STiLLE, THE FUTURE OF THE PAST 29 (2002) (noting that
archeology suffers from the analogous idea that "[y]ou study it, you kill it").
286. See RPCOEUR, supra note 7, at 259 (noting, for example, that "the event called
Auschwitz ... lies in individual and collective memory before being in the discourse of the
historian," thereby "plac[ing] the historian-citizen in a situation of responsibility as regards the
past"). This intermediation of the historian's own historical situation is precisely why Ricoeur
writes of a "crisis of testimony." Id. at 176. Oral and written testimonies of past horrors do not
themselves "speak," according to Ricoeur, unless "someone asks them to verify," in other words
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practitioners operate subject to an ever more relativistic mix of ideological influences,
and view the past through the lenses of post hoc intellectual constructs such as
feminism, minority and gender discourse, sexuality, nationalism, and class.287 Far from
being a detached, factualized, transparent activity-the conceit of chronique-history
is described (notably by its structuralist critics) as a relativistic enterprise, presentist in
288bias, and neither immutable nor permanent. History, in this sense, has no intrinsic
289
nature beyond the mind of the historian, no deterministic theory, no concealed
patterns, and no necessary teleology.29
to sustain "some hypothesis." Id. at 177. Quoting Marcel Proust, Ricoeur analyzes the
"historian's question" as not just a "bare question," but as an "armed question that brings with it
a certain idea of possible documentary sources and research procedures." Id. Thus, memory is
"archived" by the acts of the historian, and ceases to be a true memory in the sense of being
"retained within a relation of continuity and appropriation in regard to some present conscious
awareness." Id. at 178. History, therefore, becomes a "critical reprise" of memory. Id. at 260.
287. See supra note 276 and accompanying text (discussing these "new" histories). For
Paul Ricoeur, who identifies three levels of historical discourse (documentary,
explanation/understanding, and narrative representation), there is "interpretation" at all three
levels-at the documentary level with the selection of sources, at the explanation/understanding
level with the choice among competing explanatory models, and at the narrative level with the
historian's personal preference, the basis of which remains "relatively opaque," for a choice of
scale (for example, macrohistory or microhistory). RJCOEUR, supra note 7, at 185, 235, 339. If
history is classically distinguished from fiction on the basis that history retraces what actually
happened, Ricoeur asks why an "aporia" of truth in history becomes apparent "through the fact
that historians frequently construct different and opposed narratives about the same events." Id.
at 241-42. Thus, Ricoeur views the process of history as essentially a perpetual process of
writing and rewriting, so that the history book, the product of writing about documents (oral and
written testimony), becomes itself another document, "open to the sequence of reinscriptions
that submit historical knowledge to an unending process of revisions." Id. at 234. A startling
example of the historian's hermeneutical challenge is the recent conflict concerning what might
be called the "historicization" of the Holocaust (and Auschwitz), in other words, allowing the
experience of National Socialism to be in some sense reinterpreted by being compared to other
historical events such as the Stalinist purges in the Soviet Union. See Jalowiecki, supra note
148, at 44 (discussing the Historikerstreit, the "historians' debate," as to whether a
"normalization" of Germany's past should permit Nazism to be placed within the larger
European context, for example as a copy of mass atrocities previously committed by the
Bolsheviks under Stalin and Lenin). This "relativization" of historical interpretation was
advocated by a new school of German historians. Was Nazism uniquely monstrous so that all
modes of conventional (comparative) representation are, in Ricoeur's words, "put to flight"?
RiCOEUR, supra note 7, at 256-57 (concluding that this debate undermines "[tihe principle of a
distinction between interpretation and fact," and will not be resolved by forbidding any mode
other than the "literal chronicle," which would mean "demanding the denarrativization of the
events in question").
288. See MUNSLOW, supra note 119, at 110 (presenting an epitome of the criticism of
Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, and others); see also RIcoEuR, supra note 7 (discussing
history's susceptibility to "reinscription").
289. See MUNSLOW, supra note 119, at 109. Thus, for example, Roy Jenkins concludes
a very serviceable biography of Winston Churchill with the magisterial pronouncement that
Churchill, "with all his idiosyncrasies, his indulgences, his occasional childishness, but also his
genius, his tenacity and his persistent ability, right or wrong, successful or unsuccessful, to be
larger than life," was "the greatest human being ever to occupy 10 Downing Street." JENKINS,
supra note 274, at 912. Jenkins's conclusion is certainly not based on a marshalling of all of the
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In sum, therefore, history's revisionist impulses inevitably marginalize its power to
shape public memory in the centralist, consensus model of official management of
memory. But history also belies its own promise of chronique (which might, in other
circumstances, have yielded a powerful alternative model of public memory) because
its interpretivist biases make it conceptually no more likely than official memory to
create a completely accurate portrait of the past.
D. History on Trial: An Empirical Study
It is ironic, indeed, that history's essentialist struggle to expose the entire past tends
to make chronique ontologically improbable-a perfect chronique, knowing
everything about everything that happened in the past, is unattainable both as a matter
of logic and because of the interpretive fallacy.291 History, then, is forced into a kind of
intellectual defensive crouch, promising complete knowledge but always subject to
marginalization when that knowledge is unavailable. Official public memory, in
contrast, exists from the start as imposture, the certain product of drastic selectivity, a
ritualistic and ecumenical cosmology of the State. The claims of official memory are
not expected to be forensically testable (on the deep level of historical fact), and yet are
capable of displacing or incorporating contestative narratives. And even if these
observations may seem counterintuitive, they can be demonstrated empirically through
a brief inspection of how historical incidents have been portrayed in the adversarial
setting of some of the recent Holocaust-related civil and criminal trials. These trials,
two of which are addressed here, are powerful instruments for the present discussion
because they attempt to judge history by legal prescripts of proof and evidence rather
than by standards of scholarly inquiry.
292
Again, if history is premised on chronique, should it not also be adept (to the extent
that it has investigated a past event) at providing accurate, detailed, and testable
propositions even in the courtroom? The intuitive assumption, I should think, is to
suggest that national myths (rather than history as chronique) will not survive the
forensic scrutiny of a civil or criminal trial, since official memory tends toward
substantial historical inaccuracy. 29 The Holocaust proceedings, however, did not put
comparative evidence of the lives of the fifty-two occupants of the office of British prime
minister since the position was created in the eighteenth century. Surely the conclusion is
instinctual, and as such it is informed by Jenkins's own career experience as a member of the
British Establishment. A very different view of Churchill, for example, can be gleaned from
recent revisionist biographies and in a brief but thoroughly remarkable diatribe by a prominent
Irish journalist that appeared at about the same time as the Jenkins biography. See supra note
144.
290. See WINDSCHuTTLE, supra note 257, at 177 (discussing the absence from history, a
resolutely empirical enterprise, of any "deep-seated design"); see also RiCOEUR, supra note 7, at
184 ("[T]here is no one privileged mode of explanation in history."); supra note 287 (further
discussing Ricoeur's position).
291. See RICOEUR, supra note 7, at 448 (arguing that "[tihe idea of an exhaustive
narrative is a performatively impossible idea[;] [tihe narrative necessarily contains a selective
dimension").
292. See LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OFJUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND HIsroRY
IN THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST 224 (2001).
293. See Leora Bilsky, Justice or Reconciliation? The Politicization of the Holocaust in
the Kastner Trial, in LETHE's LAW: JUSTICE, LAW AND ETmcs IN RECONCILIATION 154, 166
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national myths, in the sense of official memory production, on trial.294 If we accept
that, like the assembled images of an official public memory, the mere utterance of the
word "Holocaust" evokes a range of archetypal references (no doubt including
"Nazism," "Auschwitz," "genocide," "six million Jewish victims," and other
synecdochical phrases), then it is interesting that the "Holocaust" as an archetype of
public memory did not come into direct question in any of these trials.
For example, in the civil libel action brought in 2000 by British historian David
Irving against an American academic, Deborah Lipstadt, who had written a book inter
alia accusing Irving of Holocaust denial, Irving's strategy was to transform the
litigation into a trial about the Holocaust in history, the facticity of very specific
assertions, rather than a trial about the fundamental reality or non-reality of a structure
that exists in public memory under the rubric of "the Holocaust. 295 Thus, Irving
concentrated a great deal of his case on attempting to induce doubts about the existence
of purpose-built gas chambers at Auschwitz and, more broadly, whether Hitler knew,
or the Nazis even contemplated, a systematic top-down program of exterminating
(using the example of one of the heroic myths of Israeli memory of the Second World War to
suggest that national myths may be based on actual events but studded with factual
inaccuracies).
294. This is not to suggest that criminal trials do not serve an elitist agenda of memory,
in the same way that I have earlier suggested that truth commissions do. See supra note 209 and
accompanying text; see also DOUGLAS, supra note 292, at 109, 241-42 (noting that the trial of
Gestapo officer Adolf Eichmann has become a "sacral commemorative space" in Israel, and
arguing that the creation of a heroic memory of martyrdom and resistance, expunging the
despised history of the Jew as hapless victim or spineless collaborator, offered a species of
"national group therapy" in reconsidering an offensive past). Political theorist Hannah Arendt
opposed this representational logic as a flawed (and ultimately banal) departure from the
legalist, proceduralist, formalist business ofthe law in weighing charges, rendering judgment,
and meting out punishment. See DOUGLAS, supra note 292, at 110. I doubt that Douglas truly
engages Arendt's critique. His response is rhetorical, almost polemical, namely, that a trial must
possess one element of "irreducible risk.., the specter of acquittal," id. at 11, as well as a
power to "submit the most horrific outrages to its sober ministrations... [to be] a spectacle of
legality, [and to make visible] the sweeping neutral authority of the rule of law." Id at 41.
Simultaneously, however, Douglas extols the trial for being precisely a vehicle for the narratives
of the survivors, so that the Eichmann trial conveyed to a new generation of Israelis these
"astonishing stories of personal survival" of their forebears. Id. at 142. Thus, Douglas clearly
expects the trial to do "representational justice" to the Holocaust "qua event." Id. at 113.
Eichmann was, in Douglas's view, a trial "by gesture," where the exterminated Jews were
"imagined as absent would-be citizens ... in which the present State projects itself into the
recent past to vindicate the rights of those who would have become its citizens." Id. at 120.
Douglas's rhetorical concession that a "judgment" must be attached as a kind of exclamation
point to the trial (a "disciplining drama" to avoid becoming "a race without a finish . .. a
meandering lecture.., an interminable story," id. at 175-76) merely emphasizes that Douglas
perceives the true purpose---or, better said, success--of the Holocaust criminal trial as
integration into official public memory rather than, as Arendt would have it, a sober and
depoliticized rendering of administrative justice.
295. D.D. GUTrENPLAN, THE HOLOCAUST ON TRIAL: HISTORY, JUSTICE, AND THE DAVID
IRVING LIBEL CASE 96 (200 1) (emphasis added) (noting that this was a new kind of trial, since
perpetrator trials "are probably already finished"). In her book, DENYING THE HOLOCAUST: TIIE
GROWING ASSAULT ON TRUTH AND MEMORY (1993), Deborah E. Lipstadt had identified Irving as
a principal figure in the movement to deny the historical reality of Nazi crimes.
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Jews.296 What Irving challenged, in fact, was history's posing as a discipline that has
the power of ex post verification or repudiation of the accuracy of the factual premises
used in the management of official memory.
297
In this setting, history, lacking an easily searchable cache of sources (a documentary
order by Hitler authorizing mass extermination, for example) proved an unreliable
witness. The strategic and tactical maneuvering of the courtroom, as it turns out, yields
not so much a composite and instructive picture of the events of the Holocaust (or of
any other general category of public memory, for that matter) as a particularistic
impression of doubt with respect to specific incidents. Doubt is a reflection of the
inevitable accommodations, including occasional triumphs of sophistic reasoning,
produced in an adversarial contest, 298 whether civil or criminal.2 99 In the criminal trial
296. See GUTrENPLAN, supra note 295, at 276 (quoting the statement in the decision of
the judge in the Irving libel trial, Charles Gray, that "the documentary evidence for implicating
Hitler in any policy for the systematic shooting of Jews is sparse. There is no 'smoking gun').
297. Lipstadt and her lawyers faced the epistemologically daunting task of "[proving]
the reality of the Holocaust," GUTrENPLAN, supra note 295, at 2, in the face of Irving's forensic
punctilio. Here is how Guttenplan sets the stage:
Libel defense in Britain is always an uphill struggle, and part of Lipstadt's burden
lay in having to prove things most of us take for granted: Adolf Hitler's murderous
intentions, the horrifying efficiency of the death camps, the fatal consequences for
the Jews. But the very act of taking so much for granted conceals precisely those
questions which Irving's strategy was designed to provoke: How do we know
these things really happened? What is the evidence? Who are the witnesses? How
do we know they are telling the truth?
Id. at 2-3.
298. The trial of Klaus Barbie in France, for example, took place in a world farremoved
from the context of his crimes: "And this simple fact turned out to have enormous consequences
which threatened the integrity of the trial," according to Alice Kaplan in her introduction to
Alain Finkielkraut's 1989 essay on the Barbie trial. Alice Y. Kaplan, Introduction, in ALAN
FINKIELKRAUT, REMEMBERING IN VAIN: THE KLAUS BARBtE TRIAL AND CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY ix, xx (Roxanne Lapidus & Sima Godfrey trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1992). As
Kaplan notes, the temporal dislocation of the trial allowed Barbie's defense lawyer, Jacques
Verges, to direct attention to France's own record of moral ineptitude and hypocrisy in the
colonies, notably Algeria, after World War I: "[H]e set up recent history [including France's
own colonial policies] in a competition with what had come before it." Id. at xx. Barbie's
lawyer, in other words, attempted to defend his client "on the basis of history that occurred after
his own crimes." Id. at xxi. Thus, Verges pursued a "defense of rupture," implicating ordinary
Frenchmen in a web of tu quoque accusations. DOUGLAS, supra note 292, at 208. Verg~s
ruthlessly characterized crimes against humanity as "rhetorical window dressing Europeans used
to describe crimes committed against fellow Europeans, as against those perpetrated against the
colonized Other." Id. at 209. In this reasoning, according to Douglas, "everyone became a
Nazi": the French in Algeria, the Americans in Vietnam, and even the Israelis in their
association with a Palestinian genocide. Id. Kaplan, supra, concludes that although normally the
present moves and the past remains still, the Barbie trial confuses "decades, political positions
and moral stands," so that "[h]istorical agents from another era... haunt what came after them."
Id. at xiii. This posture of relativization is not unfamiliar in conventional historical scholarship.
Primo Levi, after all, writes that the Gulag came before Auschwitz. See PRIMO LEVI, THE
MIRROR MAKER: STORIES AND ESSAYS 164 (1989).
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of the Canadian Holocaust denier, Ernst Zundel, for example, his lawyer, Douglas
Christie, consciously attacked history's claim to be a neutral, objective arbiter of the
past. At the trial, Christie argued that the Nazi gas chambers were a myth, and
portrayed his client as a latter-day Galileo persecuted for his rejection of a particular
slice of dogmatic orthodoxy.300 In his cross-examination of the Israeli historian Raul
Hilberg, Christie exposed numerous areas of factual disagreement among mainstream
Holocaust historians on such elemental issues as the number of victims, the operational
status of the concentration camps, or most dramatically, the premeditated nature of the
crime of the Holocaust.
30 1
Instead of directly challenging the general archetype of the Holocaust, Christie
sought to use the ontological weaknesses of chronique, and in particular the factual
divergences he had uncovered in testimony, to relativize the Holocaust. He argued, for
example, that the absence of a specific documented order by Adolf Hitler to instigate
mass extermination 30 2 could be generalized to the Holocaust itself: it was a theory, and
entitled therefore to "the same epistemological status" as the negationists' theory,
"[a]nchored in hearsay, unquestioned axioms, opaque documents, and unreliable
,,303memory. And Christie also exploited history's other weakness, the interpretive
299. See DOUGLAS, supra note 292, at 260 (reflecting on how criminal prosecutions, in
situ the Nuremberg, Eichmann, and Zundel trials, should be viewed as tools "to represent and
judge traumatic history"). Id. at 243. To Douglas's mind, the weapons of the adversarial contest,
including what he calls a "formal evidentiary agnosticism," may ironically wear down the line
between truth and fiction that, ordinarily, the criminal law purports to demarcate. Id. at 243. For
Douglas, therefore, it is scarcely surprising that truth-tellers are routinely called liars in the
overheated cauldron of courtroom exchange. Id. at 241-42.
300. See id. at 224 (noting that Zundel was prosecuted under Canada's "false
statements" statute for publishing a pamphlet questioning the veracity of the claim that six
million Jews perished in the Holocaust).
301. See id. at 236 (describing how Christie baited Hilberg on the basis that "no
historian has yet discovered a written order issuing from Hitler commanding the extermination
of Europe's Jews," or "even a specific oral command"); GutrENPLAN, supra note 296 (referring
to a similar finding in the Irving libel trial). Christie also attacked Hilberg with the allegation
that the historian, unlike the scientist, was simply "a dutiful compiler of hearsay," and "that
Hilberg's method was based on certain axioms [such as the existence of the death camps] whose
truth [he] had never bothered to call into question." DOUGLAS, supra note 292, at 233. Christie
suggested that Nuremberg was based on hearsay and "victors' justice," and "that the Nazis' most
serious crime was losing the war." Id. at 234.
302. DOUGLAS, supra note 292, at 236 (commenting on how this documentary lacuna
parallels the lack of clarity as to whether Hitler even issued a specific oral command).
303. Id. at 238. "[H]earsay, unquestioned axioms, opaque documents, and unreliable
memory" might well describe the stuff of official public memory. See id. But, again, Christie
was not mounting an offensive against the "truth" of the Holocaust as archetype, only its relative
truth in relation to the negationist theory. Christie's attack, therefore, was not against official
public memory as such, but more pointedly against the pretension of history (and the historians
who took the stand) to supply the factual information on which official memory purports to be
based. In the precise framework of a criminal trial, Christie argued for a "reasonable doubt"
about the reality of the Holocaust, but not for its absolute unreality. For Lawrence Douglas,
Christie's advocacy highlighted the complex ways in which negationist arguments mimic the
rhetorical conventions of attorneys practiced in the art of adversarial litigation. See id. at 239
(exposing how cross-examination proved a lethal weapon in skilled hands, as Holocaust
witnesses were smothered in the microdetails of pit depths and roof angles).
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fallacy, contending that historical inquiry is necessarily mediated and interpretive.
"[T]he historian's treatment of his sources," Christie maintained, "is prefigured by his
[contemporary] understanding of events" (the challenge of triangulation, as noted
above), and the "past is consequently enveloped in an impenetrable hermeneutic
haze.,,304 All of history, in this argument, is irreducibly indeterminate.
°0
E. Conclusion
History's idealized notion of chronique, and its sensitivity to a more accurate past,
might have provided the framework for a more authentic model of public memory than
that of official public memory. But the immanent weaknesses of contestability and
interpretive relativism combine to make it necessarily a weaker model. As such, history
(understood primarily as academic history3°6) would provide little counterweight to the
prominence and apparent power of official public memory. Nor would history, with its
strongly revisionist impulses, ontologically compete with official memory as a rational
technique of societal stability and preservation. In the search for an authentic model of
public memory, this Article now moves from the conceptual limitations of history-
and indeed from the notion of a model that competes with official memory-to a
theory that conceptualizes a possible inherent, and therefore definitional, limitation of
official memory. In this understanding, public memory is reconceptualized to include
both a non-dynamic component, official public memory, and an autonomous condition,
the emotional or affective memory of individuals, that remains cognitively resistant to
official memory. To do so, I need to develop a theory of public memory that
recognizes the place of individual lived experience in its consideration of the past. I
304. Id. at 235 (analyzing Christie's culminating attack on the meaning of history and
memory). This was also the defensive strategy adopted by French collaborationist Maurice
Papon at his trial in 1997, when he contended that actions and events that took place within the
framework of the Nazi occupation could not be safely recollected outside that period. See
NossrrER, supra note 59, at 83-84 (setting out Papon's theory that self-interest dictates what is
remembered and forgotten).
305. See DouGLAs, supra note 292, at 238 (reporting Christie's argument that all
disagreements turn into an "irresolvable interpretive dispute"). As discussed earlier, see supra
text accompanying note 280, there is a respectable body of historiographical scholarship that
does indeed perceive history as intensely mediated. See Richard J. Evans, Introduction to E.H.
CARR, WHAT is HISTORY? xii (2d ed. 2001) (noting Carr's general hypothesis that "our search
for the facts of history, and our identification of those facts when found, are necessarily
determined by the-perhaps unconscious-beliefs and presuppositions which guide the
search"); see also LEvi, supra note 298, at 166 (writing of an "ambiguous polemic" that scours
the stains of the past).
306. But even faddish popular history suffers from transience and lack of centrality.
Moreover, this kind of popular history-particularly television history-is essentially
decontextualized, and events are seen without texture, as "dramas without consequences."
Adrian Hamilton, A History of the World, Without Consequences, THE INDEPENDENT, July 31,
2003, at 17. In other words, is popular history of any greater value than the similarly reductive
work of official public memory? The answer, I suspect, is probably not. See Ian Kershaw,
Behind the Screen: How Television Trumpets and Trivializes History, TIMES LrrERARY
SUPPLEMENT, Mar. 14, 2003, at 16 (noting that television leaves "little room for elaboration,
differentiation or qualification").
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begin, therefore, with the theory of "collective memory" first conceived by Maurice
Halbwachs.
IV. RESTORING THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE REALM OF PUBLIC MEMORY: MAURICE
HALBWACHS AND A NOTION OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY
A. Introduction
Having exposed the weaknesses of history as an authoritative source of memory that
challenges official memory, I seek in Part IV to develop a conception of public
memory that moves more closely to the lived experience of individuals rather than to
the mediated images of official memory (and, indeed, of history). Drawing on the
concept of "collective memory" expounded by the French social philosopher Maurice
Halbwachs, Part IV begins to restore the autonomy of a uniquely intense condition of
personal memory, the memory of past emotional states, within the framework of public
memory. That restorative process will continue in Part V with a treatment of Marcel
Proust's dynamic literary expression of the transcendent power of individual affective
memory.
B. The Mediated Past of Official Memory
Official public memory shapes a mediated memory of events that have receded
(even quite recently3°7) from the immediate experiences of most of the living
population of the State. To do this, official memory uses combinations of the
characteristic patterns analyzed in Part II (selectivity, constructivism, mythopoesis,
incorporation, and presentism). The operative effect of these characteristic patterns is
that the memory projected by State intervention is, as Maurice Halbwachs suggests, a
"borrowed memory," 308 which the individual, responding to State prompts, can
imagine but not actually remember. Some of these constructed memories have become
so abstract-foundation mythologies, for example-that they are more truly symbols or
conceptions of an inherited past .3° This kind of memory can become merely
propagandistic, 310 or be delegated to the commemoration exercises of the political
class, as well as to the memorials which are the ciphers of remembrance.
311
307. See supra text accompanying note 16 (discussing construction of official public
memory concerning the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001).
308. HALBwACHS, THE CouEcTivE MEMORY, supra note 9, at 51 (referring, in situ, to
the mediated nature of the "memory" we possess of events in a State's history).
309. See id. at 52. As one caustic critic of constructed memory has suggested, these
memories have the tenor of an "ideological construct." NORMAN G. FiNKELSTEtN, THE
HOLOCAUST INDUSTRY: REFLECTIONS ON THE EXPLOTATION OF JEWISH SUFFERING 5 (2000)
(indicting Holocaust remembrance as such a construct).
310. Norman Finkelstein, in a polemic that has garnered public attention in Germany,
represents the Holocaust as a propagandistic shield for Israel. See id. at 30.
311. See EDKINS, supra note 18, at 92 (examining the function of memorials and
commemoration in the process of "nation building").
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Formalized, abstracted past memory is encoded in words or epithets like "founding
fathers," "victim State," "Holocaust, ' 312 "Vichy France," 3 13 "9/11,, 3 14 or "Ground
Zero," 315 but that insistent mnemonic repetition 31 6 merely produces (and reproduces)
what Halbwachs calls a "condensed" or "schematic" measure of the actual experiences
that others lived.317 For the individual citizen, therefore, this transmitted, mediated
memory is not really memory at all.
311
Viewed from a purely rational rather than ideological perspective, it is manifestly
not a futile exercise for governments to use their superior resources (including the
lawmaking prerogative) to shape a national consensus on the past. In other words, as I
312. See Koonz, supra note 59, at 259 (observing that the single word "Holocaust" now
does polysemic duty for an abundance of crimes and victims).
313. See NosSITER, supra note 59, at 104-05 (describing the birth of a "Vichy"
government).
314. See EDKnuS, supra note 18, at xiv (noting, in the context of "traumatic disruption
of the linearity of time and expectations," how this numerary combination "stood in as the most
evocative designation for what had happened").
315. See id. at 105 n. 173 (describing the use of the term "Ground Zero," the "technical
term for the point on the surface of the ground immediately below or immediately above the
detonation point of an atomic weapon," as "a regrettable exaggeration of the destruction caused"
at the World Trade Center site); see also IRWIN-ZARECKA, supra note 37, at 26 (assessing the
"symbolic potency" of the term "Auschwitz," which---outside Poland where the town located
near the remains of the camp is located-has become an untransferable term that attaches only
to the Holocaust); Michael Schudson, Ronald Reagan Misremembered, in CoLLEc'nVE
REMEMBERING, supra note 79, at 108, 118 (observing, in the popular culture, a patterning of
language that occurs, a rhetorical structure to recall "what everyone knows"--as in, presumably,
the rhetorical structure that surrounds the phrase "9/11").
316. See MARGALT, supra note 7, at 54 (discussing the "division of mnemonic labor" in
modem societies, which-unlike the direct line from people to priest in traditional societies-
"travels from person to person through institutions, such as archives, and through communal
mnemonic devices such as monuments and the names of streets").
317. HALBWACHS, THE CoLLEcrIVE MEMORY, supra note 9, at 52 (attributing this
property to historical memory). Thus, the telling of the experience is compacted into a single
symbolic name. Beneath these shorthand labels, the quantitative base for recollection may be
vast or circumscribed-a Proustian abundance of detail (for the Holocaust, for "9/11 "), or an
inaccessible record. Irwin-Zarecka mentions the "far from extensive memory base about mass
murders in the Soviet Union." IRwIN-ZARECKA, supra note 37, at 27. The short-circuiting
synaptic process of mnemonic labels helps to resist the departure of events to what Peter Novick
calls "the margin of consciousness." NOVICK, supra note 145, at I (describing a pattern by
which historical events "disappear down a memory hole where only historians scurry around in
the dark").
318. See MARGALIT, supra note 264 (discussing how communities canonize lines of
memory, which are then distinct from historical lines to the original event). This suspicion of
canonical memory, as it might be called, prompts Novick and (much more tendentiously)
Finkelstein to demand an explanation for the elevation of the Holocaust in American life: it is
avowedly not an American memory, they suggest, so why should it be so memorialized in the
United States? See NOVICK, supra note 145, at I (staking his claim to examine why the
temporally and geographically distant event of the Holocaust "loom[s] so large" in modem
American culture); see also FINKELSTEIN, supra note 309, at 144 (considering the "pretense"
that the Holocaust is an American memory).
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considered in Part II, governments can rationalize this practice because its
effectiveness is ordained by the ontological properties of a mediated memory. Thus,
the past, as many writers have expressed in many different formulations, is indeed a
foreign country.319 Its grip on the present becomes increasingly tenuous and open to
being managed (or, in more benign terms, interpreted).320 The only knowable past, in
this sense, is whatever component of the past is residually preserved in the present. 321
Moreover, when we as individuals survey the past, we are to an appreciable degree
heeding the mileposts of officially created memory, since we plot our personal
biographies, particularly during the years of early adulthood, within borrowed temporal
and structural paradigms that we share with our contemporaries and generations. 322 We
recollect years, decades, presidencies, political and economic cycles, and even eras of
national sporting achievement, and we conjure and imagine the continuum of our
existence within a shared flux of local, national, and international ideas and events. 323
As individuals, we do not remember every event in the State's history. Nor were we
actually a witness to the overwhelming majority of the events that inspire the structured
official recollection of the State's past. These official public narratives, therefore, are
much more than juiceless sequences of dates and facts, or mere mnemonic cues.324
They provide, to a greater or lesser extent, a formative context for each individual's
319. "The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there." L.P. HARTLEY, THE
GO-BETWEEN 9 (1953). L.P. Hartley's memorable phrasing, the opening lines of his wistful
novel of a sixty-year-old man recollecting an episode in lost youth, yielded the title of a well-
researched study of how the past is treated in contemporary culture. See DAVID LOWENTHAL,
THE PAST IS A FOREIGN COUNTRY (1985).
320. "Remembering the past and writing about it no longer seem the innocent activities
they were once taken to be. Neither memories nor histories seem objective any longer .... In
both cases ... selection, interpretation and distortion is socially conditioned." Peter Burke,
History as Social Memory, in MEMORY: HISTORY, CULTURE AND THE MIND 98 (Thomas Butler
ed., 1989).
321. See LOWENTIAL, supra note 318, at 187 (citation omitted) (arguing that naming or
thinking of past things seems to imply their existence, but they do not exist-we have only
present evidence for past circumstances).
322. See Neal, supra note 126, at 204 (concluding that, in terms of receptivity to
external events, "[tihe members of a generation are influenced disproportionately by what was
happening historically during their formative years"). In Neal's analysis, the "formative years"
are "primarily the years of late adolescence and early adulthood" in which major life decisions
arc made in a context of "hyper-receptivity" to community and national events. 1d.
323. "Grand narratives and individual narratives rise and fall together." Keith Hayward
& Wayne Morrison, Locating 'Ground Zero': Caught Between the Narratives of Crime and
War, in LAW AFJTR GROUND ZERO 139-46 (John Strawson ed., 2002) (putting this observation
in the context of the mutability of seemingly inexorable social components, including the
nation-state, after September 11, 2001). British historian Simon Schama conjures a metaphorical
image of individual lives plotted against a backdrop of public events, writing of how (in the
context of wartime generations) "many of them... saw their own lives as a seamless whole,
their calendar of birth, love, ambition and death imprinted on the almanac of great events."
SIMON SCHAMA, CniZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, at xi (1989).
324. See HALBWACHS, THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY, supra note 9, at 54 (attacking such a
conception as incongruent with reality, since "[o]ur lives.., sit on the surface of social bodies"
and we can "link the various phases of our life to national events"-though usually only "after
the fact" as we reconstruct the context of our earlier lives).
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experiences as a member of a national community.32 We rely for these remembrances
on the memory of others, including the memory framed by public law (which may
include a founding treaty, a constitution, the report of a truth commission, or an
epochal criminal trial), and also on the official chatter of the policy speeches,
commemorative addresses, and even judicial pronouncements of quotidian
administration. As a rational matter, therefore, official elites will always be tempted to
exploit the contingent reality of the larger past to adjust the lenses of history and
memory in service to the predominating ideological impulses of the moment.
326
C. Halbwachs and the Personal Lived Memory
To restate the power and dominance of official memory is to realize that none of the
contextual affiliation it provides to the broader political world is truly "lived" history,
as Halbwachs seems to understand an individual's existence. It is a simulacrum of lived
history, a history that has been learned (or imposed).327 For Halbwachs, the personal
lived memory predominates over the superficial stamping of general and historical
conceptions. 328 Public memory in these circumstances comes not as corroborator or
completer of an individual's recollection, but as the very source of what the individual
325. How all of memory penetration happens is probably a matter of "idiosyncratic
personal experiences." LOWENTHAL, supra note 319, at 195 (recalling, for example, that his
memory of the "parcel of facts" about Roosevelt's New Deal included his parents' partiality to
the President and his grandparents' dislike of labor unions, so that political history is an annex
to family history). The people who lived at a particular time, and whose memories were shaped
by the actuality of events, can pass on certain artifacts of memory (in the form of written
testimonies, caches of letters, family storytelling, and so on). But a child growing up will have
only fleeting personal impressions of the times in which it lives. Later, the adult will reconstruct
or reposition childhood within a socio-political milieu whose existence is to an appreciable
degree the transmitted legacy of State action (as well as of history books, media, and other
sources). See RICOEUR, supra note 7, at 394-95 (noting that "we can link the various phases of
our life to national events only after the fact;" in this way, "personal as well as collective
memory is enriched by the historical past that progressively becomes our own"). A young
Austrian growing up in the formative years of the post-war republic will have memories of
family discussions of public events such as the State Treaty that granted Austria its
independence in 1955, see supra text accompanying note 41, of public discourses about
Austria's social and economic recovery, of a timeline of particular leaders and of public policy
issues. A young American in the same period of Austrian formation would be unlikely to
register any memory at all of an Austrian independence treaty. That person's memory
conception of Austria, if any existed, might well be some recall of seeing a motion picture, for
example, The Sound of Music, in the 1960s. See supra note 227.
326. See Coser, Introduction to HALBWACHS, THE COLUECrvE MEMORY, supra note 9,
at 25 (observing that "[tihere are no empty spots in the lives of groups and societies").
327. See HALwAciHs, THE COLLECTrVE MEMORY, supra note 9, at 57 (indicating that
this history, for all of its availability through formal study and reading, is nevertheless "learned"
and not "lived," and memory can rest only on the latter).
328. See id. at 56-57 (recognizing, however, that our childhoods, for example, do bear
the "stamp" of the recent history through which we have lived, albeit in a State of unawareness);
see also supra notes 317, 324 (noticing that Halbwachs understands the pervasiveness of
"national events" in the lives of the milieus he describes).
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wishes to repeat.329 It cannot, in that sense, be in any way an authentic memory. The
notions of official and personal memory, in fact, can be conflated to speak of a
coalescence in memory of lived personal experience as well as a mediated past.
Halbwachs, therefore, has a segmented understanding of what public memory
means, proposing a narrower scale of reference that exists alongside (but would appear
to be distinct from) the shaping of officially produced memory. He roots his public
memory-which he calls "collective" memory 33-in smaller personal milieus or group
dynamics, interpreting it as a very particularized and inherently temporary
phenomenon, namely, the viewpoint of living groups.331 Thus, Halbwachsian non-
official public memory is the imprint of a societal constituency (Halbwachs specifies a
nuclear family, a class of schoolmates, the population of a village) on its
332membership. A large part of the potency of this rendering of public memory is that,
unlike official memory, it occurs without the volition of an "activist of memory" (the
State)333 yet is not either a genetic endowment or an innate psychic structure analogous
to Jungian stereotypes.
334
And Halbwachs also segmentalizes history, which he accuses (like official memory)
of assuming the mantle of omniscient observer, creating a universal memory of the
human species, "but there is no universal memory because every collective memory
requires the support of a group delimited in space and time." 335 Halbwachs conceives
of history, therefore, as a unitary, monolithic, self-isolating process, putting together
past events "by separating them from the memory of the groups who preserved them
329. See HALBWACHS, THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY, supra note 9, at 51 (noting that these
"historical remembrances" can be increased through conversation and reading).
330. Id. at 50.
331. See id. at 80 (describing collective memory as "a current of continuous thought
whose continuity is not at all artificial, for it retains from the past only what still lives or is
capable of living in the consciousness of the groups keeping the memory alive").
332. These so-called "microhistories" are also the object of some historians'
epistemological scaling-down of the process of historical research. See RICOEUR, supra note 7,
at 210-11 (discussing the principle of a variation in "scale" in historiography, and of a felt need
to correct the inescapable loss of detail and complexity that accompanies the traditional
historical larger scale); see also id. at 239 (discussing the traditional Annales school, where
everything turns on the "primacy of the political... [and] the accent falls on decisions made by
leading individuals").
333. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (considering Mark Osiel's conception
of the State as an "activist of memory").
334. See YERusHALMI, supra note 78, at xxxiv (contending that a child left in a forest
will not spontaneously utter a known language, nor will that child be imbued with recollection
of the events of a collectivity: "[o]nly the group can bequeath both language and a transpersonal
memory"). Boyarin, too, contests the idea of a "superorganic" memory, insisting that the place
of memory "on the most material level" is the individual brain. Boyarin, supra note 170, at 23.
Boyarin argues, therefore, that any notion of a collective memory of a people must be
considered a psychological metaphor, operating through "intersubjective practices of
signification, neither given nor fixed but constantly recreated within a framework of marginally
contestable rules for discourse." Id. In these words Boyarin seems to underplay the directive
force of official public memory. As understood in this Article, official memory is not
intersubjective (in the sense of plastic and autonomous), but is strongly constructed by power.
335. HALBWACHS, THE COLLECTVE MEMORY, supra note 9, at 84.
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and by severing the bonds that held them close to the psychological life of the social
milieus where they occurred, while retaining only the group's chronological and spatial
outline of them."336 True public memory, in contrast, is the fluid possession of specific
groups, a shifting constellation of ideas and events that are mutually reinforcing and
that ebb and flow with the shifting membership of the group. History searches a
posteriori for the landmarks of change, retrospectively constructing the "Hundred
Years War," for example. 337 History perceives the outcome of a "sequence of
transformations," but Halbwachsian public memory is the group "seen from within
during a period not exceeding, and most often shorter than, the average duration of a
human life., 338 The progression of memories is irregular-eroding as members of the
social group die or become isolated-and so in a constant process of transformation
along with the group itself.
339
Halbwachs's insight is that individual memory can be socially defined because of its
accretional potential when the experiences of known others accumulate to build a
composite of the past.3 H While all of this departs from Durkheim's quasi-mystical
notion of the social group as a psychic unit, with nearly all the characteristics of the
human individual, nonetheless Halbwachs maintains that the "succession of our
remembrances, of even our most personal ones, is always explained by changes
occurring in our relationships to various collective milieus."341 In this context,
336. Id. (considering history as a creator of "external" frameworks). In this context,
Halbwachs's estimation of history adopts the forensic, "picture-book" process of literal memory
(of pure chronique) that Marcel Proust characterized as inauthentic. See infra note 439 and
accompanying text.
337. See HALBWACHS, THE COLLECTIVEMEMORY, supra note 9, at 81-82; see also Mary
Douglas, Introduction to HALBWACHS, THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY, supra note 9, at 18 ("No one
arrives at the dawn of a great historical period exclaiming, Today we begin the Hundred Years
War!"). Thus, Halbwachs hews to a traditional, universalist view of history, whereas more
recent history work seeks focused and specific (and traditionally overlooked) narratives, for
example, the experiences of women and minorities. See supra text accompanying notes 276,
287; see also RIcOEUR, supra note 7, at 246 (discussing the post eventum construction of
phenomena that explain past events, such as structures of domination which are then
"incorporated into the narrative of an event such as a battle").
338. HALBWACHS, THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY, supra note 9, at 86 (pinpointing how a
group self-portrait unfolds through time, allowing the group to recognize itself through the total
succession of images, "a record of resemblances").
339. See id. at 82 (emphasizing that the continuous development of the collective
memory is unlike history in that it has "irregular and uncertain boundaries" rather than "clearly
etched demarcations").
340. Thus, as Mary Douglas explores in her introduction to Halbwachs, the author
clearly separated "the elements of social life that contribute to the collective memory" revealing
"a flexible, articulated set of social segments consisting of live individuals who sustain their
common interests by their own selective and highly partial view of history." Douglas, supra
note 141, at 17; see also RiCOEUR, supra note 7, at 38 (writing of a category of "reminiscing,"
which makes the past live again by "evoking it together with others, each helping the other to
remember shared events or knowledge, the memories of one person serving as a reminder for the
memories of the other"). Ricoeur invents a bold aphorism to summarize Halbwachs: "to
remember, we need others." Id. at 120.
341. HALBWACHS, THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY, supra note 9, at 49 (suggesting, in
opposition to Henri Bergson's exaltation of a subjectivist, personal consciousness, that the
[Vol. 80:605
IN SEARCH OFA THEORY OF PUBLIC MEMORY
Halbwachs writes importantly of an affective community. 342 Each individual memory in
the community is a viewpoint on that non-official public memory. 343 The contribution
of the individual memory is elevated and accorded a status that it cannot occupy in the
un-experienced, unlived, and consequently inauthentic conceptual space occupied by
official public memory.
D. A Critique of Halbwachs
Despite the allure of Halbwachsian theory as a potentially powerful counterpoint to
official memory, if one accepts that Halbwachs has advanced a possible theory of non-
official public memory, there are two critical weaknesses of his putative conception
that must now be addressed. First, while his theory seems to propose a more bounded
sphere of public memory, Halbwachs does not examine how much (or how little) of
that space could still be occupied by the constructed frameworks of official memory
and how much by his own conceptual lodestone of individual lived experience.
3
"
Second, and more problematically, a Halbwachsian idea of a public memory that more
content of a mind---of a memory-is the result of the "action in concert" of a multiplicity of
elements that mark its "relationships to various milieus").
342. See id. at 30. But see also id. at 33 (declaring that "our most personal feelings and
thoughts originate in definite social milieus and circumstances," indicating that he is resisting a
conceptual distinction between personal emotional memory and the effects of the collective
memory). According to Avishai Margalit, communities of memory take many forms, and "[w]e
should not be stuck with one stock example of the nation as the only possible community of
memory." MARGAUT, supra note 7, at 102 (discussing the guild of New York firefighters,
encircled by other religious and political communities of memory, who keep alive the heroism
of the hundreds of firefighters who died in the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001). Margalit
writes of "[n]atural communities of memory," including "families, clans, tribes, religious
communities, and [ultimately] nations." Id. at 69-70 (conceding, as he must, that each of these
communities is a "social construct" and therefore not technically a "natural" event at all, but
emphasizing that the resilience of social habits and institutions under the pressure of change is
probably greater than "the essences of natural kinds"). For Margalit, the guild-like nature of the
New York firefighters' community evidences what he labels thick relations between its
members, that is to say, the community has a natural sense of solicitude for its members, in
opposition to the thin relations which connect us to individuals outside our communities of
shared memory, and which therefore tend to dominate in society. See RIcoEmR, supra note 7, at
131-32 (positing a category of "close relations" as intermediate between the self and the-more
public, in Ricoeur's view-"they" of Halbwachs's collective memory: "my close relations are
those who approve of my existence and whose existence I approve of in the reciprocity and
equality of esteem"). Margalit, like Halbwachs, is clear that societal communities of memory
exist, but is confusing as to whether those communities include the State itself. Thus, his
concept of "thick relations" encompasses categories that are intuitively part of this concept,
namely, parent and friend, but also the category of "fellow-countryman," which is more likely to
be considered a category of "thin" relations. See MARGALT, supra, at 7. For an exposition of
Margalit's concepts of thick and thin relations, see id. at 7, 36-37, 101-02.
343. HALBWACHs, THE COULECTIVE MEMORY, supra note 9, at 48 (recognizing that the
act of remembering is specific to each individual, that individuals vary in the intensity of their
experience of the remembrance, and "that everyone does not draw on the same part of this
common instrument").
344. But see supra note 324 (noting that Halbwachs certainly recognizes the potentially
intrusive power of what he calls "national events").
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authentically confirms individual memories is just as conceptually incapable as official
memory of registering the effects of individual memory's unique feature of emotional
or affective recall on each individual within that schema of public memory. While
granting once more that Halbwachs may not have imagined his theory of collective
memory as a counterpoint to official public memory, the contrast is implicit, and to that
extent it is necessary to consider each of the vulnerabilities described in this paragraph
in more detail.
1. Weak Conceptualization of Frameworks
Halbwachs's insights have become muddled through repeated association with the
amorphous concept of collective memory, a term that does not in itself dislodge a
distinction between officially produced and unofficially produced memory.
345
Halbwachs does emphasize localization and specificity, and his articulation of a certain
idea of collective memory surely intends no phenomenological identification with
official public memory. 346 But Halbwachs himself is responsible for some of the
conceptual slippage that has nonetheless taken place. While he draws the essentialist
distinction noted above between lived and mediated memory, the salience of the
distinction does not seem otherwise to have engaged his intellectual attention.
Halbwachs writes generically of how "[w]e can remember only on condition of
retrieving the position of past events that interest us from the frameworks of collective
memory.",347 But these "frameworks" could reasonably be expected (given the earlier
discussion of borrowed contexts) to include also the constructed emanations of official
public memory.
Halbwachs, in other words, does not elucidate his notion of frameworks necessarily
to exclude the constructivist operations of the State from the contingencies of time,
space, and the order of physical and social events which are to a large extent imposed
on us through being established in and recognized by the members of any particular
societal group.348 In other words, although his theory seems to call for public memory
345. See supra note 4 (distinguishing, for purposes of the present Article, a concept of
"official public memory" from that of "collective memory").
346. This may be in part because the term "collective memory" has been wrenched from
the localized context Halbwachs seeks to give it, so that, as Osiel points out, the term has
remained a "woolly" concept that would benefit from conceptual clarification. OsiuL, supra note
74, at 18, n.28 (detecting ten different usages of the term in current social thought).
347. HALBWACHS, ON COLLECTIVE MEMORY, supra note 9, at 172 (discussing the
particular clarity of recollections that appear "at the junction of a greater number of these
frameworks," intersecting and overlapping with one another).
348. Halbwachs does view the "nation" as a "larger group," but only to insist that "the
nation as such can't be said to be interested in the destiny of each of its members." Id. at 77; see
also supra notes 317, 324 (considering Halbwachs's awareness of the role of "national events"
in the lives of individuals). In this sense, "the nation is too remote from the individual for him to
consider the history of his country as anything else than a very large framework with which his
own history makes contact at only a few points." HALBWACHS, THE COLLEcrI MEMORY, supra
note 9, at 77. The nation, then, is seen as the polar opposite of the individual, and in between are
the more restricted groups (or frameworks) that constitute authentic collective memory. But to
posit the "nation" as a remote group or framework, and even to accept some peripheral intrusion
of "national events" into sub-State milieus, does not preclude its sustained influence as a group
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to be depoliticized (and re-individualized), he offers no conceptual boundaries for
ensuring that this is so.
2. The Implications of an Affective Community
a. Individual Memory in a Collective Context
A Saussurean model of public memory, 349 as espoused by Halbwachs, functions
within a reticulation or network, each individual memory being propagated by, and in
turn propagating, other individual memories, a mutually reinforcing ground-up
socialization process that stands in obvious contrast to the top-down strategies of
official public memory. Within this conceptualization, however, a potentially strong
objection to authenticity still exists. Halbwachs, consumed by the apparent authenticity
of individual memories acting in concert with one another, failed to recognize that
collective memory of a social group, formed from the interplay of the memories of
each member of the group, will be suffused with the emotional or affective memory of
each individual in the group--and, for the individual, that affectivity, the memory of
how he or she felt in the past, will be the element of epiphanic significance (what this
Article will describe in Part V as Proustian "transcendence"). 35
or framework, and assuredly does not dispose of the influence of official public memory as a
directive component of individual experience.
349. Ferdinand de Saussure's linguistic theory recognized the so-called "principle of
opposition," declaring that "the most precise characteristic [of linguistic signs] is in being what
the others are not." FERDINAND DE SAUSSUIRE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 117 (Charles
Bally & Albert Sechehaye eds., Wade Baskin trans., 1959); see also OswALD DUCROT &
TzvETAN TODOROV, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF THE SCIENCES OF LANGUAGE 18-19
(Catherine Porter trans., 1983) (citing Saussure as discussing how the linguistic "unit is defined
only by its differences," and as such, "is based upon nothing other than its 'noncoincidence with
the rest"').
350. It is not as though Halbwachs was unaware of affective or emotional memory. But
he was, as Mary Douglas points out, "collectivist and sociological" where his master, Henri
Bergson (and Emile Durkheim also) were "individualistic, psychologistic, [and] subjectivist."
Douglas, Introduction, supra note 141, at 7. To the extent that Halbwachs considers the
affective memory at all, it is to dispute the idea that "[a]ffective States" are wholly
individualistic and internally generated, escaping the reach of a common collective memory and
resident only in the individual mind. See HALBWACHS, THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY, supra note 9,
at 96. In thus demonstrating his apostasy, however, Halbwachs seeks to reduce affectivity to a
series of archetypes ("conscious states") that derive ultimately from the common consciousness.
See id. For example, the fact that "pain" can "be experienced by our fellow man" (in his view)
demonstrates that "pain" is part of the common domain and is therefore of a "collective and
familiar character." Id. at 97. In effect, our personal experience of an emotion is "only an
incomplete and truncated [version of the] collective representation[.]" Id. Thus, Halbwachs
concludes,
In reality, many currents that proceed back and forth between one consciousness
and another crisscross at each moment or stage of the unfolding of our thought.
Consciousness is the point of intersection. The apparent continuity of what is
called our inner life is due partly to going along such a current, a course of thought
unfolding, in others as well as ourself, a particular inclination of collective thought
2005]
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The individual has lived and experienced the recollected event. As such, the
recollection cannot solely be an amalgam of shared stories about a past occurrence
(Halbwachs's cumulative "collective" memory), but for each individual the
recollection will project an emotional resonance that transcends any integration of the
organizational details of the shared memory. Halbwachsian collective memory, in other
words, is a shared composite of the past, but it must also be a recollection that each
individual necessarily appreciates affectively.35 1 Thus, the collective product of these
shared individual memories will not, and cannot, be in any sense a more authentic
rendering of the past. Consequently, when Halbwachs refers to an affective community,
he fails to appreciate the full resonance of this thought, since the affectivity (the
emotional quotient) of memory that drives the communal recollection is not solely a
pooling of incomplete personal memories to create a composite (and purportedly more
authentic) collective memory. This is what Marcel Proust means when he disparages a
forensic memory process that corresponds to flicking the pages of a picture book.352
... . [Alffective impressions tend to blossom into collective images and
representations.
Id. at 97-98. Again, however, Halbwachs provides no conceptual basis by which it could
reasonably be asserted that abstractions such as "pain," "love," "jealousy," or "grief" are simply
the results of a generic accretional process (collective memory) which otherwise functions only
to assemble consolidated memories of past events (his dominant articulation).
351. Ricoeur raises an additional objection, founded in Halbwachs's own words.
Halbwachs uses the idea of viewpoint or perspective to indicate that "it is individuals as group
members who remember." RIcoEUR, supra note 7, at 124. Thus, he would "readily acknowledge
that each memory is a viewpoint on the collective memory, that this viewpoint changes as [the
individual's] position changes, that this position itself changes as [the individual's] relationships
to other milieus change." Id. As Ricoeur surmises, this free "use of the notions of place and
change of place.., defeat a quasi-Kantian use of the idea of framework, unilaterally imposed on
every consciousness." Id. It appears, rather, that the individual's unity of interior consciousness,
its internal coherence and pre-existence, which is antithetical to a collective experience that
precedes individual memories, is being conceded by Halbwachs.
352. See infra note 439 and accompanying text (discussing Proust's notion of literal
memory). This is an intensely ironic critique of Halbwachs, who did not see himself within the
Bergsonian tradition of regarding the entirety of the past as retained in some subterranean
gallery of the mind and summonable like the printed pages of a book. See HALBWACHS, THE
COLLEC'nVE MEMORY, supra note 9, at 75 (noting that, for Bergson, only certain brain-related
obstacles prevent us from evoking our entirely preserved memory of our past; see also Douglas,
supra note 141, at 5 (calling Bergson's idea that past experience is stored in the unconscious
"part of [Bergson's] theory of the intuition of personal identity"). Halbwachs was no literalist of
memory. He understood that memory (organized through a social milieu) is a constructive
process, while insisting on the shared nature of the data and conceptions. See HA.BWACHS, THE
COLLECTIVE MEMORY, supra, at 31 (asserting that the "data and conceptions" are continually
passed back and forth between minds). But Halbwachs's idea of construction, nonetheless, is a
forensic one, since his constant assumption is that reconstruction is the product of accumulation
of data, with the addition of "reasoning" where the data is lacking. Id. at 69. Halbwachs,
therefore, intimates that at least a simulacrum of the past is always feasible, whereas modem
studies of memory have emphasized its creative and directive properties (which do not
necessarily produce a reproduction of the past). See infra note 363 and accompanying text
(discussing modem theories of memory).
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b. The Constructivist and Affective Dimensions of Individual Memory
Missing from Halbwachs, therefore, is not only a conceptual instrument to caliper
the respective spaces of non-official and official public memory, but also a
comprehension that his notion of a decentralized public memory of shared stories could
appear, without more, as merely a derivative, more thinly populated branch of the
memory work that the State performs (through law and other channels) at the national
level. Again, Halbwachs may not have understood that there is an essentalist distinction
that needs to be made between official memory and his more attenuated perception, a
distinction that resides precisely in his unreflective use of the phrase "affective
community." He may have assumed-given the scientific knowledge of his time-that
a collective memory gleaned from the reticulation of separate individual memories in a
societal group could not ipsofacto be confused with the formalized patterning of State-
sponsored memory. Yet present-day understanding of the operations of individual
memory reveals that it actually operates with some analogy to the directivity of official
memory.
This is not, of course, the popular perception of individual memory.353 While it is
353. The scientific study of memory, the search for the brain locus of memory
functions, has produced no definitive account of how individual memory operates. A recent
summation of current learning, for example, describes the continuing dispute as to
"localizability" within the brain. See Steven Rose, Memory: Biological Basis, in THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO THE MIND 458 (Richard L. Gregory ed., 1998) (1987) (noting that the
controversy has persisted since at least the 1940s); see also DANIEL L. SCHACTER, SEARCHING
FOR MEMORY: THE BRAIN, THE MIND, AND THE PAST 9 (1996) (indicating that "memories are not
stored in any single location in the brain . . . nor are they distributed throughout the entire
brain"). Present thinking prefers to avoid any conception that the memory function is a tangible
molecular substance, and to see it instead (in the way that most of us would probably imagine it
metaphorically) as a living "system" of synaptic interconnectivities: "Memory," says the author
of a leading study of Alzheimer's disease, "is everywhere." DAVID SHENK, THE FORGETTING:
ALZHEIMER'S: PORTRAIT OF AN EPIDEMIc 51 (2001) (arguing that, like consciousness, memory
cannot be isolated or extracted, but is a living process) (emphasis in original). Thus, there is no
central processing mechanism for memory. It is a dispersed function, operating through "a vast
and dynamic interaction of neuronal synapses." Id. Each memory trace (or "engram") requires a
unique agglomeration of neurons "from different regions of the brain" firing in sequence. Id. at
51-52 (emphasis added). These traces must, presumably, have some physical manifestation
inside the brain structure, but they do not comprise a discrete, physically identifiable cluster or
lobe of cellular tissue. But each new sequence is effectively a simulacrum of a predecessor
sequence, so that each iteration of a memory trace (in terms of reproductive fidelity) is a
distortion of its predecessor (which in itself was a distortion). See Graham F. Reed, DjI Vu, in
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE MIND, supra, 182, 183 (suggesting that "in a series of
recollections we are not recalling the original event at all, but our last recollection of it"). One
has the impression from the scientific studies of a brain system "on fire" with kinetic memory
traces, a free-association cognitive matrix with the odd and counter-evolutionary characteristic
that repeated access to the traces diminishes their acuity and their accuracy but not necessarily
their vibrancy. Professor Rose comments that all of this science travels a "long way from Marcel
Proust's evocation of youthful memory ... with its sense imagery," but in fact the scientific
record remains hugely incomplete. Rose, supra, at 460. He presents the current state of
biochemical and anatomical knowledge in quite revealing terms, comparing the search for the
memory function to the fact that one can say a great deal how a tape recorder works by
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true that, unlike the animals, a normally functioning human mind does not instantly
forget what has happened, 34 we imagine our memory systems to be shapeless and
insecure, haphazard and fickle.35 5 We know that individuals recounting the past are
notoriously prone to inaccuracy, 356 with a tendency to conflate past events and even
retrospectively to imagine that certain things happened and other things never did.357
Impeded by what Paul Ricoeur in his vast study of memory and history calls "the
vicissitudes of the exercise of memory," 358 we do not recall in a precisely linear
progression, nor do we enjoy a crystalline transmission of the texture and sequence of
analyzing "the chemistry and design of the recording head of a tape recorder and a cassette of
magnetic tape." Id. But one cannot, merely through such study, predict the message on the tape
without playing it! Id.
354. See Sarat, supra note 82, at 307 (contrasting human and animal recall and the
rebarbative capacity of the human past to disturb calm in later moments); see also John
McCrone, Reasons to Forget: Scientists Count the Ways We Get It Wrong, TiH TIMES LITERARY
SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 30, 2004, at 3 (noting that animals make fully intelligent responses informed
by their past experiences, but have "no power to roam their memory banks 'offline').
355. See Inga Markovits, Selective Memory: How the Law Affects What We Remember
and Forget About the Past-The Case of East Germany, 35 LAw & Soc'V REV. 513 (2001)
(contrasting public memory and personal memory). The condition known as anteograde amnesia
denotes the inability to store new memories. SHENK, supra note 353, at 47. In this sense,
Halbwachs may have thought of collective memory as a kind of social "confirmation" of the
poor memories of individuals.
356. And this inattention may be quite volitional. See David Middleton & Derek
Edwards, Conversational Remembering: A Social Psychological Approach, in COLLECTIVE
REMEMBERING, supra note 79, at 23 (observing that, within the "pragmatics" of conversation,
individuals have a "rare" concern for accurate and dispassionate accuracy, which in turn may
simply comprise one of a variety of claims or positions to which talk about the past might be
oriented). Middleton and Edwards discuss a classic study of the congressional testimony of
convicted Watergate conspirator John Dean to illustrate the absence of verbatim recall, the sense
of "gist" that predominates in personal recollection. The study of Dean's testimony (which was
compared with President Nixon's subsequently published transcripts of conversations taped in
the Oval Office) found a "repisodic effect," an ability to recall the overall nature and
implications of a repeated series of events despite "lots of gross errors of recall." Id. at 36-37. A
patchwork of "gross errors" covers a "deeper level" at which "he is right." Id. More darkly,
Lawrence Douglas describes how the Demjanjuk trial "volatilized memory." DOUGLAS, supra
note 292, at 212. It exposed memory's susceptibility to suggestion and misidentification,
"unintentionally inviting the [Holocaust] negationists to attack the larger truths in the survivor
narratives." Id. Indeed, as Douglas notes, there was an obvious linkage made at the trial court
level between the accuracy of the identifications and the veracity of memories of the camp. Id.
357. See EDMUND BLAIR BOLLES. REMEMBERING AND FORGETING: AN INQUIRY INO THE
NATURE OF MEMORY 83 (1988) (suggesting, pace Halbwachs, that we tend to believe our own
construction of the past); see also RICHARD J. McNALLY, REMEMBERING TRAUMA 42 (2003)
(noting that people sometimes have problems of "reality monitoring," an uncertainty as to
whether an event they remember actually happened-that is, came from "perception"--or was
merely a dream or fantasy).
358. RCOEUR, supra note 7, at 57, arguing that if the exercise of memory is its use, "yet
use includes the possibility of abuse," what this philosopher labels "bad 'numetics.'
Throughout this recent work, Ricoeur is troubled by memory's vulnerability, "which results
from the relation between the absence of the thing remembered and its presence in the mode of
representation." Id. at 57-58.
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past events. 5 Our power over our recollections seems at best intermittent. We lose the
strong impression of events we would like to remember and have insidious and often
traumatic recall of unpleasant events. Much of our memory is latent, and seems to
require a powerful catalyst (such as a visit to an old childhood neighborhood) to
unleash a Proustian cascade of supposedly forgotten people and events.3 6 So we would
likely conjecture that our individual memory systems respond to randomized impulses,
and must be quite dissimilar to the managed and highly processed formats of public
memory.
36 1
This sense of ourselves and of our memory systems is not wrong, but it is
misaligned. For individuals (and, analogically, for official memory), the past is not a
projection of events on an internal videographic screen, but is itself a creative,
constructed process. 362 There is an executive program for memory, but it is not one that
plays the traces of the past in our heads as though they were videotapes, 363 and there is
no searchable database of every memory trace we have ever laid.364 The most
fundamental property of individual memory is that it successively cannibalizes itself in
allowing us only to remember the memory of each prior memory of the original event.
Thus, when a memory is constructed, it is the construct that we activate when we
359. See BOLLES, supra note 357, at 72 (observing that memory, hostage to subjective
organization, processes the past "according to our understanding of what happened, not
according to the way something really occurred"); see also Henry L. Roediger III et al.,
Remembering, Knowing, and Reconstructing the Past, 30 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND
MOTIVATION 97, 100 (1993) (noting how recall attempts by students reading a short story
featured "many omissions, alterations of meaning, and occasional additions"); see also
LOwENTHAL, supra note 319, at 194 (discussing how the hierarchy of what is remembered is in
continual flux, in a process of distillation, distortion, and transformation of the past,
"accommodating things ... to the needs of the present").
360. See McNALLY, supra note 357, at 40 ("All else being equal, we are more likely to
recall something when the context of remembering resembles the context of encoding.").
361. See Markovits, supra note 355, at 513 (postulating a haphazard behavior pattern
for individual memory).
362. See BoL.Es, supra note 357, at xi (indicating that there is no "storehouse of
information about the past anywhere in our brain"); see also supra note 353 (discussing the
impossibility of "localizing" memory in the brain). The nature of the construction that takes
place is complex, but includes a re-scripting to fit with our present views and needs, the
distorting influence of our present knowledge and egocentric biases that enhance the role of the
self in recollected events; ScHACTER, supra note 353, at 7 (referring to memory's curious
blending of limitations and pervasiveness as its "fragile power"); DANIEL L. SCHAcTER, THE
SEVEN SINS OF MEMORY 138-39 (2001) [hereinafter SCHACTER, THE SEVEN SINS].
363. See SHENK, supra note 353, at 35 (noting that autobiographical recollection is a
"reconstructive, not a reproductive, process").
364. See BOLLES, supra note 357, at 83 (in a different metaphorical vein, suggesting
that the remembering mind "does not consult some file cabinet to check a dossier containing a
fixed truth"); see also SCHACTER, THE SEVEN SINS, supra note 362, at 9 (emphasizing that we do
not record experiences as if memory were a camera, but rather through a process of extraction of
key elements, recreation, and reconstruction). The metaphorical chain includes lockboxes and
warehouses, and has some claim to conceptual origin in Augustine's CONFESSIONS. RICOEUR,
supra note 7, at 98 (describing Augustine's metaphors of the "spacious palace" of memory, the
"great storehouse" of the memory, and the "vast cloisters" of memory, from which memories are
"brought out and called back again when they are needed").
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attempt recall, not the event itself.365 Individual memory is not pure recall, and despite
its long evolutionary gestation, as David Shenk explains in his acclaimed study of
Alzheimer's disease, it retains a "built-in fuzziness. ' 366 These characteristics are
vividly demonstrated by the functioning of our repisodic memory, the memory we hold
of repeated similar past events. Someone who takes many airline flights, for example,
will have a composite retrospective impression of such flights, but not typically a
strong memory of any single flight. A person who rarely flies, or who has only taken a
single airline flight, will retain a much more specific (episodic) memory of that more
rare event.3 67 And just as official public memory serves the teleological purposes of the
present and future, so our individual recollections of our personal pasts reflect the
present preoccupations of our lives, including the generation of our concept of self.
368
Indeed, research has shown that we remember ourselves in the past as we are now.
369
None of this should be surprising. Like the work of official memory, the prime
function of individual memory is, to borrow the unapologetically scatological imagery
of one writer, to flush and void.370 This metabolic feature of the human brain is
indispensable to sane life functioning. 371 The burden of carrying all of our memories in
365. See RIcOEUR, supra note 7, at 76 (discussing the constructive process of memory
in the context of the work of Jean Piaget). In John McCrone's description of current scientific
understanding, the brain continually reshuffles its connection patterns for the construction of
memory, a "sound design principle" if one thinks of the brain as "evolved for the efficient
processing of current experience rather than for the preservation of a faithful record of the past."
McCrone, supra note 354, at 3. In McCrone's paradigm, all human memory becomes a struggle
against true brain function (and, in this, he comes rather close to the argument that human
recollection is an annoying anti-evolutionary surplusage).
366. SHENK, supra note 353, at 56-57 (describing the brain's innate fuzziness as a
"tendency to regularly forget, repress, and distort information and experience"); see also
HALBWACHS, THE CoLLEC'rIVE MEMORY, supra note 9, at 70 (noting the habit of recalling past
events "in organized sets").
367. MCNALLY, supra note 357, at 35-36 (using airplane flights as a model for the
"reconstructive character of autobiographical memory"). In contrast to episodic memory of
remembered events, "semantic" memory encodes factual information (for example, that John F.
Kennedy was the thirty-fifth President of the United States), with no associated recollection of
how or when that memory was acquired. See SHENK, supra note 353, at 48 (noting that semantic
facts are "our facts about the world").
368. See McNALLY, supra note 357, at 38 (analyzing a study in which 48-year-old men
were asked to reflect on their self-concepts as teenagers). The results indicate a disconcerting
inability to dispense with the self-concepts in existence at a later stage in life. McNally notes
that the study "can make us despair about remembering anything accurately about our past" but
recognizes that we retain a certain fidelity to the "essence" or "gist" of past experiences,
particularly those "having personal, emotional significance" (emphasis added). Id. at 38-39.
369. See BoLLEs, supra note 357, at 83 (discussing the persistence of our current view
of self when we look back to the past).
370. See HrrCHENS, supra note 7, at 85 (suggesting that an inability to flush and void
memory would produce idiot savantism; see infra note 371 for a literary illustration of this
condition); see also SCHACTER, THE SEVEN SINS, supra note 362, at 4 (noting that "[tlransience
is a basic feature of memory").
371. A system that failed to flush memory "would likely result in mass confusion
produced by an incessant coming to mind of numerous competing traces." SCHACTER, THE
SEVEN SINS, supra note 362, at 190 (discussing example of a Russian mnemonist whose
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instantly accessible fashion would be intolerable, so individual memory is constantly
emptying its contents. In fact, modem human memory finds itself most adapted to
higher order judgmental operations and is no longer merely (as it was in earlier times)
a repository of rote learning.372 The ability to flush away most information allows a
kind of mental precipitate to form, which comprises our rationality, our capacity to
form general impressions, and our capacity to extrapolate from those to judgment. 373
Ordinary individual memory, in a word, is constructed.
But too much can be made of these processual similarities between individual and
official public memory. When Halbwachs wrote of an affective community,374 he
unconsciously signaled that individual memory has an emotional dimension, an
affectivity, that is precisely the unconstructed capacity to remember the emotional
resonance (although not a detailed forensic picture) of a past event. We remember, in
effect, how we felt at the time of a particular incident or series of incidents. Details may
evaporate (as memory's evacuative properties decree), but the power of the affective
memory does not. In effect, we have an instinctive antipathy or attraction when
exceptional memory for details caused him to be unable to function at the abstract level). To
take an extreme example of dysfunctional memory, Jorge Luis Borges's character, Funes the
Memorious, was a Uruguayan who, as a result of a fall from a horse at the age of nineteen, finds
that henceforth he can forget nothing.
We, in a glance, perceive three wine glasses on the table; Funes saw all the shoots,
clusters, and grapes of the vine. He remembered the shapes of the clouds in the
south at dawn on the 30th of April of 1882, and he could compare them in his
recollection with the marbled grain in the design of a leather-bound book he had
seen only once, and with the lines of the spray which an oar raised in the Rio
Negro on the eve of the battle of Quebracho .... In effect, Funes not only
remembered every leaf on every tree of every wood, but every one of the times he
had perceived or imagined it. He determined to reduce all of his experiences to
some seventy thousand recollections, which he would later define numerically.
Two considerations dissuaded him: the thought that the task was interminable and
the thought that it was useless. He knew that at the hour of his death he would
scarcely have finished classifying even all the memories of his childhood...
JORGE LOuIS BORGES, Furies the Mernorious [Funes el Memorioso], in FiCCIONEs 112, 114
(Anthony Kerrigan trans., 1962).
372. As Shenk points out, modem society is "awash in external memory," where "Post-
It notes, steno notebooks, Palm Pilots, libraries, and the Internet" have superseded the giant
mnemonic devices of past centuries (such as memory palaces). SHENK, supra note 353, at 232.
The modem brain, in this understanding, is an organ of "synthesis," melding together ideas,
emotional impressions, rhetorical flair, and amusement. See id.; see also SCaHACrER, THE SEVEN
SiNS, supra note 362, at 192 (regarding memory for "gist information" as essential to
categorization and comprehension).
373. See SHENK, supra note 353, at 60 (intuiting that "[t]he brain eliminates trees in
order to make sense of, and remember, the forest[:] . .. [florgetting is what makes us so
smart."); see also McCrone, supra note 354, at 3 (arguing that our brains are evolved "not for
retrospection and contemplation but for intention and anticipation-for looking forwards rather
than backwards, outwards rather than inwards, for being selective rather than merely retentive";
recollection, in other words, ought to be called an "anticipatory" image).
374. HALBWACHS, THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY, supra note 9, at 30-33.
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presented with the aggregations of the past.375 Here, rather than in Halbwachs's
unresolved distinction between the public memories of the State and sub-State societal
groups, lies the point where individual memory reaches an ineluctable conceptual
separation from the kind of processed public memory represented by official memory
and, in truth, by Halbwachs's collective memory.
How strong is affective memory? New scientific scholarship attests to the intuitively
persuasive, but hitherto frequently disputed, idea that memories of past trauma are no
less persistent than memory of ordinary events. In fact, consistent with the idea that
emotional or affective memory is the most adhesive, a recent study by a Harvard
Medical School professor demonstrates that stress and trauma do not impair memory of
the central features of the stressful or traumatic experience-they strengthen it.
376
Impairment, in fact, provides a framing of irony to this analysis, since the study
concludes that trauma survivors, contrary to what one would expect from the normal
evacuative properties of individual memory, have an impaired ability to forget the
central features of disturbing events. 377 The evidence from Holocaust survivors, for
example, suggests a capacity to offer narratives of the salient details of their
incarceration. 378 The study concludes that a painful capacity for remembering is the
price we pay for memory mechanisms that allow us to remember dangers, to survive,
and to reproduce. 379 Thus, the study apparently abandons the Freudian construct of
deep repression, which has sustained the recovered memory branch of the
psychotherapy industry for decades.380 Freud posited the notion of disturbing memories
375. See BOLLES, supra note 357, at 34 (describing the term affective memory as an
erudite synonym for emotional memory). Notice, however, that invocation of emotional memory
does not require a cognate condition in the present: "[T]he memory is, in fact, capable of
recalling joy without being joyful, and sadness without being sad." RICOEUR, supra note 7, at 99
(describing the memory of "passions of the soul"); see also MCNALLY, supra note 357, at 62
(noting that, to the contrary, "what is difficult to imagine is how something as maladaptive as a
mechanism for repressing, dissociating, or otherwise forgetting trauma could possibly have
evolved throughout the course of natural history").
376. See MCNALLY, supra note 357, at 62. Although McNally emphasizes that a
stronger memory of the "central features" of the stressful experience may persist at the expense
of "peripheral details," this selective elimination is consistent with the findings, noted earlier,
that one of the most pervasive properties of human memory is an ongoing and irreversible
evacuation of its contents. See supra note 371 and accompanying text; see also SCHACrER, THE
SEVEN SINS, supra note 362, at 124 (demonstrating inaccuracies behind the epidemic of "false
memories" that developed in the 1990s). Schacter also explores the intense relationship between
emotion and memory, citing numerous experiments indicating that emotionally charged
incidents are better remembered because of the "boost" they receive at the moment when the
memory is bom. Id. at 163-64 (confirming McNally's notion of a dichotomy between central
focus and peripheral details).
377. See McNALLY, supra note 357, at 62. Thus, "trauma does not block the formation
of narrative memory." Id. at 180.
378. See id. (citing studies by Lawrence Langer).
379. See id. at 62 (considering that this phenomenon may be a product of natural
selection, and a more likely outcome than a "maladaptive" capacity to repress trauma).
380. McNally's view on the phenomenon of repression is not so much that it is
psychological folklore, but that it is a potential hypothesis that remains to be proven. Id. at 77
(noting that "[firom an evolutionary perspective... it is difficult to imagine how a repression
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locked up by a censor-jailer, memories that stayed out of conscious thought but which
were not destroyed.3 8 ' The emotional quotient of memory, it turns out, is never
suppressed.
E. Conclusion
Halbwachs insists that even individual memory is structured through social
frameworks, so that unofficial public memory (or, in Halbwachsian usage, collective
memory) is not a metaphor, but a social reality transmitted and sustained through the
conscious efforts and institutions of the group. 38 2 But Halbwachs does not explicitly
account for a conceptual distinction--the affective distinction--that crucially separates
official public memory from the public memory of sub-State societal groups. Without
the affective distinction, the constructive processes (as opposed to the teleological
purpose) of official public memory, and the more decentralized public memory of
groups, would differ primarily in degree. Halbwachs's intertwining of individual and
public (collective) memory, localized in small community activity such as alumni
groups, is a serious attempt to integrate individual lived experience into the realm of
mechanism that undermines memory for significant events could have evolved."). For a
countering argument, but unsupported by the kind of evidence McNally demands, see JUDITH
LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 1 (1992) (concluding that "[t]he ordinary response to
atrocities is to banish them" from memory). See also Victor Barall, Thanks for the Memories:
Criminal Law and the Psychology of Memory, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1473 (1994) (reviewing
HARRY N. MACLEAN, ONCE UPON A TIME: A TRUE STORY OF MEMORY, MURDER, AND THE LAW
(1993), (accepting a scientific dichotomization between "normal" and "repressed" memories and
that the mind conceals traumatic incidents from itself within the "unconscious")).
381. See MARGALrr, supra note 7, at 2-3 (discussing the formative modem metaphor of
"Freud's prison"). Freudian psychotherapy traded on the ability-regarded as a healing
process--to bring repressed memories to the conscious level. See id. at 3 (noting that repressed
memories, in Freudian theory, are subversive and cause dysfunctionality). The parallels with the
work of official public memory cannot be overlooked, although the degrading of confidence in
Freudian theory warns us not to make similarly confident assertions that communal memories
are any more susceptible to Freudian intervention. Margalit, a skeptic concerning the power of
memory to provoke societal healing, mentions the example of French President Charles de
Gaulle as an archetype of the "public" censor-jailer, artfully concealing the collaborationist
history of Vichy France behind the scrim of a post-war refounded Republic, and therefore
causing a neurotic backlash in French civil society after the war. See id. at 5. For Germany, the
hegemonic rituals of regret and remorse produced (and lately have again produced) a
contestative focus on Germans as victims of Allied reprisals against Nazism, including the
horrific consequences of the Allied razing of Dresden and other German cities. See To Make
Amends, British Give Dresden a Cross, 59 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2004, at A8
(mentioning calls by German opposition lawmakers for a national memorial day for German
civilians killed in Allied bombing raids); see also JORG FRIEDRICH, DER BRAND: DEUTSCHLAND
im BOMaENKRrEG 1940-1945 [The Fire: Germany During the Bombardment 1940-1945] (2003)
(condemning the Allied attacks as war crimes, and using a linguistic register that mimics the
idiom of the Holocaust, e.g., describing densely populated urban areas as a Vernichtungsraum,
"extermination space"). But see FREDERICK TAYLOR, DRESDEN: TUESDAY 13 FEBRUARY 1945
(2004) (arguing that, as Germany's seventh largest city, Dresden was a legitimate target with an
industrial center contributing to the war effort).
382. See HALBWACHS, ON COLLECTIVE MEMORY, supra note 9, at 22 (insisting that
Halbwachs's collective memory does not imply "some mystical group mind").
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public memory, but does not, by itself, offer a powerful conceptual limitation of
official public memory. The final Part of this Article, therefore, will seek to use the
insights of literature, and in particular of Marcel Proust's great novel of time and
memory, to reveal affective memory as an autonomous condition of lived experience
which defines and limits the reach of official public memory. Understood in this way,
official memory intrinsically confronts a permanent potential of contestation.
V. A PROTECTED COGNITIVE SPACE FOR INDIVIDUAL MEMORY:
INTEGRATING MARCEL PROUST'S THEORY OF TRANSCENDENCE
A. Introduction
The search for an authentic epistemology of public memory, therefore, takes us
beyond the managed imposture of official public memory, the imperfect chronique of
history, and the incompleteness of Maurice Halbwachs's conception of a public
memory founded in the lived experience of individuals. These modes of public
memory offer insight into how the phenomenon of the past is managed, interpreted,
recorded, altered, embellished, remembered, or forgotten by governments, by sub-State
societal groups, and by professional historians. But, in the context of searching for a
public memory that privileges a conceptual space for individual memory (and is
therefore authentic where constructed memory cannot be), this Article has exposed
important weaknesses in all three modes. Official public memory is a rational
governmental act, backed by the centrality of law and policy that consecrates certain
claims about the State's past as a dominant narrative for the State and its inhabitants.
For individuals, it provides contextual grounding for their lives as members of the State
community (as demonstrated in the empirical study of Austria), but this kind of
memory serves the larger interests of social control and State endurance and resists the
specific personalization or individualization of lived personal memory.
History, also, presents a depersonalized, often universalized version of the past, but
its claims to unremitting objectivity and truth, which might have provided a compelling
counter-discourse to officially constructed memory, are diminished by the interpretive
fallacy and by the ontological improbability of a comprehensive chronique.
Halbwachs, who intuited that a genuine memory can be socialized through collective
sub-State milieus, was nevertheless unable to provide conceptual boundaries to ensure
that localized public memory, formed from the social frameworks that exist in each
individual's life, can exist free from encroachment by the master framework (as it
were) of State memory.
The search for a personalized conception of memory, therefore, is a search for a
theory of public memory that is cognitively (empirically) protected from the reach of
State power: this theory of public memory would set a conceptual limit to the apparent
power of official public memory. The uniqueness of a personalized conception of
memory, noted particularly in relation to the vulnerabilities of Halbwachs's theory, lies
in its affectivity, its capacity to experience the emotional (rather than the merely
iterative or commemorative) resonance of the past. The hermeneutic challenge of
isolating this unreplicable feature of individual lived memory could be tackled in a
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number of ways: perhaps through biology383 or through philosophy, or even by
application of logic. In this closing Part of this Article, however, I rely upon the most
humanistic of resources, the practice of literature, and the most adroit practitioner of
literary memory, Marcel Proust, to articulate a concept of public memory which will
be, in effect, a theory of the integrity of affective memory (in Proustian terms,
transcendent memory) as a permanent counterpoint to official memory.
384
B. Proustian Inspiration
Marcel Proust is memory's literary icon,385 and memory is the afflatus of Proust's
literary masterpiece In Search of Lost Time.386 Proust, according to his most
383. One could, for example, explore the physiological basis for intensified emotional
memory as Daniel Schacter has done in his studies of the role of the amygdala, a small almond-
shaped structure in the brain that appears to play a significant role in the neural systemization of
recalling trauma. See SCHACrER, THE SEVEN SINS, supra note 362, at 178; see also SCHACTER,
supra note 353, at 214 (concluding that "the effects of emotional conditioning depend on the
amygdala, and are processed separately from explicit knowledge about what happened during
the conditioning episode"); JOSEPH LEDoux, SYNAPTIC SELF: How OUR BRAINS BECOME WHO
WE ARE 213-21 (2002) (exploring role of amygdala circuits in fear conditioning). Interestingly,
Schacter emphasizes the adaptive nature of the amygdala's function, noting that a persistent
memory of emotionally arousing experiences-traumatic experiences-boosts our chances of
avoiding recurrences. See ScHAcTER, THE SEVEN SINS, supra note 362, at 187.
384. In this respect, to the extent that any kind of hermeneutic bracketing is possible or
desirable, this Article falls within the first of the two tropes of the law and literature movement
identified by Bruce Rockwood, namely, the study of specific texts and authors "for the light they
shed on the nature of the law and its impact on our lives." Bruce L. Rockwood, The Good, The
Bad, and the Ironic: Two Views on Law and Literature, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 533,533 (1996)
(reviewing DANIEL J. KoRNsTEIN, KiL ALL THE LAWYERS? SHAKESPEARE'S LEGAL APPEAL
(1994) and IAN WARD, LAW AND LITERATURE: POSSmtTIrms AND PERSPECTIVES (1995)). The
other trope Rockwood identifies is engagement in the "systematic introspection" required to
situate law and literature as a continuation of modem and postmodern intellectual history. Id.
385. Edmund Blair Bolles appreciates that Proust's style and setting may be
uncomfortable for a modem readership (unless distilled through the popularizing skills of a de
Botton, see infra note 387, but concludes that "people interested in the relation between memory
and life should at least be aware of Proust's epic." BOLLES, supra note 357, at 277 (emphasis
added).
386. See supra note 10 (explaining editions cited in this Article). In Search of Lost Time
is an extended retrospective narrative (written in the first person) that recounts how a young,
upwardly-mobile ing6nue, a child of the commercial bourgeoisie, achieves his ambition to be
admitted to the elite aristocratic circles of Belle tpoque (turn-of-the-century) France. As he
reaches his self-determined pinnacle (apparently in middle-age), the old aristocratic order is
collapsing with the advent of world war. Throughout the Search, French aristocratic society is
experienced as a rather ridiculous affair, and the tone of the work is unrelentingly ironic. To
salvage something from the wreckage, the hero resolves to create a work of art (a novel),
something that has eluded him during the years of his social ambitions. The finished novel, it
would seem, is the Search itself. For Proust's narrative devices, see infra note 394 (discussing
the use of a narrating intermediary). The monumentality of Proust's work has naturally
provoked its quota of parody. Of particular note is Monty Python's "All-England Summarize
Proust Competition," whose winning entry ("Marcel becomes a writer") could not be more
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industrious modem critic, Jean-Yves Tadil, lived his life twice, once through existence
and once more through the "resurrection" of memory. 387 The task Proust set for
himself, the recapturing of lost time,388 could scarcely be more ineffable or more
enigmatic. Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi makes a brief, startling reference to Proust in the
introduction to his study of Jewish public memory, suggesting that something within
the Proustian spectacle of memory is deeply unsettling. Thus, Yerushalmi disparages
the blandness of translator C. K. Scott Montcrieff's rendering of Proust's title as
"Remembrance of Things Past" (which Montcrieff borrowed from a Shakespearean
sonnet 389) because the true meaning of Proust's vast project is a "darker and more
anxious search for a time that has been lost."
390
Yerushalmi correctly gauges the complexity of Proustian memory, a search which
pits simple memory, the forensic recovery of events, against authentic (and frequently
uncomfortable) affective memory. Although one of the divertissements of Montcrieffs
translation (and that of his cotranslators Andreas Mayor and Terence Kilmartin) is to
watch Proust's architectonic prose mutating into a mannered, post-Victorian
gingerbread style of English,39' Montcrieff and his collaborators sometimes step
falsely, opening up a disjuncture between Proust's more richly ironic intention and the
translator's surface meaning. For example, early in the final book of the Search, Time
laconic. See Ellison, supra note 24, at 202-03 (contending that the Monty Python group uses
the signifier "Proust" to represent all that is high and great in an alienating literary tradition).
See also ALAiN DE BoTroN, How PROUST CAN CHANGE YOUR LIFE 34-35 (1997) (explaining the
inspiration behind the competition as being the suspicion that Proust, who could dedicate
multiple pages of narrative to the simple act of falling asleep, could be ridiculed as a literary
poseur).
387. See JEAN-YvEs TADi, MARCEL PROUST 89-90 (Euan Cameron trans., Viking
2000) (1996) (recounting how this existential cycle of lived experience and recollection was
detectable in Proust's earlier writings).
388. See MALCOLM BowIE, PROUST AMONG THE STARS 30 (1998) ("From first word to
last, Proust's novel is about time.").
389. "When to the sessions of sweet silent thought/I summon up remembrance of things
past." William Shakespeare, Sonnet 30, in CAMBRIDGE SCHOOL, SHAKESPEARE, THE SONNETS 39
(Rex Gibson ed., 1997). But see Proust in Translation: Love by Osmosis, ECONOMIST, Oct. 5,
2002, at 81 (noting that Proust himself disliked the original English title and that the phrase B la
recherche should signify something that is quasi-scientific and experimental, distant from the
comfortable English "remembering").
390. YERUSHALMI, supra note 78, at 5 ("We ourselves are periodically aware that
memory is among the most fragile and capricious of our faculties"). The
Montcrieff/Enright/Mayor translations, hitherto the benchmark for Proust in English, have
recently been superseded (or supplemented, depending on one's biases) by a new Penguin
translation, published in September 2002, which features six different translators, each of whom
tackles one of the books of the Search. This new "collegial" translation has received a mixed
critical reception, but its recency (and proclaimed fidelity to the prestigious Piade edition, see
infra note 393), commend it as the preferred translation for the present Article. As a matter of
general observation, based on close comparison of the Montcrieff/Mayor/Kilmartin and Penguin
texts, the new translators are determined to move Proust into a mode of unadorned
contemporary directness, freed from the elaborate declamatory style of their predecessors.
391. See Robert Alter, The Sweet Cheat Well and Truly Gone, TiMEs LITERARY
SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 25, 2002, at 11 (mentioning the gingerbread characterization); see also
BOLLES, supra note 357, at 277 (describing reading Proust as like trying to live for a season on a
diet of the world's most exquisite chocolate).
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Regained,392 the Narrator 93 returns to scenes of his childhood (at the village of
Combray394 ) but finds himself distressed by the lack of "that contiguity from which is
born, even before we have perceived it, the immediate, delicious and total deflagration
of memory., 39 5 To "deflagrate" memory, in its English denotation, would be to
392. The final book of the Search was originally "Le Temps Retrouve." The title as
rendered in the new Penguin translation, see supra note 10, Finding Time Again, has been
described as "perplexing," given its locutional correspondence to the expression "finding time to
read the paper." Alter, supra note 391, at 12. But the Penguin edition has the signal advantage
of being based on the highly prestigious and authoritative Pliade edition of A la recherche du
temps perdu, produced from 1987 to 1989 under the editorship of the world's most
accomplished Proustophile, Jean-Yves Tadi6. See Andr6 Aciman, Proust Regained, N.Y. REV.
OF BOOKS, July 18, 2002, at 58 (discussing Tadit's apparent endorsement of the Penguin
translation). Unless otherwise indicated (as in the present footnote, for example), the translations
provided in this Part are from the new Penguin edition. (A copyright note: U.S. copyright law
allowed Random House to renew its copyright on the last three parts of the Montcrieff-Mayor-
Kilmartin translation, including Time Regained; accordingly, I am using the Penguin translation
of the last two volumes of In Search of Lost Time as published in the United Kingdom and
Canada, and these translations will not be published in the United States until 2019. See Peter
Brooks, The Shape of Time, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REv., Jan. 25, 2004, at 11 (discussing this
copyright issue)).
393. The voice of Proust's novel is an intermediary who is described by critics (though
not by Proust in the novel itself) as the "Narrator." The device is deployed so expertly that the
character of the Narrator appears to "morph" seamlessly from the small child of the early scenes
in Combray (his childhood vacation home) to the social ingenue of the middle sections, to the
(apparently) middle-aged adult in the climactic final banquet scene surveying the effects time
has wrought on his contemporaries and elders. See infra note 423 and accompanying text. That
the Narrator is a projection of the mind of Marcel Proust seems inescapable. Indeed, at two
points in the novel the Narrator's name is mentioned as "Marcel," a rupture of fourth wall
conventions that the author cannot have intended to be accidental. See ROGER SHATTUCK,
PROUST'S WAY: A FIELD GUIDE TO IN SEARCH OF LOST TtME 32-33 (2000) (suggesting that the
Narrator is "Marcel" who has grown old and become a writer and who tells his story in roughly
chronological order). Shattuck uses an invented composite, "Proust-Marcel," indicating the
apparent intrusion of the "author" Proust into the artifice of his novel, to explain the excursus on
transcendent memory that stands at the core of the final volume of the Search (and that is the
concern of the present Article). See id. at 132; see also INGE CROSMAN WIMMERS, PROUST AND
EMOTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF AFFECT IN A LA RECHERCHE DU TEMPS PERDU 176 (2003)
(describing the device of the Narrator as a "flexible poetics" which allows Proust at the same
time "to engage in fabulation and to speak in his own voice when it [comes) to sharing insights
of universal import"); see also WHIrrE, supra note 24, at 153 (describing Proust as a literary
"cyclops," "a creature with a single great 'I' at the center of his consciousness," a sovereign
intellect, even if he used the literary device of the Narrator to pretend otherwise).
394. Combray is the fictional village where the Narrator spends childhood vacations
with his parents. See SHATTUCK, supra note 393, at 30-31 (presenting a glossary of places in the
Search).
395. MARCEL PROUST, Time Regained, in IN SEARCH OF LOST TIME (VOL. VI) 2
(Andreas Mayor & Terence Kilmartin trans., Modern Library Edition 1993). Montcrieff died
before he could work on the final volume, but his stylistic presence remains in the work of his
successor, Andreas Mayor. As part of the Penguin translation team's quest for authenticity in
reflecting Proust's structure, this passage and several pages of related text now appear in
Volume V, Albertine disparue (translated into English as The Fugitive) of the new Penguin
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suddenly and violently burn it-in effect, to obliterate it.396 But Proust (or the Narrator)
surely never intends to suggest the literal destruction of memory itself, but rather the
destruction or effacement of the distance ordinary memory places between us and our
experience of the past, its insidious presence as an artifice of the mind that forecloses
an authentic "re-experiencing" of lived (past) experience.
Proust, in other words, engages in a "search" not for lost time, as the modem title
seems to assure us, but for a way of revivifying or recapturing lost time in a way that is
not defeated by the evacuative, distorting, and inauthentic characteristics of ordinary
memory. 397 Our lives spin past in a series of what English writer A.S. Byatt has called
"disjunct sense-impressions," 398 and Proust tries to restore a redeeming sense of
consciousness to this experience. This is an early hint of Proust's later disquisition on
an elevated form of memory, which is transcendence (in effect, the surmounting of the
weaknesses of ordinary forensic memory). Transcendent memory is (in Proustian
terms) fundamentally paratactic, ordering the past into smaller and smaller parts of
deepening intensity. 399 In contrast, official public memory-and law itself-are
hypotactic, seeking the connections and relations to assemble a synthetic common
experience.
400
translation, see supra note 392, where the word "deflagration" is rendered rather less
tendentiously (and considerably more accurately) as "irruption," which suggests that memory
bursts or breaks into present consciousness. In the new Penguin edition, the text of The Fugitive
appears in the same bound volume as the fifth volume of the novel, The Prisoner (L4
Prisonniere). MARCEL PROUST, The Fugitive, in IN SEARCH OF LOST TIME (VOL. 5) 653 (Peter
Collier trans., Penguin Books 2002) [hereinafter PROUST, The Fugitive]. For information about
the translation choices made in moving the text to the earlier volume, see Translator's
Introduction to MARCEL PROUST, Finding Time Again, in IN SEARCH OFLOSTTIME(VOL. 6) x-xi
(Ian Patterson trans., Penguin 2002) [hereinafter, PROUST, Finding Time Again].
396. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 523 (2d ed. 1987).
397. Ordinary memory, as discussed in Part IV, is also "constructed" memory. See
supra text accompanying note 348.398. BYATT, supra note 269, at 31 (expressing, however, a postmodernist resistance to
the modernist theme of the constitution of the Self, accompanied by a sense that even great
modernists like Proust, Joyce, and Mann exhausted themselves in a vain attempt to transcend the
reality that "[w]e are perhaps no more than a series of disjunct sense-impressions, remembered
incidents, shifting bits of knowledge, opinions, ideology, and stock responses"). On the other
hand, Proust may never have intended such a project of overcoming of (as he saw it) life's
natural disjunctures. Indeed, philosophers are starting to look again at the theoretical/practical
distinctions between those who view life as an unfolding narrative (so-called "diachronics") and
those who have no particular tendency (or desire) to scrutinize themselves in strongly narrative
terms (the "episodics"). See. e.g., Galen Strawson, Commentary: A Fallacy of OurAge, TIMES
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 15, 2004, at 13-15 (identfying Marcel Proust as fundamentally an
"episodic," whose "remembrances [were] inspired by his [elpisodicity").
399. Parataxis is a term of stylistics which refers to a narrative of side-by-side sentences
without transition or connections. See SHATTUCK, supra note 393, at xv-xvi. Since parataxis is
obviously not Proust's dominant style of writing, see infra note 400, the word is used here for
potential philosophical implications.
400. Hypotaxis, as a term of stylistics, indicates the kind of complex array of
connections and subordinating relations favored in Proust's writing. See id. (noting, however,
that Proust does-fleetingly-use parataxis). As the main text seeks to suggest, Proust's
hypotactic writing seems at odds philosophically with his "paratactic" search for deeper and
deeper fragments of intensity. On the stylistic meaning of parataxis, see supra note 399.
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C. Connectivities of Individual and State Memory
In a general sense, Proust's reflections on how individuals assimilate the past
correspond closely to his occasional assessments of how States behave in matters of
memory. Both the individual and the State, in his view, are engaged in a perennial
process of evacuating memories, of simply forgetting their pasts4R' Time, for the
individual, removes both past love and past grief,40 2 and nudges us toward a dulling of
our "curiosity" about the past which ultimately discourages questions about things that




And this benign effacement of the past is also true, in Proustian analysis, of the most
apparently dominant and disquieting events of a State's history. Proust does not
explicitly suggest that the State is the responsible agent of effacement, but he intuits
that there are directive forces, seemingly more powerful than individual memory,
which steer social remembering and forgetting. In Proust's sensibility, nations actually
"behave to some extent as if they were individuals," 4 5 and while his context is the
401. To borrow a phrase from Proust critic Malcolm Bowie, this may be the
"ontological telos" of the Search. BowiE, supra note 388, at 5 (emphasis in original).
402. See PROUST, The Fugitive, supra note 395, at 656 (expressing his astonishment
that the passage of years can remove all apparent traces of past love and past grief, so that
nothing remains of past torture; this result, in Proust's view, is consistent with a world in which
everything wears out, and everything perishes). Proust is not suggesting that affective memory is
removed, but only that time's arrow is so swift that the impact of past loves and griefs is no
longer felt as a continuing imposition on the later present.
403. Id.
404. See Jack Jordan, The Unconscious, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION, supra note 24, at
100, 110 (citing Proust's own declamation to the same effect).
405. PROUST, Finding TimeAgain, supra note 395, at 81. As revealed in the Narrator's
often comical obsession with Mme Verdurin's salon, Proust rarely ascends to the macrocosmic
plane of national or global events. Rather, he is content to reveal the psychological "laws" of
humanness through the agency of his dramatis personae. See Harvey Wickham, The Impuritans,
in PROUST: REvIEws IN ENGLISH, supra note 10, at 128, 131 (postulating, in connection with his
treatment of character, that "[Proust] must always have his 'law'); see also WILLIAM C.
CARTER, MARCEL PROUST: A LIFE 74 (2000) (noting how Proust, after making a particularly
revealing comment about a character's personality or behavior that the reader might think
unique, "deftly switches to a pronoun, one or we, and embraces us all") (emphasis in original);
PHYLLIS ROSE, THE YEAR OF READING PROUST: A MEMOIR tN REAL TIME 21 (1997) (observing
that Proust is a kind of social researcher, discerning "connective laws" beneath particular
examples of behavior). Proust's greatest "law," of course, is his recognition that change comes
to all societal structures, or what we might call a law of group entropy. See Georges Lemaitre,
Marcel Proust, in PROUST: REvIEWS IN ENGLISH, supra note 10, at 239-40 (discussing Proust's
exacting description of the special characteristics, and eventual decay, of French high society of
the Belle tpoque); see also J.M. COCKING, PROUST: COLLECTED ESSAYS ON THE WRITER AND His
ART 46 (1982) (reflecting on how Proust's "laws" apply also to the decline and renewal of
groups, as the grand monde of the French aristocracy became infiltrated by the bourgeoisie
represented in Proust's novel by his Narrator). As Cocking notes, Proust drew criticism (from
Jean-Paul Sartre, for one) precisely because of his propensity to generalize. See id. at 244--45.
Sartre, according to Cocker, faulted Proust for espousing a bourgeois conception of a
universalized human nature informed by analytical generalization. See id. at 245. Nonetheless,
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belligerency of nations (in situ, France and Germany), his awareness of an internal
logic of national behavior, and the "passion" that feeds that logic, 406 have broader
resonance. 4°7 Thus, Dreyfusism, which caused an explosive cleavage in pre-war French
society, had by 1916 been "integrated into a range of respectable and normal
things."4° 8 This integration, moreover, brought with it a moral indifference to the
polarities of the cause. The intrinsic goodness or badness of Dreyfusism (or of Dreyfus
himself) simply vanished from public debate as the Great War approached: "it was no
longer shocking . . . [and that] was all that mattered." 4°9 In Proust's view, the
disappearance of the shock value, of any sense of (or the mattering of) accuracy,
effaces memory and means that people simply do not remember whether something
was once thought outr. 41°
Proust is not unaware (at least novelistically) of the great cycles of public history through which
individual lives move and by which they are influenced. He writes, ironically and meiotically, of
"huge organized agglomerations of individuals which we call nations." PROUST, Finding Time
Again, supra, note 395, at 79. Lest this aperfu be dismissed as fatuous, Proust strikes home a
telling point: "[The life of a nation] merely repeats on a larger scale the lives of its component
cells; and anybody who is incapable of understanding the mystery, the reactions, the laws of
such entities will utter nothing but empty words when he talks about the struggle between
nations." Id. To adapt a phrase, the collectivity recapitulates the individuality.
406. PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 81 (comparing national disputes
to domestic or amorous quarrels).
407. Not that Proust is unaware of the grotesqueries of patriotism and the difficulty of
securing a "detachment" from one's country's cause. See id. at 82. The Narrator associates his
own bitter personal experiences of betrayal and falsehood with the deceptions of States, and
reasons that it is adolescent innocence that induces us to take people (and countries) at their
word. See id. Nonetheless, patriotism is resilient because "in all countries most of the people are
silly," capable of defending, "passionately and foolishly, an unjust cause." Id. at 82-83. Proust,
once again, establishes these opinions through the medium of a character, here Baron de
Charlus, an idiosyncratic aristocrat who is (irrationally) angered by the unquestioning optimism
of his French countrymen in underestimating Germany's strength in World War I. See id. at 83.
408. Id. at 33. The Dreyfus Affair, which straddled the end of the nineteenth century
and the beginning of the twentieth, concerned a false allegation against a French military officer,
Captain Alfred Dreyfus, who was Jewish, that he had disclosed national secrets to the Germans.
It led to the famous newspaper manifesto of the writer Emile Zola, which began with the
resonant declaration, J'Accuse! For background to the Dreyfus Affair, see Cynthia Gamble,
From Belle t4,poque to First World War: The Social Panorama, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION,
supra note 24, at 7, 19-20 (describing the political significance of the affair in turn-of-the-
century France); see also WHITE, supra note 24, at 10-13 (noting that Proust's defense of
Dreyfus angered conservative, Catholic, pro-army aristocrats); TADIM, supra note 387, at 300-
301 (assessing Proust's reaction to the affair in the context of his social circles). On Zola's
intervention, see William Paulson, Intellectuals, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION To MODERN
FRENCH CULTURE 145, 146-147 (Nicholas Hewitt ed., 2003) (discussing how the Dreyfus affair
made the word "intellectual" a common usage associated with principled intervention in public
life by writers, scholars, and other elite observers). Notice, incidentally, how comfortable Proust
was with references to external (and real) political events. See HrrITENS, supra note 7, at xvi
(bracketing Proust with Tolstoy, Dickens, and Nabokov in having a capacity to assimilate a real
political milieu into storytelling).
409. PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 34 (emphasis in original).
410. Obviously, official public memory takes advantage of the evacuative properties of
individual memory, most especially of memory stretched over several generations, to alter
consciousness of the past. In this perception, people in a given society (according to Proust) lack
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Proust does grant the State one critical attribute that distorts the symmetry he
usually observes between public and individual responses to the departing past. He
notices that the individual and the State have strikingly different capacities to absorb
the broader significance of major events. In what might appear to be a delicate irony
for the arguments made in this Article, Proust seems to imply that the State, precisely
because (and not despite the fact that) it is an impersonal collectivity, can actually take
on a sense of feeling that is denied to the individual.4 1' Proust speaks of a "reciprocal
process" which "multiplies whatever concerns our own well-being, and divides by such
a formidable number whatever does not concern us, that the death of millions of
unknown people hardly troubles us, and we find it scarcely as disagreeable as a cold
draught."'412 And, in this precise phrasing, Proust grasps the compelled intermediation
that affects (or afflicts) the citizens of any State.4' 3 Proust's statement of this
psychological law is rendered, in the conventions of the Search, through an
idiosyncratized vignette of the socialite and mattresse du salon, Madame Verdurin,
savoring her breakfast croissant (a wartime exception baked specially for her), while
reading in her newspaper of the fate of the sunken passenger ship Lusitania "[als she
dipped [the croissant] in her coffee, and flicked her newspaper with one hand so that it





clarity about the timing and significance of past historical events. Such people are, in Proustian
parlance, "inattentive and forgetful," PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 34, and
are likely to imagine that events are placed much further in the past than they actually are. See
id. Proust, indeed, suggests that the pre-war days were perceived in his time as separated from
the era of the First World War by a temporal chasm resembling a geological age. See id. The
dustbins of history, then, are capacious, and for Proust's compeers even the notorious Dreyfus
Affair, see supra note 408, had faded as the sujet de salon even for that enduring socialite and
indefatigable maftresse de salon, Madam Verdurin, as her importunities to her society guests
change from "Do come... to talk about the [Dreyfus] [aiffair" to "Do come in at five o'clock
to talk about the war." PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 37 (emphasis added).
For background to the elite institution of the salon, see ROGER SHArrucK, THE BANQUET YEARS:
THE ORIGINS OF THE AVANT-GARDE IN FRANCE, 1885 TO WORLD WAR I 9-10 (1968) (noting
aristocratic favor for a formalized stage on which to pursue cultivated conversation). Proust's
pejorative reference to the Dreyfus contretemps as belonging to a "prehistoric" time can still be
felt sometimes in the modem age when we dismiss such recently-departed eras as the presidency
of Bill Clinton, see supra note 74, reflecting on this sense of psychic distance from past eras.
411. Margalit, for example, elaborating a theory of societal relations, suggests that
"lm]ost people most of the time carry on by not caring for most other people." MARGAIIT, supra
note 7, at 32-33 (discussing, apparently as a matter of rational observation, that human beings
limit their circle of caring to family, friends, and some significant groups). "Caring" is a
demanding attitude, and likely to become diffuse. We might care for humanity "in general,"
therefore, but not individual human beings beyond a closely-drawn circle. Id. at 33. In that
context, the pose of "caring" is better struck, and more effectively, by the State.
412. PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 80.
413. Thus, Proust (speaking through Baron de Charlus) suggests that "[t]he truth is that
people see everything through the eyes of their newspapers, and how could they do otherwise
given that they are not personally acquainted with the people or the events concerned?" Id. at
93.
414. Id. at 81. See also supra note 405 and accompanying text (discussing Proust's use
of the character traits of his dramatis personae to demonstrate general psychological laws).
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Yet these remarks are at one with the characteristically dark ironic tone of the
Search. The State's absorption of great and terrible events, its commemorative capacity
qua State, is just as affectively empty as Madame Verdurin's casual flicking of her
newspaper. Official public memory is designed exactly to perform its incorporative and
commemorative duties in loco parentis for the citizenry, whose individual grasp of
national events or catastrophes, even when they have played a part, is necessarily
personalized and localized in a Halbwachsian sense. But Proust does not mean to
suggest that the State itself has an independent memory of past events, much less a
sense of their affective resonance. If States have a sense of "feeling," as Proust seems
to imply, it is more properly described as a feeling of civic obligation rather than an
emotional commitment. To adapt a French expression, the actions of the State are
motivated by a spirit of l'itatique oblige.
D. Transcendent Memory in Proust
1. The Aesthetic Meaning of Transcendence
For most of the seven books of the Search, Proust's observations on memory take
the form of intermittent aperfus. In the final book, Finding Time Again,415 memory
becomes a manifesto. Indeed, Proust's work, despite its inherent resistance to
popularization, has entered vernacular appreciation through the phrase "Proustian
moment," used to connote the involuntary rush of elegaic memory provoked by a
416
sudden sensory experience (such as the smell of fresh-mown grass in summer).
Proust's conception of transcendent memory-his aesthetic theory 
4
1
- is mnemonic4 18
and metonymic. 41 9 This richest grain of personal affective memory operates by a
recessive analogical power that occurs instantaneously when a triggering mechanism is
415. See supra notes 10, 392 (discussing this newest English translation of the final
book of the Search and the translation project which produced it).
416. See Bowni, supra note 388, at 64-65 (comparing Proustian moments with
Freudian slips, neither of which would have entered common speech "if their import had been in
any way obscure").
417. See KRISTEVA, supra note 24, at 108 (introducing an analysis of Proust's theory of
involuntary memory).
418. See Joseph Collins, The Doctor Looks at Literature (extract), in PROUST: REvIEws
IN ENGLISH, supra note 10, at 58, 60 (suggesting that, since the elementary components of
present stimuli resemble previous stimuli, the recurrence of a new grouping of these stimuli
produces an adaptive response, an "associative memory" that functions as a "mnemonic
combination").
419. The word "metonymic" is used here in the sense of "associative." See J. Middleton
Murry, M. Marcel Proust-A New Sensibility (extract), in PROUST: REvIEws IN ENGLISH, supra
note 10, at 3, 5 (articulating a deep connection in Proust's novel between memory and
association, such that "the act of penetrating through some present circumstance to a fragment of
past experience, which it seems to hold strangely concealed behind it, is represented as a
consummation of personality"); see also KRIsTEVA, supra note 24, at 19 (detecting a metonymy,
reflected in the metaphor of the madeleine, "between present sensation and past sensation").
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activated. Proust's work is replete with these mechanisms, these incitements of
recollection,420 but they accumulate most insistently in Finding Time Again.
Evocation of this unique property of individual memory occurs in a scene plotted in
the wartime Paris of 1916. While Proust's labyrinthine set-pieces (and associated
sentence constructions 421 ) are the stuff of literary legend, 2 none is more so than the
climactic vanity-fair event, the afternoon reception and concert at the house of the
Prince de Guermantes, 423 which the Narrator locates in three hundred pages at the core
of Finding Time Again.424 As the Narrator approaches the Guermantes mansion for the
420. Roger Shattuck provides several evocative terms to describe Proust's experiences
of affective recollection, including moments bienheureux, "mnemonic resurrections," and, most
provocatively (though attributed to Samuel Beckett), "fetishes." SHAAUCK, supra note 393, at
257.
421. Critics have referred to "the clumsy centipedalian crawling of the interminable
sentences," id. at 3 (quoting Arnold Bennett), or to the "molasses" of an "over-long book, with
its over-long sentences," Joshua Landy, The Texture of Proust's Novel, in CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION, supra note 24, at 117, 117. Bowie refers to the "fantastication" of Proust's writing
style. BowiE, supra note 388, at xvi (although Professor Bowie, it must be said, was probably
not offering this epithet ungraciously).
422. No claim can be made, incidentally, that Proust's final volume displays a
craftsmanlike cohesiveness. One commentator simply labels the whole volume incoherent. See
COCKING, supra note 405, at 164; see also id. at 166 (arguing that the theory designed by Proust
for the novel's climax "proliferated into a discussion which is desultory, repetitive, confused,
and sometimes obscure"). Published after his death and posthumously recreated from his chaotic
notes, the structure has been criticized as unwieldy, the arguments as dense, and the language as
a single, forbidding (even by Proustian standards) block of densely-textured prose. See MARIA
PAGANINI, READING PROUST: IN SEARCH OF THE WOLF-FISH 230-31 (Caren Litherland & Kathryn
Milun trans., 1994) (summing up Proust's extraordinary efforts here as a kind of "lucid
madness"). But Proust's stylistic and structural failings, while making his arguments harder to
follow, certainly do not make them impenetrable.
423. See PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 164. The Guermantes family
represents the aristocracy in Proust's novel, the ossified predecessor (as family and as salon) to
the upwardly-mobile bourgeois ascendancy of Madame Verdurin. See supra note 414 and
accompanying text. For the Narrator, however, the Guermantes represent an exalted and
unattainable State, and he snobbishly disapproves of Madame Verdurin's less august origins
(which parallel his own). Indeed, for him, the name of Guermantes cuts another channel of
memories filled with "all the images of seigneurial forest and tall flowers which had then
accompanied it .... I had wanted to go to the Guermantes' house as if that might have been
able to bring me closer to my childhood and to the depths of my memory in which I saw it."
PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 164-65. Ironically, Madame Verdurin marries
into the house of Guermantes, and it is she (as the Princesse de Guermantes) who presides at the
final reception depicted in Finding Time Again. See Gamble, supra note 408, at 12-13
(describing the collapse of the Guermantes dominion).
424. The event is heralded with a brief epiphany, as the Narrator makes a carriage
journey through the streets of Paris and suddenly experiences an ecstatic transformation into "an
aviator, who has up to that point travelled laboriously along the ground, suddenly 'taking off,'
[and rising up] slowly towards the silent heights of memory." PROUST, Finding Time Again,
supra note 395, at 166. The Narrator, in this supernal incarnation, is no longer "passing through
the same streets as those who were out walking along them that day, but instead [moves]
through a shifting past, sad and gentle." id. at 167.
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afternoon party, he steps onto an uneven paving stone and experiences a jolt of
recognition. The recollection is very specific, however. It is a recollection of a
happiness
that, at different points in my life, had given me the sight of trees I had thought I
recognized when I was taking a drive round Balbec, the sight of the steeples of
Martinville, the taste of a madeleine dipped in herb tea, and all the other
sensations I have spoken about, and which the last works of Vinteuil had seemed
to me to synthesize.
42
Ironically, these unguarded moments are the sentinels of memory. They are specific
pathways or channels to the recollection of past events. The perception of the uneven
paving stones, linked in memory to experiencing a similar set of uneven paving stones
in the baptistery of St. Mark's Basilica in Venice, restores a complete memory image,
"along with all the other sensations associated with that sensation on that day," 426 and
that memory image, and its components, "had been waiting in their place, from which a
sudden chance had imperiously made them emerge.' '4 27 Earlier in the novel, the taste of
the madeleine had, in its turn, provoked an entire memory of Combray, the locus in
quo of the Narrator's childhood.428
But for Proust, transcendent memory is not just a cascading series of synaptic
impulses sparked by a causal agent.429 The experience is far from mechanical. Entering
the pathway or channel produces a very precise result in the Narrator's experience:
425. Id. at 174-75. These signature triggers of memory, including the madeleine,
provide a continuing pulse within the narrative. Balbec is the Narrator's summer vacation
destination on the Normandy coast; Vinteuil is the composer of a violin sonata that serves as a
recurrent mnemonic motif for the Narrator; see also WHrrE, supra note 24, at 142 (noting that
the theme of involuntary memory, presaged in the first book of the Search by the experience of
the madeleine, is at last fully worked out here, as the Narrator begins his fateful entry to the
afternoon reception).
426. PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 175; see also KRISTEVA, supra
note 24, at 108 (describing Proust's conception of "connecting links" superimposed on past
memories).
427. PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 175-76.
428. "In the same way, the taste of the little madeleine had reminded me of Combray."
Id. at 176. The experience repeats a few moments later in the narrative, when the Narrator waits
in an antechamber for admission to the party at the end of a musical set, and is transformed by a
servant's accidental knocking of a spoon against a plate into recognition, through auditory
resemblance to the action of a railwayman's hammer, of a past scene where he watched a row of
trees from a railway carriage while opening a bottle of beer, the very row of trees whose
depiction so threatened him that he despaired of ever achieving literary power. Id. The past
echoes once more when he touches a napkin to his cheek which has the same "stiffness" and
"degree of starch" as the towel with which he sought to dry his face on his first day at the
seaside resort town of Balbec. Id. at 177.
429. See SlArUCK, supra note 393, at 257--64 (patterning these episodes of
"involuntary" memory in terms of a sequence that typically involves a state of mind, a physical
sensation, an accompanyingfrisson of pleasure, all of which spark a vision of an analogous and
forgotten past event, with (possibly) a presentiment of the future and, finally, some response to
the experience (which, according to the governing conceit of the novel, is ultimately the creation
of the novel itself)).
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anxiety and intellectual doubts about the reality of the experience are dissipated.43°
One critic speaks of this moment as Proust's "seminal moment of insight. ' '4 3 1 The
essence is recapture, the moment when an instant of past life returns, but without the
interception of intellectual construction that typically occurs in the present (which itself
is consumed with the utilitarian purposes of the future).432 Proust's Narrator is
conscious of a transformative experience. The provoked recollections have no
precedent in earlier efforts to "remember" childhood sojourns in Combray or even a
journey to Venice made in adulthood.433 Those earlier, mechanical efforts were
products of an undifferentiated memory, 4  a memory that fails to integrate the full
range of kinesthetic and affective experiences that accompanied the original experience
(whether color, taste, temperature, atmosphere, condition of hunger, feelings of
pleasure, or the experience of pain or sadness).435 Thus, the memory which returns on
430. PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 175. In this passage, the Narrator
actually expresses the sense that uneasiness "about the future," as well as all intellectual doubt,
have dissipated. This reaction, however, cannot be intellectually separated from the powerful
impression formed by the resuscitation of the past, but is an inevitable emotional
accompaniment of that resurgence (when the remembered event has positive associations).
Shattuck, too, spots this oscillation of past and future in Proust's episodes of ecstatic memory.
See SIHIArucK, supra note 393, at 258 (suggesting that the penetration of "the future" in
Proust's experiences of memory has generally escaped notice).
431. RONALD HAYMAN, PROUST: A BIOGRAPHY 300 (1990) (referring, in situ, to the
earliest manifestation, in the first book of the Search, of Proust's phenomenon of involuntary
memory).
432. This idea of "intellectual construction" matches the understanding of ordinary
forensic memory, which is considered supra, at text accompanying note 362. See PROUST,
Finding Time Again, supra note 396, at 181 (explaining how "the intelligence desiccates [the
spirit of the past]," and constructs a future "out of fragments of the present and the past from
which it extracts even more of their reality without retaining any more than is useful for the
narrowly human, utilitarian ends that it assigns to them").
433. See PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 178.
434. The word "undifferentiated" is used in the Mayor & Kilmartin translation. PROUST,
Time Regained, supra note 395, at 260. The new Penguin translation prefers the less evocative
usage, "uniform." PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 178.
435. PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 178. Proust's aesthetic theory
generally implicates a joyful resonance of the past, since he is experiencing these moments of
ecstatic memory as pivots for the production of art. See id. at 181 (writing of a "joy" that
diminishes even the power of death). But since so much of the novel's memory work explores
the Narrator's experiences of sadness or alienation or loss of intimacy, it is reasonable to
postulate that Proust cannot have intended, as a matter of theory, to exclude the resurgence of
unpleasant emotional memories along with those that inspire artistic creation. See, e.g.,
CROSMAN WIMMERS, supra note 393, at 60, 120 (emphasizing earlier sections of the Search
where episodes of returned memory are clearly linked to sadness, anguish, and suffering). Thus,
although Proust speaks of ecstatic recollection, his theory is capacious enough to include
memories of a past that are not joyful or radiant, but which are just as susceptible to ecstatic
recapture in the more expansive sense of a sudden, intense feeling or moment of overpowering
emotion. We can speak, in fact, of an ecstasy of "rage" or "grief' as readily as one of joy or
love. See RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 619 (2d ed., 1987)
(distinguishing a state of "ecstasy"-which produces intensified feelings that may be of rage or
grief or love-inter alia from a state of "rapture," which shares the power of ecstasy but most
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deliberate effort, the conjured memory- the ordinary forensic memory, one might say,
of past events436---can never be as vivid in its impressions as the kinesthetic/affective
memory that returns and repairs the intellectual separation which our minds have
created between the words uttered and the actions performed in the past and the
"environment" in which they were uttered or performed.437 The present and past mix
inextricably, and time (in its relentless intermittent flux) is vanquished.3
Memories of this strength, Proust believes, have an absolute certitude.439 They are
experienced paradoxically in the present moment and at the same time in the context of
a distant moment, so that the past encroaches extra-temporally upon the present and the
mind tumbles into an existential imbalance as to whether it is in one or the other.440
often refers to an elevated sensation of bliss or delight). It is also possible to interpret these
passages as moments of ecstasy generated purely by the appreciation that the past can return in
this fashion (whether the evoked memory is one of joy or sadness). Proust's pleasure, in other
words, lies in the overcoming of the effacing power of memory, rather than in the specific
emotional quality of the summoned memory. See, e.g, RICoEuR, supra note 7, at 417, observing
that "we welcome as a small happiness the return of a sliver of the past, wrestled away, as we
say, from oblivion." In another place, Ricoeur writes of a notion of "happy memory" that seems
also to capture the sense that it is the experience of overcoming oblivion, rather than the nature
of the recollected memory, that is most significant:
I consider recognition to be the small miracle of memory. And as a miracle, it can
also fail to occur. But when it does take place, in thumbing through a photo album,
or in the unexpected encounter with a familiar person, or in the silent evocation of
a being who is absent or gone forever, the cry escapes: "That is her! That is him!"
And the same greeting accompanies step by step, with less lively colors, an event
recollected, a know-how retrieved, a state of affairs once again raised to the level
of "recognition." Every act of memory (faire-mimoire) is thus summed up in
recognition.
Id. at 494-95. Finally, one might well question Proust's confidence (however contrived for
purposes of his novel) that art is the product only of optimistic recollection, since so much of the
empirical evidence points the other way. See KRiSTEVA, supra note 24, at 170 (analyzing
Proust's exploration of memory in which the solipsistic "I" unfolds "ideas and images, flavors,
smells and tactile impressions, reverberations and sensations, jealousies, frustrations, bouts of
sadness and more joys").
436. Again, this is the intellectual, constructed memory of the past. See supra note 362
and accompanying text (noting that the mind does not preserve a videographic record of past
events); see also Philo Buck, The Waters Under the Earth (extract), in PROUST: REvIEwS IN
ENGLISH, supra note 10, at 303, 305 (discussing the differences between Proustian memory and
the memoranda of diaries or statistical record of doings that are filed for reference); Lemaitre,
supra note 405, at 246 (discussing how everyday reality is often "adulterated" by intellectual
elaboration).
437. See PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 178.
438. See Lemaitre, supra note 405, at 246 (writing of Proust's commingling of past and
present as a sort of "metaphysics").
439 See PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 179.
440 See id. Proust, in effect, is attempting to arrest the flow of time-the very quality
that defines time. Proust (through the Narrator) is provoked to imagine that the experience
enjoys an extra-temporality, operational through an instantaneous fusion of the present with the
past: the medium for perception of "the essence of things," in effect the Narrator's "being,"
stands "outside of time." Id.
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Memory, in this sense, is not mere narrative or banal recollection. The past and present
seem fused in a spiritual communion, yet the experience itself is more real than either
of them.44 1 What is projected is the "sensory time of our subjective memories.",,2
While the effect has been overstated as one of drug addiction," 3 the sensory particulate
that Proust claims to isolate is nothing less than a fragment of "time in its pure
State." 444 Thus, the being that savors the triggers of memory (at the Guermantes house,
the spoon touching the plate, the touch of the linen napkin, the uneven paving stones,
445
or much earlier, the taste of the madeleine), is a being suffused with what one could
call Platonic essences, a being drawing "nourishment only from the essence of
things." 446 When a noise or a scent or a taste or a sight from the past, Proust is
suggesting, is heard or smelt or savored or seen (involuntarily) again in the present, a
union of experiences can occur that is paradoxically "real without being present, ideal
without being abstract," and the "permanent and habitually hidden essence of things is
liberated.,447
Proust's Narrator appreciates that the essence of these reminiscences is that he is
"not free to choose them,"" 8 which indeed is the very "mark of their authenticity.'4 9
Thus, the Narrator's insight is truly paradoxical: the resurrection of past images and
sensations is both spontaneous and authentic. The fortuitous springing to life of past
sensations "controlled the authenticity of the past that it resuscitated.''4s° Conscious
recollection and conscious observation (presumably including the structured work of
official memory, of history, and indeed of ordinary human memory) cannot accomplish
this authentic recapture. 4 ' This transcendent memory is a heightened affective
441. See id. at 180.
442. KRiSTEVA, supra note 24, at 171 (emphasis in original). See id., at 170-71
(positing the internal subjective appreciation of time as an extreme alternative to the opacity of
exterior time, the "hackneyed" calendrical spectacle of ordinary life).
443. See Buck, supra note 436, at 310 (finding something of the "attitude of the drug
addict" in Proust's ecstatic embrace of a succession of "sensuously rich memories of things
past").
444. PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 180.
445. See supra note 428 (reciting how these seemingly trivial actions or sensations are
the catalysts of recall for the Narrator).
446. PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 181.
447. Id. See Frederick C. Green, French Novelists from the Revolution to Proust
(extract), in PROUST: REviEws iN ENGLISH, supra note 10, at 148, 149 (suggesting that each of
Proust's extrapolated fragments of pure time "carries with it like an aura the self we were when
it was first experienced by us").
448. PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 187. See also SArrUCK, supra
note 393, at 121-22 (arguing that true memory, in the Proustian sense, "surges into being out of
its opposite: oubli," since otherwise it is merely a familiar habit-and therefore, presumably, the
work of construction rather than transcendence).
449. PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 187.
450. Id.
451. See id. And so, as the Narrator (by happenstance) comes across the book Francois
le Champi, a childhood favorite by George Sand, in the Guermantes library, the experience
brings a surge of childhood memories, not from the perspective of the adult browser, but "as the
child I had been at that time;" thus the book retains that very sensibility of who he was when he
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memory, standing outside the vicissitudes of time. It is time that was lost, and is now
regained.45 2 In Proustian terms, this "affective " transcendence is memory's most pure
and most personalized artifact.
2. Proust's Irony
Proust is deeply engaged in a search for authenticity in memory, precisely the search
that has been the theme for the present Article. To reprise the closing insight of the last
subsection, he identifies a molten core of personal memory, of heightened affectivity,
that has no analogue in the structured memory work of officialdom or history--or in
the constructed nature of ordinary individual memory. Proust attributes real force to
this transcendent memory. It is not merely a trick of ddja vu.4 5 The returning memories
are not mere echoes or simulacra of past sensations. The past sensation itself surges
forward. 4 4 The sensation, common to past and present,455 pushes against the present
reality, forcing itself into consciousness. And though beaten back by the present, as the
state of ecstasy recedes,456 the past is nevertheless able to permeate the present
scene. 457 The result is a palpable wavering of the self between the "fugitive"
first experienced it. See id. at 194. The child "rises up" to take the Narrator's place, the child
who is
[T]he only one who has the right to read the title Francois le Champi and who
reads it as he read it then, with the same impression of the weather outside in the
garden, the same dreams as he formed then about other countries and about life,
the same anxiety about the future.
id. Note again, that Proust, perhaps unconsciously, summons the darker memory of the past
("anxiety" is rendered in the Mayor & Kilmartin translation as "anguish," see Time Regained,
supra note 395, at 285), even as he seeks to define a concept of involuntary memory that
prompts joyful transcendence, the prerequisite (he feels) of artistic achievement. See supra note
435 (considering the implied presence of pain as well as joy in Proust's notion of involuntary
memory).
452. "One minute freed from the order of time has recreated in us, in order to feel it, the
man freed from the order of time." PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 1; see also
SHATrUCK, supra note 393, at 118 (describing Proustian involuntary memory as "privileged,"
allowing us "not just to see across time but to see time itself').
453. But see SHATTUCK, supra note 393, at 111 (suggesting that Proustian
transcendence is nonetheless "a close relative of deja vu," since it, too, represents "an
unexpected short-circuit between past and present in our apparatus of perception").
454. See PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 182.
455. See id. (referring to a "duplicate" of a past sensation).
456. On the layered connotations of the word "ecstasy," which may encompass both joy
and grief, see supra note 435 (discussing how an ecstatic summoning of the past may include
painful memory).
457. See PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 182-83; see also SATTrUcK,
supra note 393, at 119 (offering the robust metaphor, to appreciate the simultaneous depth
perception of past and present, of the "stereopticon," a nineteenth century binocular device that
provided three-dimensional depth and verisimilitude).
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resurrections of the past and the present reality.458 What are experienced, according to
Proust, are "fragments of existence which [have] escaped from time.''459
The mystical intensity of Proust's writing exposes an astonishing truth about human
memory-the power and persistence of affective recall-that has been confirmed by
recent scientific study.460 Viewed retrospectively, Proust is a shrewder analyst of the
psyche than Freud. Some critics have felt that Proust's manifesto of memory is
overwrought, that he has indeed meditated excessively on the implications of an
enigmatic deja vu.461 But it is important to appreciate that Proust's framework of
thought is one of supreme irony. Proust was, after all, a novelist and not a theoretician
of time or memory.4 2 His understanding of a spontaneous transcendent memory is
presented within the confines of one of the most non-spontaneous and structured
formats imaginable, the artifice of a novel. The Narrator's experiences, rich with the
thrill of affective recall, are densely plotted elements of this novel.
Proust, in fact, reveals toward the end of his manifesto that the only way to stabilize
the experiences of transcendence," 3 which contrast so formidably with the "picture
book" experience of ordinary memory, 4" is to engage in an even higher power of
transcendence through the creation of a work of art.465 Indeed, he is acutely sensitive to
458. PROUST, Finding TimeAgain, supra note 395, at 183 (comparing the experience of
these "resurrections" of the past to a "dizzying uncertainty akin to that which one sometimes
experiences through some ineffable vision at the moment of falling asleep").
459. id.
460. See generally McNALLY, supra note 357 (analyzing the clinical and scientific
evidence supporting the indelible imprint of emotional memory).
461. Thus, even a devoted Proustian, like Malcolm Bowie, offers the disconcerting view
that Proust was in need of a "resonant exit-speech" to lend an air of "righteous striving" to an
essentially selfish mental adventure. Bowm, supra note 388, at 6; see also COCKING, supra note
405, at 213 (arguing that the "truths" of Proust's experience are more important than the
"rigidity" of his intellectual system, and that Proust's schema of involuntary memory is "not
very convincing").
462. See KRISTEVA, supra note 24, at 306 (arguing that, in consequence, it would be
"dangerous to try to 'extract' a philosophical doctrine from his work").
463. Thus, Proust's Narrator believes that an insight into essence is without value
unless somehow he can "stabilize" or "immobilize it." PROUST, Finding TimeAgain, supra note
395, at 184.
464. The Narrator, therefore, contrasts the spectacle of involuntary memory with the
mundane aspects of "voluntary memory," a conscious process of "leafing through a picture-book
to choose illustrations of [days in Combray or Balbec, etc.]," so that the Narrator can then say,
"with the selfish pleasure of a collector, as [he] catalogued the illustrations of [his] memory:
'I've certainly seen some beautiful things in my life."' Id. at 181. (Interestingly, Proust here
makes no distinction between a constructed and a videographic memory, see supra note 436 and
accompanying text, but one so aware of memory as Proust would hardly have thought that
voluntary memory is anything other than a gauzy derivative of the actual texture or accuracy of
past events and places. Moreover, even physical travel (back to the places conjured in the
memory field) offers no hope of recapturing time that has been lost, since it merely provokes the
illusion (according to the Narrator) that "these bygone impressions had an existence outside of
[himself]." PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 185.
465. Art, then, becomes the channel through which the Narrator will resolve a quixotic
paradox: "Impressions of the sort that I was trying to stabilize would simply evaporate if they
came into contact with a direct pleasure which was powerless to bring them into being."
2005]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the intellectual work needed to understand the force of memory.466 He is attempting to
intellectualize affective memory as the source of artistic creation, and that valiant
ambition is exactly why his writing sometimes verges on the ecstatic. 46 7 But the irony
PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 185. The savoring of these impressions,
therefore, is to understand them in their proper medium, within the self. See id. Life (and love)
are tremendously difficult to appreciate in the flux of time. Roger Shattuck captures Proust's
intent very sharply, positing that we cannot summon our entire selves into a simultaneous
existence, and that "intermittence," therefore, is "the only steady state we know." S-arrUCK,
supra note 393, at 5. We are a "succession of selves," id. at 6, and "our character [is] successive,
dependent on time to reveal itself in any depth," id. at 89. See supra note 399 (discussing
tension between narrative and episodic approaches to sensory existence). Proust, impatient and
inquisitive, is constantly obsessed with the notion that "reality" (experience) must "reside
somewhere else than in action." PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 185. It must
reside in the realm of the "extra-temporal" that surges through the experiences of involuntary
memory. Id. at 186. The task of interpreting these sensual, meta-intellectual insights strikes the
Narrator as the "making of a work of art." Id. at 187.
466. For Proust, the emotions of memory are a force that requires the application of the
intellect fully to understand (and to translate into worthwhile artistic creation). See PROUST,
Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 205. But see WrTE, supra note 24, at 143 (contending
that art, which is recollected experience, can never be accessed through reasoning or method
alone, but delivered through a process beyond the intellect's control). White is correct that
involuntary memory is an extra-intellectual experience, and Proust himself says so, but Proust
also realizes that the artifice of his novel---of any work of art-requires post-experiential
intellectual effort. Thus, Proust repeatedly mentions the dreaming state, and the frailty of
memory, and the sometimes mysterious intertwining of the real and dream worlds, as emblems
of the "purely mental nature of reality," PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 223,
the fact that our minds are the true arbiters of perception, see id. at 221. "I had lost my
grandmother in reality many months after having lost her in fact, I had seen people vary in
appearance according to the idea that I or others had of them, a single person being several
according to the people who were observing him ..... Id.
467. Again, however, Proust's experience of ecstasy must be understood as a carefully
controlled mental experiment that occurs within the artifice of his novel. It is quite different,
therefore, in temperament and construction from the "ecstatic" (and intentionally spontaneous)
medieval dervish poetry of masters such as Jelaluddin Rumi. See generally the collection
assembled in THE ESSENTIAL RuMI (Coleman Barks trans., 1995) (demonstrating how Rumi's
poetry shifts abruptly among thoughts and ideas and defies conventional notions of structure and
consistency). Rumi's lunatic versifying is atypical of literature, which is determined by the
writer's control of remembered sentiments, so that Proust's Narrator attributes to literature the
power to "reconstruct[] the demolished work of amorous illusion, giv[ing] a sort of afterlife to
feelings which [are] no longer in existence." PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at
214. Art-literature-demands a reconceptualization of "our private suffering .... in [a]
general form, which enables us to some extent to escape its grasp, makes everybody sharers in
our pain, and may even offer a kind of joy." Id. Intellectually, therefore, escape from suffering is
always possible:
Where life walls us in, the intellect cuts a way out, for although there may be no
cure for love that is not reciprocated, the investigation of one's suffering does
provide a way out, even if only by revealing its likely consequences. The
intelligence does not recognize closed situations in life, with no way out.
Id. Passion "outlines" the content of art (and of books), and intervals of repose allow the writer
to craft art (and write books), "intercalated between a number of episodes in the [writer's] life."
[Vol. 80:605
IN SEARCH OF A THEORY OF PUBLIC MEMORY
of artifice does not obscure-rather, it enhances-Proust's success at depicting the
force of personal affective memory in our inner lives. The gallery of "Proustian
moments" in the Search is an artist's rendering of the unique and complex property of
affectivity in the human psyche.
468
E. Proust's Ideology
Proust examines the mind's capacity to experience memory otherwise than through
application of strict reason.469 While a cynical view would be that Proust is offering
nothing more than warmed-over Freudian free association theory,470 his entire
argument is a resounding endorsement of the power of affective-transcendent-
memory, revealed through spontaneous recollections that elude the contingencies of
time and unite past and present in a moment of epiphany.
The choice of Proust as the exegete of memory ought not to suggest, however, that I
intend that Proust should be taken absolutely literally, as though he is a physician
documenting the pathology of a condition of the mind. True, there is irony in
describing an experience of memory that is, since it is located inside a novel, just as
constructed as the modes of memory (official, historical, and individual) considered
Id. at 217. Relying on this evidently Wordsworthian sentiment, the writer's control (the Narrator
hesitates to use the word "exploitation") of his or her past, or more particularly of the people
encountered in one's past, causes a "scrupulous" transformation into archetypes and composites,
subservient now (along with the emotions they earlier inspired) to the later production of art. Id.
at 218.
468. In a moment of ironic self-reflection, Proust (once again, in the voice of his
Narrator) allows that his aesthetic theory of transcendent recall-the sensation of the
madeleine-is implicit, indeed paradigmatic, in the works of other well-known writers. In
Chateaubriand's Minmoires d'Outre-tombe, which contains several passages of aroused
recollection, the writer's encounter with the scent of heliotrope causes him to reflect that, "in
this perfume of a new dawn... there was all the melancholy of regret, of absence and of youth."
PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 228; see also supra note 435 (addressing the
question of involuntary memory of past grief-or, as here, regret-as integral to Proust's
theory). Similarly, Baudelaire "seeks deliberately, in the scent of a woman ... the analogies
which will inspire him and evoke for him 'the azure of the sky immense and round and a harbor
full of masts and pennants."' PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 228. Invocation
of Baudelaire, a poet noted for his symbolist excesses, is the surest sign of artifice. The creation
of such "analogies" (particularly those as strained as Baudelaire's) is inherently a work of
careful post hoc composition. The Narrator actually refers to Baudelaire's "transposed
sensation" and places himself in "such a noble tradition" with respect to his soon-to-be
attempted work of creation. Id. at 229. The truly spontaneous production of art, as it happens, is
a will-o'-the-wisp chased by many modernist writers. See generally MARTIN ESSLIN, THE
THEATRE OF THE ABSURD (1980) (recounting a controversial movement in modernist French
theater that sought to use stagecraft to mimic, and to communicate, the sense of perplexity that
its authors felt when confronted with the human condition; the audience was forced to confront
actions lacking apparent motivation, characters in constant flux, and seemingly perverse and
unconnected stage happenings designed to unnerve the audience into wondering "what is going
to happen next?"). Proust is no closer to spontaneity than any of these artists.
469. See Andre Maurois, Invitation to Learning (unrehearsed broadcast with Maurois as
a guest), in MARCEL PROUST: REviEws IN ENGLISH, supra note 10, at 286, 289 (noting that, for
Proust, intuitive memory is the only true memory).
470. See Jordan, supra note 404, at 113 (making the comparison, though not cynically).
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earlier in this Article. But, as the last subsection intimates, Proust's transcendent
memory is more properly a device to convey certain realities about the intensity of
affective memory. There is a transcendence to personal memory that neither official
nor historical memory can duplicate or imitate. Since memory, most of the time, offers
very little to the imagination, it is certainly worth considering the suggestion that
Proust is not advocating that we simply wait around for the magical interventions of
involuntary memory, but rather that transcendence is a way of understanding that so
much of memory is dull and unspecific.47' Proust, then, is an artist and novelist, not a
scientist or philosopher, and his intimations of an escape from reality through
involuntary memory are a novelistic way of rendering an important truth of human
memory.472 In a sense, this is Proust's challenge to official public memory, which
assumes a kind of "anosognosia"-medically, a vanished capacity for awareness of a
disability-on the part of the populations to which it is addressed. 73
F. Conclusion
Maurice Halbwachs proposes that a different (but wholly valid) kind of socialized
memory flourishes among the collective milieus of sub-State groups, such as families,
village (and, I would add today, suburban) communities, alumni associations, and
religious sects. The lived experience of individuals in a community, Halbwachs
suggests, creates an authentic "collective" memory within each community. Halbwachs
is no doubt correct about this, but he fails to appreciate that an authentic personal
memory must include what Proust reveals as the essence of lived experience, the
affective and emotional resonance of the past. By not doing so, Halbwachs in effect
presents lived memory as denotation rather than connotation. He understands the
memory of lived experience as Proust did before he experienced the ecstasy of
transcendent memory: as sterile recall, images without the essence of experience.
To reconceptualize Halbwachs in Proustian terms, the affective memory of lived
experience, rather than the lived experience of sub-State groups, provides the most
authentic counterpoint to the dominance of official memory. This sphere of memory, as
articulated in Proust, is an autonomous condition that lies beyond the selected,
constructed, mythicized, incorporative, and presentist patterns of official public
memory. Accordingly, it is a sphere of memory that is (as Halbwachs may well have
sensed but never articulated) cognitively protected from the State. The present search
471. See COCKING, supra note 405, at 256 (seeing Proust as a guide to deeper awareness
rather than an ideologue of involuntary memory).
472. One critic has described the Proustian notion of escaping time as more properly an
artist's "figure of speech." Lucas, supra note 25, at 190. Lucas attributes the "abnormal"
intensity of Proust's own experiences-which, even for him, passed quickly-to the "mystic's
communion with the Absolute." Id. at 190-91; see also SHATrucK, supra note 393, at 123
(writing, more complexly, of Proust's "[elnfolding a real psycho-physiological experience into a
poetic-rational elucidation"). Proust, indeed, himself refers to his sensation of ecstatic recall as a
"subterfuge." PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 180; see also PAGANINI, supra
note 422, at 223 (suggesting that Proust's use of this term, and of other related terms, seems to
insist on the "suspicious" nature of involuntary memory).
473. See SHENK, supra note 353, at 120 (showing this medical usage in the context of
the cognitive disabilities of Alzheimer's disease).
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for an authentic public memory ends, therefore, with a conceptual limitation that is
intrinsically, indeed definitionally, present in the understanding of official public
memory.
CONCLUSION: THE ENDURING POWER OF AFFECTIVE MEMORY
The premise of this Article has been that there is an authentic quality of personal
memory-in effect, Proustian affective or transcendent memory-which official public
memory cannot replicate or incorporate and which, therefore, is cognitively protected
from the contrived emanations of State memory. Parts I and II presented, empirically
and theoretically, the imposture of official memory as revealed through selectivity,
constructivism, mythopoesis, and its incorporative and presentist biases. It functions as
a tool for social control, monolithic and universalist in design, apparently unopposed
by any permanent discourse that respects the autonomy of individual memory. Official
public memory imposes narratives, suppresses or incorporates counter-narratives, and
intrinsically asserts the State and its interests over the individual.
The search for an authentic theory of public memory, then, comes to this:
irrespective of the management of official memory, the sphere of a State's public
memory can never conceptually exclude the autonomous affective memory of its
individual citizens. Managed public memory reaches the conceptual limit of its power
in the face of this unique property of individual memory. Thus, when we say that the
past remains open or open-textured, 474 but always threatened by the canonical
techniques of official memory, we can now also recognize that official public memory
definitionally and ontologically must always embrace the lived experience of
individuals as reflected in their personal affective memory. And, in doing so, elite
memory must acknowledge potential contestation4 5 because official public memory
cannot conceptually mask this unique property of individual memory.
Thus, an authentic theory of public memory is neither normative (in the sense of the
continuing play of contestations advocated by Mark Osie1476 ) nor descriptive (in the
sense of the post-Westphalian challenge to official narratives that John Gillis perceives
as already in existence477). Instead, the understanding of public memory reached in this
Article recalibrates official public memory as inherently confronting the permanence of
contestation for the very reason that it lacks power conceptually to efface the affective
resonance that living individuals possess about the past.478 Halbwachs socialized
474. See supra text accompanying note 278.
475. Competing memories, in this sense, will continue to live "an unhealthy
underground existence." RICOEUR, supra note 7, at 455.
476. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing Osiel's notion of a
discursive solidarity).
477. See supra text accompanying note 186 (discussing Gillis's view of the
sacralization of the nation-State).
478. What about the passing generations? Is a State's official public memory capable of
incorporating the affective memories of its nonliving citizens? The simple answer is that the
sheer endurance of the State must inevitably impact the capacity of past generations to maintain
a contestable relationship with official memory. Halbwachs, after all, defined his collective
memory in terms of milieus that do not outlast the lifetimes of its component individual
members. See supra note 338 and accompanying text. And yet, although this discussion lies
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individual memory, but in doing so removed its signature imprint of affectivity. His
model of collective memory, therefore, effaces the individual almost as convincingly as
official memory.
In this conceptualization of public memory, the Austrian government, for example,
could never efface or incorporate the affective memory of the living victims of
Nazism. Whether or not it ever breaks the surface of State memory management, the
threat of contestation endures as a cognitive reality in the minds of individuals, beyond
the incorporative reach of official memory.479 Authentic public memory, therefore, is
likely a question of faith over fact.480 Before Proust experienced the ecstasy of the
madeleine, he thought of memory as sterile recall, images without the essence of
experience. That forensic sterility also marks the work of official public memory.
Emotional reminders, "recognition," open connections to a whole life of people and
experiences that are revivified on a Proustian plane of transcendence. This is the
fullness of memory, what Proust himself calls emotional courage.481 None of this
denies that official public memory can provide a stimulus or incitement for affective
beyond the present scope of this Article-and may require psychological as much as
jurisprudential or sociopolitical study-there are anecdotal reasons, largely drawn from the
generational shift from Holocaust survivors, to indicate that affective memory is transmissible
through the generations. See EDKINS, supra note 18, at 193 (noting a developing literature on
the "second-generation," and that "increasingly the children of [Holocaust] survivors are taking
up the torch from their parents"); see also EVA HOFFmAN, AFTER SUCH KNOWLEDGE: MEMORY,
HISTORY, AND THE LEGACY OF THE HOLOCAUST (2004) (recounting the author's own lived
experience as a member of the "hinge-generation" between experience and memory of the
Holocaust, and how the condition of her parents' wounded psyches, rather than the experience
of violence itself, has been passed down to her); Clyde Haberman, Art, Tragedy And the Eye Of
a Beholder, N.Y. TuvIMEs, Mar. 13, 2002, at B 1 (noting the clamor raised by an organization
called the International Network of Children of Jewish Holocaust Survivors in opposition to an
exhibition at the Jewish Museum in New York).
479. Thus, as Paul Ricoeur has recently argued, "a distinct place must be set aside...
for abuses, in the strong sense of the term, resulting from a concerted manipulation of memory
and of forgetting by those who hold power." RICOEUR, supra note 7, at 80 (referring to official
memory in this context as "instrumentalized memory").
480. See BORAINE, supra note 200, at 378 (recognizing that there is an alchemy that
must take place, not necessarily grounded in fact, before countries can truly heal after division).
For Germany, for example, there can be no rational State mechanism that affectively separates
the Nazi State from its post-war successor. See supra note 202 and accompanying text
(discussing legal mechanisms for doing this). While the Nazi State may indeed be perceived (by
Germans and non-Germans alike) as the evil Doppelginger of the modem democratic Federal
Republic, the appreciation of the distance traveled from Nazism is pragmatic, not an emotional
act by the German State. Germany exists in the modern world as a civilized democratic State
because it must; it exists as a State that has renounced Nazism because individuals have
achieved that metaphysical separation in their own minds. A recollection of a Holocaust of
millions of victims is a historical fact absorbed into a State narrative. The emotional
dimensionality of these massive crimes is a transcendent fact that only individuals can
appreciate, and, in this case, almost certainly only the individuals who survived that event. But
see supra note 478 (on the intergenerational transmission of some kind of affective
remembrance of the Holocaust).
481. PROUST, Finding Time Again, supra note 395, at 205 (better rendered, perhaps, in
the Mayor & Kilmartin translation as "the courage of one's emotions," see TIME REGAINED,
supra note 395, at 300).
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recall, but it is cognitively removed from the reaction it provokes-in the
encapsulating phrase of one Proustian critic, look to where the finger points, not to the
wrist.48 2 Whether the remembered event is joyous or painful, the power of Proustian
483transcendent memory lies beyond the State's power of incorporation.
EPILOGUE: FINAL REFLECTIONS ON THE LIMITs OF OFFICIAL PUBLIC MEMORY
If, indeed, there is no such thing as absolute historical truth, 4" the mythmaking role
of the State and its lawmaking apparatus can be rationally understood. It is easy to
fathom that no State has yet come to a full reckoning with its past.485 The best that can
be expected, in the view of one writer, is support of a continuing dialogue whose
honesty is tailored to the circumstances, culture, and tradition of each State.486 But
facing cascades of events and recollections, it is the task of State memory (and its
handmaiden, public law) to make of memory a fixed object, an iconic framework of
explanation,4 87 in opposition to the contestative narratives and counter-narratives that
482. See BOLLES, supra note 357, at 279 (explaining that the reminder must be
distinguished from the memory, so that analysis of the stimulus or trigger of memory (the
madeleine, for instance) will not in itself account for the reaction of memory).
483. A telling example of the survival of affective memory despite official neglect or
amnesia is provided by the survivors of the Allied napalm firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945.
After fifty-seven years, some of the survivors have begun to express themselves publicly about
the bombing which, unlike the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has never been
officially memorialized in Japan. For Japanese government leaders after 1945, remembering the
firebombing victims "could mean explaining things like the deliberate placement of war
industries in dense residential areas, or the prolongation of the war for many months after its
outcome was clear ... "Howard W. French, 100,000 People Perished, But Who Remembers?,
N.Y. TImEs, Mar. 14, 2002, at A4. Post-war Japan prioritized the cultivation of diplomatic and
commercial relations with the United States, which prevented official consideration of what one
historian calls "almost a genocidal attitude on the part of the American military, [which]
extended to the American public." Id. (quoting John Dower, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology). For one of the survivors, his strongest memory is of the Sumida River "thick with
bodies." Another survivor "began to cry as she recalled how she had fled the spreading blaze,
but was separated from her younger brother, whom [sic] she never saw again." Id.
484. A sentiment echoed by Ema Paris in her recent global study of memory. See PARls,
supra note 59, at 450 (arguing that "[w]hat matters is the way that the past-however it is
conceived-can be bent to serve the present," so that, "[a]lthough twentieth-century totalitarian
cultures perfected the art of the controlled historical lie, in varying degrees, the desire to shape
the way history is remembered is universal") (emphasis added); see also KAMMEN, supra note
84, at 3 (remarking that "critics adhering to diverse ideological persuasions have suggested that
societies in fact reconstruct their pasts rather than faithfully record them").
485. See NossrrER, supra note 59, at 16 (reflecting on the difficulties of fully exploring,
and honestly judging, the past actions of a country's leaders and significant numbers of its
citizens).
486. See id. This idealistic formulation, reminiscent of Osiel's theory of a discursive
solidarity, see supra note 180 and accompanying text, allows the interlocutor to ask whether a
country sponsored a candid accounting of its past.
487. See Hamber & Wilson, supra note 215, at 17. The authors ascribe this function
narrowly to truth commissions, which act as "performances of memory, " but it is a function that
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may seek to exploit the past, with more or less honorable motives, for particular
constituencies or groups.488
Currently prevailing scholarly views on impunity and postconflict justice would
likely question this use of public law (and the attendant amnesty power) to fix a
collective idea of the past in transitional or post-conflict societies.489 But against that
must be set the offical agenda of rapid closure, the desire to build a new post-conflict
society that is not overwhelmed by the burdens of memory, even if that means
sloughing off the past too easily, and asking survivors to engage in closure before all
the psychological processes of truth and recompense could possibly be fully
internalized.4 9 And for those successor elites who have inherited a preserved juristic
talisman (in Austria, for example, the 1943 and 1955 expressions of Allied support of
Austria's alleged victimhood during the Nazi occupation4 91), the very existence of a
constitutional or legislative artifact may insulate them for a long time from the charge
of imposturous tampering with the past. They can limit themselves to commemoration
and, if threatened by counter-narrative forces, to the kind of cautious, technical, and
legalistic realignment of the dominant narrative that has lately been attempted in
Austria.
What this Article has demonstrated, however, is that the construct of official public
memory is ontologically unable to incorporate-and thereby to neutralize-the
transcendent experience of individual affective memory. The difference between these
two conceptualizations is absolute. The incorporative device of a truth commission, for
example, calls to mind Michael Ignatieff's warning against the dangers of linking
humanistic metaphors to the power of the State, as if a whole society could "come
awake" after trauma in the same way that an individual sometimes does.492 And
has also been discharged (as in the case of Austria) by the more typical operations of public law
and governance.
488. Elites, it might be said, are not interested in doing what history does and
individuals can hardly avoid doing, namely, problematizing the past. And this quest for a
buoyant perspective on the past is especially perplexing, Eric Foner suggests, because history
has so few "unambiguously festive conclusions." FONER, supra note 3, at 191 (mentioning
William Dean Howells's remark that "what the American public always wants is a tragedy with
a happy ending").
489. See generally Kent Greenawalt, Amnesty's Justice, in TRuTH V. JUSTICE 189
(Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000) (attempting to construct a narrow model for
the grant of amnesty by truth commissions---excluding, for example, amnesty from civil liability
to victims or surviving relatives). But, as noted above, see supra text accompanying note 215,
even truth commissions, as emanations of the State, necessarily work to "fix" a collective
remembrance. The output of truth commissions itself becomes part of a new master narrative,
and the absorption of victims' stories into this master narrative pursues the overarching public
goal of assuring social stability.
490. See Hamber & Wilson, supra note 215, at 13.
491. See supra text accompanying note 31 (discussing Austria's externally-supported
aspiration to victimhood status after the Second World War).
492. See Ignatieff, supra note 215, at 121 (arguing that "[tlhe only coming awake that
makes sense... is one by one, individual by individual, in the recesses of their own identities").
But see RICOEUR, supra note 7, at 78 (insisting on the "analogical" sense of a "collective"
trauma, but observing also "a direct analysis" of wounds to collective memory in losses that
affect the power, territory, and populations of a State, notably in "[m]ourning behaviors" such as
the "great funeral celebrations around which an entire people is assembled"). (On the question
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Ignatieff appears to find it conceptually inappropriate to conflate political leadership
with the mysterious process of coming to terms with the past.493
Nor, indeed, can the law itself mimic affectivity. James Boyd White appears to
disagree, writing that law translates "mute and inexpressible experience to another
plane, where it acquire[s] significance of a new kind. It [is] a way of giving meaning to
life." 494 Words are, of course, highly potent, and in their existence as parasites of
thought4 95 they resonate from their use in the law (as noticed in the nomenclature of the
"Patriot Act"496). But Boyd White overlooks the critical understanding that the
movement toward new significance is necessarily an abstracting one, a depersonalizing
top-down effort at striking a communal tone.497 The mute and inexpressible experience,
which is properly the individual's affective recall of a past emotional environment
(whether it be joy, pain, grief, or fury49S), cannot accurately be recoded into the
abstract verbalizing of legal process.49
of the analogical relationship (or transfer) that connects collective memory to individual
consciousness, see id. at 119-20, finding that the transfer allows the prerogatives of individual
memory ("mineness, continuity, the past-future polarity") to apply also to collectivities.)
493. See Ignatieff, supra note 215, at 122 (recognizing, however, that individuals with
political authority may have a potentially large influence on the process of healing).
494. JAMES BOYD WaroE, THE EDGE OF MEANING 220 (2001) (quoting a passage of his
own juvenilia, but not repudiating it, in which White imagines the law to be a medium for
giving voice to language out of silence, or what is said out of what could not be said).
495. See FIGGis, supra note 124, at 12 (observing that words, acquiring connotation,
'cling to the mind long after their original uses are forgotten").
496. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing the adoption and meaning of
the Patriot Act in the United States).
497. Halbwachs, too, is doubtful that the law offers affective relief, calling it "a very
mundane practice which considers individuals and their relations from the outside and tends to
be frozen into formulas and reduced to a mechanical application of rules." HALBWACHS, ON
COLLECTIVE MEMORY, supra note 9, at 127 (arguing that "[aull laws are based on [general]
classification[s] of people, actions, situations, and objects according to various external
characteristics. Law's suppleness as a mechanism for abstract categorization is precisely what
commends it to the creators of official memory"). See supra note 242 and accompanying text
(discussing law's ontology as a system a posteriori).
498. See WHrrE, supra note 494, at 220 (proposing that law articulates "the wrenching
pain of the broken arm, the grief of the parent, the fury of the cheated man").
499. As an alternative to the confined sphere of State memory work, Avishai Margalit
posits a universal ethical community that would operate as a worldwide community of memory
in recollection of conspicuous evil. See MARGALr, supra note 7, at 71,78 (projecting a utopian
vision of shaping humanity to retain a common sense of memory of the "warning signposts in
human moral history" including enslavement, deportations, and mass exterminations, as in the
Gulags, Treblinka, or Hiroshima). But utopian universalism (which would require, as Margalit
acknowledges, establishment of "thick" relations of caring among humanity at large, see supra
note 342 (discussing Margalit's concepts of"thick" and "thin" community relations)), is among
the weakest of concepts in formulating a theory of memory. See MARGALrr, supra note 7, at 81-
82 (arguing that the German people, for example, should not try to project their remembrance of
the Holocaust into a remembrance for all humanity, but to "reestablish themselves as an ethical
community, encumbered with painful shared memories"). For Margalit, the most promising
projects of shared memory are those that travel through natural communities of memory. See
supra note 342 (discussing these communities). The memory of evil is a simple postulate, but
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The quest for a new theory of public memory, therefore, takes us to an
understanding that official public memory is, at bottom, an exercise of limited power.
Anxiety about the coagulating effects of government power-the endurance of the
findings of a truth commission, the specific outcome of a criminal trial, the persistence
of a doctrine of national victimology-must be counterpointed by the reassurance that
personal affective memory is always there, and always capable of generating
contestation and (eventually) of defeating incorporation. 5°° What we are presented
with, either astonishingly or intuitively, is a natural limit on government control of the
individual.
Margalit's theory relies on the very thin connections that individuals form with one another
outside the natural communities of memory embraced by Halbwachs.
500. Jenny Edkins, in a recent study, seeks to reconstitute voiceless humanity-the
categories of victims that she terms "bare life"-in opposition to the hegemonizing tendencies
of the sovereign State. See EDKINS, supra note 18, at 18 (borrowing the phrase "bare life" from
the work of Giorgio Agamben). In Edkins's construct, Holocaust victims and battlefield soldiers
are among the representatives of "bare life":
Bearing witness is an aggressive act. It is born out of refusal to bow to outside
pressure to revise or repress experience, a decision to embrace conflict rather than
conformity, to endure a lifetime of anger and pain rather than to submit to the
seductive pull of revision and repression. Its goal is change. If survivors retain
control over the interpretation of their trauma, they can sometimes force a shift in
the social and political structure.
Id. at 191 (citation omitted). Inevitably, Edkins's position is problematic, since in order to bear
witness, the victims are required to transcend the necessary inscription of their lives within the
logic of the State system. See id. at 213 (conceding that "[g]enerally, bearing witness is
normalised, categorised and appropriated"). Nevertheless, she advocates non-violent forms of
resistance, including refusal by former soldiers to participate in State commemorations (as
occurred in Britain after World War I), reclamation by the citizenry of public monumental
spaces (as in Tiananmen Square in 1989), or private acts of monument-building (such as the
veteran-financed construction of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C.). See id.
at 214. I am unsure as to whether such a program for "de-scripting" victims from the grasp of
sovereign power can be laid out as Edkins seeks to do, but her idea (indeed her optimism) is
surely latent in the construct of affective memory. The present Article offers a theoretical
explanation, presented humanistically, that seeks to set a predictable limit to (if not always to
overcome) the conceptual reach of the State and its legal and policy processes as makers of
memory.
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